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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis presents and analyses the legal dispositions concerning the European 
Court o f Auditors. The Court is the institution responsible for the external audit in the 
European Union. After a short presentation of the Court's historical background, there is 
an examination o f this institution's structure. Provisions regarding its Members, 
Personnel and Internal Organisation are analysed in an attempt to assess the Court's 
structural framework 
An analysis of the Court's mission, namely to examine all the accounts 
(revenue/expenditure) of the Communities and o f all bodies set up or simply financed by 
them, is next. The analysis focuses on the audit regarding the regularity/legality of the 
transactions and the soundness o f the financial management. The method used for these 
audits, called the "systems based approach" is presented and explained. The reporting 
activities o f the Court (Annual Report, Statement o f Assurance, Special Reports), being 
of essential importance since they include the findings of the Court along with the replies 
of the audited institutions, are given much attention. Because o f its competences the 
Court is a major player in the battle against fraud in the Communifies and its role in that 
issue is also assessed. 
The thesis includes also an examination of the Court's auditing competences 
regarding expenditure for the second and third pillar o f the European Union. 
The collaboration between the Court and the other institutions (Commission, 
Parliament, Council, European Investment Bank) is presented, focusing on the 
possibihties o f improving it. 
The dependence of the Court on the assistance of the National Audit Institutions 
o f the Member States, especially regarding on the spot checks is highlighted along with 
other aspects o f their collaboration. 
The Court's estimations regarding the poHcies of the European Union (Common 
Agricultural Policy, Structural Policies, Measures outside the Union) are also included. 
Finally, the institutional nature of the Court is discussed and proposals regarding 
granting the Court judicial authority and restructuring it are made. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
I t was on 19 September 1946, when Winston Churchill, in a speech in Zurich, 
suggested the foundation o f the "United States of Europe". This suggestion was not a 
new idea since in February 1848, a French newspaper called "Le Moniteur" had 
presented an idea about a united Europe.' But Churchill's speech had a very large 
impact. After the Second World War, the European Nations were seeking a way to 
establish peace in the tormented and practically destroyed continent. Churchill's idea 
came as a response to this wish and activated a chain reaction. 
In 1950, the French Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, in a speech 
written by his consultant Jean Monnet, suggested the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, presenting a fully developed plan for this idea. And on 18 April 1951 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris by 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. During the fifties 
many attempts were made to establish a European Political Community but they were 
unsuccessful. The result was the creation of the European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community. The respective Treaties were signed in Rome on 
25 March 1957 by the same states that have founded the European Coal and Steel 
Community. 
Like every organization, the European Communities have their system of audit of 
financial management. This system has been amended repeatedly throughout the years. 
The reason for these amendments has been that the finances of the European 
Communities have developed dramatically, especially after the continuous enlargements 
of the Communities and the provision for the creation of the European Union in the 
Treaty o f Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1992. The actions taken within the 
' T. Judt, A Grand Illusion? An essay on Europe, Penguin Books Publications, 1997, p. 6. 
framework o f the various policies included in the three pillars of the Union (European 
Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Cooperation in the Filed of Justice 
and Home Affairs) involve an enormous number of transactions that must be controlled. 
Currently, it can be said that there are four levels of audit in the European Union's audit. 
First, there is the internal control performed by the insfitufions that are actually 
performing the financial activities, namely the Commission.^ The 20* (XX) Directorate 
General o f the Commission is responsible for the financial control of the actions taken by 
the Commission within its executive competence. The Commission also is responsible for 
the ex ante examination of the Union's acfions in order to see whether the funding of 
these actions has been reassured, within the framework of the Union's budgetary 
discipline. Secondly, there is the external audit, performed by the European Court of 
Auditors. Thirdly, there is the parliamentary audit, performed by the European 
Parliament. There is a parliamentary committee charged with the control of the 
implementation o f the Union's budget. The Parliament also discharges the Commission in 
respect o f the implementafion o f the budget.^ The fourth kind of audit is the audit 
performed by the audit insfitutions of the Member States with regard to the revenue and 
expenditure o f the Union. This audit, although being performed on a national level, is 
very interesfing for the Union because the national audit institufions have a very good 
idea o f the European resources' management in their respecfive countries. So, such an 
audit could be characterized as "decentralized audit" of the European Union's financial 
management. After all, the audit institutions of the Member States have developed a 
good working relationship with the audit institutions of the European Union. 
Al l o f the above levels of audit have their importance in the financial 
management's system of the European Union. But it is commonly accepted that external 
" For a detailed analysis of the Commission's system of internal control see Annual Report of the Court 
of Auditors for the Financial Year 1988, OJ 1989, C-312/37. 
^ Art. 206(1) [276(1)] of the EC Treaty. 
audit is essential in an organization because it ensures the effective management of public 
money and the accountability o f those who make decisions about it.'* And the competent 
institution for such an audit is the European Court of Auditors. 
I . Harden, F. Wliite, K. Donnelly, The Court of Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability in 
the European Community, EurPL, Vol. 1, p. 599-632 (626). 
Chapter One 
Background and Structure 
A. Historical Background 
The historical development of the European Court o f Auditors (referred to 
throughout this text as ECA or the Court) has not been exactly parallel with the 
respective development o f the European Communities. In 1951 when the dream of Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman was realized in Paris with the signing of the Treaty for the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later in 1957 in Rome with the signing 
of the Treaty for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaty for the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), there was no provision for a Court of 
Auditors. 
Initially, the audit of accounts was carried out within each Community.' The 
financial control bodies instituted by the original Treaties comprised the Audit Board for 
the EEC and Euratom plus the ECSC Auditor. 
The Audit Board was set up by Art. 206 of the EEC Treaty and Art. 180 of the 
Euratom Treaty. Both articles had the same wording: 
"The accounts of all revenue and expenditure shown in the budget shall be 
examined by an Audit Board consisting of auditors whose independence is 
beyond doubt, one of whom shall be chairman". 
This Board covered both Communities and the number of its members was 
determined by an unanimous decision of the Council, which also appointed the auditors 
and the chairman for a period of five years.^ Initially there were six members (in 1973 
they became nine) one of each Member state, appointed on a part-time basis, and the 
' D. O' Keeffe, The Court of Auditors, in D. Curtin, T. Heukels, (ed.), Institutional Dynamics of 
European Integration-Essays in Honour of H. G. Schermers, Vol. I I , Martinus Nijholf, 1994, p. 177-194, 
(177). 
" D. Strasser, The Finances of Europe, Office for Official Publications of tlie European Communities, 
1991, p. 270. 
Board had a staff o f only 25.^ The Board did not publish its reports, which instead were 
sent to the auditee, the Commission, the Council and to the European Parliament for 
informafion alone while there was little follow-up by the Council of the Audit Board 
observations.'* 
With regard to the ECSC Auditor, the original ECSC Treaty in Art. 78(6) stated 
that 
"The Council shall appoint an auditor for a term of three years, which shall he 
renewable. He shall he completely independent in the performance of his duties. 
The office of the auditor shall he incompatihle with any other office in any 
institution or service of the Community ". 
This provision was changed by Art. 21 of the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965, 
which instituted two new external bodies: first, an Audit Board which was to examine 
the accounts o f all ECSC administrative expenditure included in the general budget (new 
Art. 78d o f the ECSC Treaty) and secondly, an auditor whose audit was to relate solely 
to the operafional expenditure and revenue of the ECSC (new Art. 78e), his original 
status being preserved in other respects.^ Thus the ECSC was audited for both its 
operational acfivity and its administrative acfivity.*^ 
At the same time the Merger Treaty included provisions concerning the 
replacement o f all the audit institutions of the Communities. More specifically. Art. 22 of 
the Merger Treaty created the "Audit Board of the European Communifies" to replace 
all the Audit Boards of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom and to 
"exercise under the conditions laid down m the Treaties estabhshing the three 
Communities the powers and jurisdiction conferred on those bodies by the 
Treaties ". 
^ T. M . James, The Court of Auditors of the European Communities and the external audit bodies of the 
Member States in Honorary Volume for the 150 years of tlie Greek Court of Audit, Athens 1984, p 469-
486 (470, note 6) & National Audit Office, State Audit in the European Union, London 1996, p. 220. 
^ National Audit Office, op. c i t , p.220. 
^ D. Strasser, op. cit., p. 270. 
'^Ibid, p. 273. 
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The Audit Board o f the European Communities had as its main task the 
production o f a report.' After the examination of this report, the Council and the 
Parliament o f the Communities were to give to the Commission a discharge in respect of 
the implementation o f the budget.^ So, the audit flinction of the Board was a part of the 
annual discharge decision system.^ 
This first institutional audit scheme, could not control, to an acceptable extent 
and depth, the continuously developing finances of the Communities. Developments like 
the adoption o f the "Own Resources" system by the Communities, on 22 April 1970 with 
the Treaty o f Luxembourg, or the several problems noted during the application of the 
Treaties' provisions about external financial control, persuaded those at the functional 
and structural levels o f the Communities to see the necessity o f creating an independent 
organization to perform the external control of the budget's implementation. Indeed, the 
Audit Board was inadequate to cope with the constantly changing condifions of the 
Communities' finances. This resulted in several long delays in the producfion of the 
Board's report, something that has given rise to much parliamentary criticism.'" The 
Board itself had pointed out two major reasons that prevented it from being effective:" 
First, the narrow interpretation o f its auditing powers. I t is true that the Treafies did not 
define them clearly, enabling the institutions subjected to audit, and mainly the 
Commission, to interpret them narrowly (one of the main problems was that according to 
that narrow interpretation the Board could not begin the audit of the accounts until these 
have been closed) and thus the Board had been reluctant to give an extensive 
' For a complete description of tliis Board's duties, see the Financial Regulation of 1973, 01 1973, L-
116/1. 
^ Art. 206 (4) of the EEC Treaty, Art. 78d of the ECSC Treaty and Art. 180 (4) of the Euratom Treaty as 
amended by the Treaty of Luxembourg, 22.4 .1970. 
^ G. Isaac, La renovation des institutions financieres des Communautes Europeenes depuis 1970, Vol. 
13, Rev. Trim. Dr. Europ., (1977), p. 736-810 (780). 
F. Wooldridge, M . Sassela, Some recent legal provisions increasing the budgetarj' powers of the 
European Parliament, and establishing a European Court of Auditors, LIEI (1976/2), p. 13-52 (14. note 
9). 
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interpretafion to the meaning o f the term "sound financial management", showing too 
much deference to the views o f the Commission.'^ For example in 1971 the Commission 
issued a general instrucfion to its services, the practical consequence of which was to 
give the right to these services to limit the interventions o f the Board of Auditors on 
issues that the services themselves had determined.'^ Secondly, the financial operations 
of the Communities had started by the late 1960s to be performed not by the 
Communities' services and agents but by the respective authorities of the public 
administrations o f the Member States. The expenditure caused in this way could not be 
controlled, since the Treaties did not include any provisions about on-the-spot audits by 
the Audit Board in the Member States. The main volume of this expenditure was related 
to the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF)-Guarantee 
Section while other expenditure related to the European Social Fund (ESF) or to the 
Guidance Section o f the EAGGF was monitored by the Commission through the general 
accounts sent to i t . ' ' ' Several times the Commission was satisfied just by the internal audit 
procedures carried out by its own services and in that case (of internal control) the Audit 
Board could not interfere unless the Commission's services allowed it to do so.'^ And 
with regard to the follow-up o f the Audit Board's remarks, this body complained that 
they remained "a dead letter".'*' 
But these were not the only reasons that made the Audit Board less efficient in its 
resuhs. According to the Rules concerning this body its members could not take 
instructions f rom governments or other bodies (Art. 4), they could not undertake any 
other Community activity (Art. 5) and they could be dismissed from their office by the 
" Report on the accounts for the financial year 1970 (p. 192 and so on) & Report on the accounts for the 
financial year 1971 (p. 188 and so on). 
F. Wooldridge, M . Sassela, op. cit., p.21 & G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 785, 786. 
G. Isaac, op. c i t , p.785. 
'"^  F. Wooldridge, M . Sassela, op. cit., p.21 & G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 788, note 238. 
G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 789. 
Report on the accounts for the financial year 1971, p. 169. 
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European Court o f Justice (ECJ) i f sufficient cause was found(Art. 7). But in these 
limitations there was no provision preventing the members of the Board from engaging in 
outside non-Community work, creating serious doubts about their independence.'^ But 
besides the problem of indepemdence, this situafion had practical negative effects since 
the auditors, being engaged in other duties, could not dedicate much time to the audit of 
the Communities, transforming it into a part-time occupation with all the consequences 
that follows. Additionally, because of their limited personnel (only 25 persons based in 
Brussels and 5 based in Luxembourg-the latter were the ECSC auditors), they had to do 
most o f their work on the Commission's files in Brussels and Luxembourg.'^ All this 
considered, it is easily understandable why the Audit Board could not keep up with the 
development o f the Communities' finances. The Audit Board itself had pointed out the 
necessity o f being able to perform on-the-spot audits in the Member States" It also 
made an attempt in that direction by making agreements with several Member States 
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France) to allow it to perform on-the-spot audit 
concerning the EAGGF. In general though, the audit performed by the Audit Board 
was more o f a purely formal ex post audit of expenses based on checking the supporting 
vouchers.^' 
Under these circumstances, the demand for a more complete audit in the 
European Communities finances became more and more persistent. There have been two 
principal factors, besides the Board's ineffectiveness, that accelerated the procedure for a 
reform in the financial system of the Communities. The first one was the enlargement of 
the Communities in 1973 by the admission of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
because these three countries have a strong tradition of independent public sector 
" F. Wooldridge, M . Sassela, op. cit., p.21. 
Sir N . Price, The Court of Auditors of the European Communities, YBEL, Vol. 2, 1982, p. 239-248 
(239). 
Report on the accounts for the financial year 1974, p. 10. 
-° G. Isaac, op, cit., p. 789-790. 
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auditing the results o f which are conveyed in reports which are closely examined by the 
Parliaments. I t was logical that the other existing Member states, which considered the 
then auditing system of the Communities as less than adequate, would cooperate with the 
new ones in order to strengthen it.^^ The second factor was the European Parliament's 
growing pressure to have a greater role in the financial affairs of the Communities.^^ In 
order to do that, the Parliament recognized that it would need the critical comments of 
an independent body on the financial activities and that a strong audit presence would be 
the means o f making this available.^'' 
The Parliament's first attempt was to try to increase the powers of the Audit 
Board. In February 1973 an amendment was tabled proposing that the Board should 
adopt special reports and opinions besides the annual report, not only upon request by 
the Council or the Parliament (as Art. 90 o f the then Financial Regulation stated) but also 
on its own initiative, something that the Commission did not accept.^^ The Parliament's 
second move was to propose the replacement of the Audit Board with a European Court 
o f Auditors on the analogy of the national Courts of Auditors of the Member states. 
The Chairman of the ParUament's Sub-Committee (now it is a full Committee) on 
^' D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 178. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 239, & A.G. Toth, The 0>dbrd Encyclopaedia of European Community Law, 
Vol I : Institutional Law, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 144. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 239 & A.G. Toth, op. cit., p. 144. For a detailed analysis of the Parliament's 
positions concerning its involvement in the budgetary proceedings tliroughout tlie years and the other 
institutions' point of view see F. Wooldridge, M . Sassela, op. cit., p. 13-43, G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 737-775, 
M . R. Emerson/T. W. K. Scoot, The financial Mechanism in the Budget of the European Community: 
The hard core of the British re-negotiations of 1974-1975, CMLRev, Vol. 14, 1977, p. 209-225, Sir. Ch. 
Sopwitli, Legal Aspects of the Community Budget, CMLRev, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 315-347, P. Dankert, 
The Joint Declaration by the Community institutions of 30 June 1982 on the Community Budgetary' 
Procedure, CMLRev, Vol. 20, 1983, p. 701-712, H. Wallace, A budget made in Strasbourg and unmade 
in Luxembourg, YBEL, Vol. 6, 1986, p. 263-282, P. Zangil, The interinstitutional agreement on 
Budgetary Discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure, CMLRev, Vol. 26, 1989, p. 675-
685, G. Isaac, L ' encadrement a moyen terme des finances publiques communautaires. L ' Accord 
interinstitutionnel sur la discipline budgetaire et 1' amelioration de la procedure budgetaire. Bilan et 
avenir, RFFP, No 45, 1994, p. 9-49. 
SirN. Price, op. cit,, p. 240. 
G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 790-791. 
Resolution of 9 May 1973 on problems connected with the practical arrangements for the Audit 
Board's performance of its duties, OJ 1973, C-37/42. This idea though was much older as it had been 
expressed in the Parliament's Resolution of 24 September 1964, OJ 1964, C-153. 
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Budgetary Control, M r H . Aigner expressed the Parliament's view in a booklet entitled 
"The Case for a European Audit Office" published in September 1973. The Commission 
in its proposal to amend the Treaties (June and October 1973) accepted the 
strengthening o f the Parliament's budgetary powers, but did not propose anything else 
on terminating the post of the ECSC Auditor^^ (which was functioning outside the 
framework o f the Audit Board). On 4 June 1974 the Council issued joint guidelines 
modifying the Commission's proposals. These included amendments to Articles 203, 
204, 205a, 206, 209 of the EEC Treaty, and the establishment of a Court of Auditors 
(replacing the Audit Board and the ECSC Auditor), something which the Commission 
saw no reason to oppose.^^ The draft o f the Treaty concerning among other matters the 
establishment o f a European Court of Auditors (ECA) had been the subject of 
negotiations between the three institutions^^, but in everything that concerns the 
provisions on the ECA, there had been no important disagreement. 
Thus, on 22 July 1975, the Treaty "amending certain financial dispositions of the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty instituting a single 
Council and a single Commission o f the European Communities", also known as the 
Second Budget Treaty, was signed in Brussels, establishing in Article 15 a European 
Court o f Auditors (Articles 206 of the EEC Treaty, 78e of the ECSC Treaty and 180 of 
the Euratom Treaty as amended by the Second Budget Treaty).''" 
D. Strasser, op. cit, p. 270 & F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p. 19-20. 
F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p.21-22 & D. Strasser, op. cit., p.270. 
See F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p. 22-23 for more details. 
°^ From now on and in order to reduce the mentioning of too many articles of the Treaties (especially 
after the Maastricht and Amsterdam amendments) that might be very confusing, reference will be made 
mainly to tlie articles of only the E C Treaty since tlie context of these articles is exactly the same with 
tlie context of the respective articles of the E C S C Treaty and the Euratom Treaty. The articles of these 
two Treaties will be mentioned and analyzed only in case that their context is different than the context 
of the E C Treaty. Also throughout the text, it is used the numbering of die Treaties' articles as modified 
after tlie Maastricht Treaty and the numbering modifications of the Treaty of Amsterdam are mentioned 
in square brackets. The numbering of the articles of die Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 used 
in the text, is according to the consolidated version of the Regulation as issued on 20 December 1996 by 
the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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B. The Structure of European Court of Auditors 
I. Members 
According to Art. 188b(l) [247(1)] of the EC Treaty'\ as amended by the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, 
"The Court of Auditors shall consist of fifteen members ". 
There is no provision in the Treaty concerning the nationality of the members of 
the ECA^^ but in practice each Member state "is represented" by a member of the 
ECA.^^ I t has been suggested to adopt the Commission's proposal, to include in the 
provisions about the ECA a disposition like the one of Art. 165 (4) [221(4)] of the EC 
Treaty about the possibility of the Council to increase the members of the European 
Court o f Justice upon request o f the Court itself^'* 
The article Art. 188b(3) [247(3)] provides that 
"The members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed for a term of six 
years by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament. 
However, when the first appointments are made, four members of the Court of 
Auditors, chosen by lot, shall be appointed for a term of office of four years 
only. 
The members of the Court of Auditors shall be eligible for reappointment". 
When this provision was applied for the first time, in 1977, it constituted a very 
important point in the history o f the Communities' institutions, since for the first time the 
Council asked the Parliament to give its opinion on the appointment of members of a 
'^ According to Art. Z . l of the Treaty of the European Union, the tenn European Economic Coininunit>' 
(EEC) is replaced by the term European Community (EC) tlnoughout the text of the E E C Treat)'. 
On tlie contrary, in Art. 2 of the Rules of the Audit Board it was required that only nationals of 
Member States may act as auditors. See F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p. 44. 
G. Th. Tenekidis, Members of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, HelRevEL, 
2/1981, p. 623-624, P. D. Dagtoglou, European Community Law, A. N. Sakkoulas Publications, 1985, 
p. 292-293, K. Stefanou, European Integration, A. N. Sakkoulas Publications, 1991, p.71,1. Harden, F. 
Wliite, K. Domielly, op. cit, p.609, note 47, & D. 0' Keefife, op. cit, p. 179. 
'^^  G. Isaac, op. cit, p. 794 & G. Th. Tenekidis, op. cit., p. 623. 
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(quasi) institution.^^ The system of appointment of ECA members is completely different 
f rom that o f the members of the Commission or the European Court of Justice.^ *' This 
has supported the opinion that the ECA was not an institution of the Communities. Right 
f rom the beginning, in 1973, the Commission had suggested that the members of the 
ECA should be appointed by a common agreement of the governments of the Member 
States. The Council, however, had rejected this proposal and proposed the current 
provision, stating that the Parliament's opinion would be seriously considered.As it has 
been noted though, according to Art. 188(3) [247(3)] the Parliament has no right to veto 
a candidate and its views have been ignored on occasions.Despite that, the Parliament 
is exercising its right o f consuhation at this stage, examining each of the proposed 
candidates thoroughly and not hesitating to express its disapproval of any candidate it 
considers to be unsuitable.There have been parliamentary Resolutions outlining the 
procedures and criteria used in forming opinion about the suitability of a candidate.'"' 
These Resolutions accused the Member States of having nominated unsuitable 
candidates and the Council of having made appointments without always having due 
regard to the professional competence and independence of members that are required by 
the Treaties.'*' This is a good indication that consulting with the Parliament in order to 
appoint the ECA members ensures that the criteria set by the Treaties are actually met 
and the governments o f the Member States are thoughtful before making a nomination.''^ 
~^ Detailed presentation of die proceedings held by the Parliament on that occasion see in G. Isaac, Les 
Finances Communautaires, Rev. Trim. Dr. Europ., Vol. 16, 1980, p. 302-353 (347-348). Whether the 
E C A was an institution of the Communities before 1993 or not, will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
The other two institutions whose members are appointed but by agreement between the Member 
States. See Art. 158(2) [214(2)] and 167 [223] of the E C Treaty. 
G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 794-795. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 220. 
P. Graig, Gr. De Burca, E C LAW, Text, Cases and Materials, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 88. 
""^  See for instance the Resolution of 17 November 1992 on the procedure for consulting tlie European 
Parliament on the appointment of Members of the Comi of Auditors, OJ 1992, C-337/51. 
1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit, p. 609-610. 
D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 180. 
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I t is generally considered unorthodox for the ECA members not to be appointed 
through the same mechanism as the members of the Commission and the European Court 
o f Justice.'^ ^ Especially after the amendments made by the Maastricht Treaty regarding 
the ECA's institutional status. Maintaining this appointing method for the ECA members 
has been seen -correctly from a point o f view- as an implication that the ECA is not 
considered to be as important as the Commission and the European Court of Justice.'*'' 
As a final remark, it is obvious that the special provision concerning the first 
appointments was made in order to assure the continuance o f the ECA function and to 
avoid the case o f a simultaneous end o f all the members' term of office.''^ 
The qualifications o f the ECA's members are stated as follows in Art. 188b(2) 
[247(2)]: 
"The members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among persons 
who belong or have belonged in their respective countries to external audit 
bodies or who are especially qualified for this office. Their independence must 
be beyond doubt.". 
From these provisions it seems that mainly two qualifications are necessary for 
the appointment: a) suitability for the office and b) independence.'"^ These qualifications, 
which must exist before the appointment, are common to appointment in other similar 
bodies. But in order to reassure the ECA's independent and unhindered function there 
are also the following provisions: Art. 188(4) [247(4)]: 
"The members of the Court of Auditors shall, in the general interest of the 
Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. 
In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions 
from any government offrom any other body. They shall refrain from any action 
incompatible with their duties. " 
Art. 188(5) [247(5)]: 
Ibid, p. 179. 43 -
Ibid, p. 179. 
P. Lelong, La Cour des Coiiiptes des Comniunautes et le controle externe des finances publiques 
europeenes, RFFP, No 4, 1983, p. 99-118 (101) & G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 
795 
""^  P. D. Dagtoglou, op. cit., p. 293, 
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"The members of the Court of Auditors may not, during their term of office, 
engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon 
their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after 
their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in 
particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the 
acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or 
benefits." 
These dispositions are based on the experience of the fianction of the Audit 
Board. The disposition o f Art. 188(5) [247(5)] aims to guarantee the independence of 
ECA, but also to establish the ful l time occupation of ECA members, preventing the 
repetition o f the Audit Board's precedent, the members of which could undertake other 
occupations, becoming thus part-time auditors for the Communities.'*^ It is also 
noteworthy that ECA members, according to Art. 188(4) [247(4)] will perform their 
duties having as guidance the general interest of the Communities. I t is one of the few 
times that the Treaties refer to the Communifies' interest. The fact that this reference is 
done within the dispositions concerning the ECA is a very significant indication of the 
Court's importance in the European institutional system. 
The termination of the duties o f an ECA member is regulated by the following 
provisions: Art. 188b(6) [247(6)]: 
"Apart from normal replacement or death, the duties of a member of the Court 
of Auditors shall end when he resign.s, or is compulsorily retired by a ruling of 
the Court of Justice pursuant to paragraph 7. 
The vacancy thus caused shall be filled for the remainder of the member's term 
of office. 
Save in the case of compulsory retirement, members of the Court of Auditors 
shall remain in office until they have been replaced. " 
Art. 188b(7) [247(7)]: 
"A member of the Court of Auditors may be deprived of his office or his right to 
a pension or other benefits in its stead only if the Court of Justice, at the request 
of the Court of Auditors, finds that he no longer fidfills the requisite conditions 
or meets the obligations arising from this office. " 
47 G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 796, F. Wooldringe/M. Sassela, op. cit, p.45 & T. 
M. James, op. cit, p. 471 . 
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These dispositions strengthen the guarantees provided by the Treaty of the 
ECA's independence. The Court o f Auditors itself is competent to determine whether its 
members are meeting the Treaty's conditions. I t can ask the ECJ to remove whoever 
should not be a member o f the ECA. I t is noteworthy that the Treaty practically states 
the exact context o f the decision of the ECJ"^ ("...finds that he no longer fulfills the 
requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from this office ") giving thus the 
impression that the ECJ will not do anything else but simply declare the unsuitability of 
the person involved and deprive the person of the office. The fact that only the ECA can 
ask for such a removal highlights its independence.''^ 
A provision with a purely administrative and procedural character is contained in 
Art. 188b(8) [247(8)]: 
"The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall determine the conditions of 
employment of the President and the members of the Court of Auditors and in 
particular their salaries, allowances and pensions. It shall also, by the same 
majority, determine any payment to be made instead of remuneration. " 
Art. 188b(9) [247(9)] stipulates that: 
"The provisions of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
European Communities apphcable to the Judges of the Court of Justice shall 
also apply to the members of the Court of Auditors. " 
The importance o f this disposition will be assessed when the nature of the ECA 
as an institution o f the European Union will be examined. 
Some other dispositions concerning details about the exact procedure for the 
appointment o f ECA members and how they must perform their duties are included in 
the Internal Regulation'" of the Court. In Art. 2 it is stated that the term of office of the 
ECA members starts from the date mentioned in the appointment's Decision or i f there is 
no such date, f rom the date of that Decision. The oath of ECA members is regulated by 
''^  G. D. Drisis, From the European Idea to the New Europe of Maastricht, Athens 1995, p. 95. 
D. O'Keeffe, op. cit., p. 181. 
°^ Internal Regulation of the European Court of Auditors, as approved by the Court on 21st of May 1981 
and modified on 27* of January 1994. (Not published in the OJ) 
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Art. 3 according to which newly appointed members, before assuming their duties or 
immediately after that, must undertake the obligations stated in Treaties. These 
obligations are described mainly in Art. 188b(4) [247(4)] and the oath given each time by 
the new members is based on this article.^' The members o f the ECA can be temporarily 
replaced in case o f absence by one or more temporary members according to the 
provisions o f Art. 12. Also, as Art. 13 provides, members may authorize members of 
staff o f the Court to sign on their behalf and responsibility any document concerning the 
sector for which this member is competent. The only exception to the rule is mentioned 
in Art. 14, according to which in everything that concerns the execution of the ECA's 
budget, the only people competent for that matter are exclusively the ECA's members 
and the ECA's General Secretary. The President must be informed about the absence of 
an ECA member as soon as possible and the same rule applies for other members and 
auditors working within the group of the absent member (Art. 15). 
n . Personnel 
As opposed to the very detailed dispositions concerning the members of ECA, 
the Treaty does not include even one provision about ECA personnel. So, the ECA itself 
had to decide what kind o f staff it would hire in order to perform the duties in the best 
possible way. This is stated also in Art. 16 of the ECA's Internal Regulation. 
Initially there have been some difficulties in staffing the Court, mainly because 
there has not been an exact estimation of the Court's fijnctioning needs. The original 
estimation did not include translating activifies and supplementary budgets had to be 
p repa red .Bu t the new personnel could not be recruited soon enough, so the ECA was 
'^ N. Themelis, The European Economic Community and its Court of Auditors, in Honorary Vohmie for 
the 150 years of the Greek Court of Audit, Alliens 1984, p 113-124 (119). 
G. Isaac, Les finances...., op. cit p. 350. 
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staffed by the personnel of the institutions it had replaced (Audit Board, ECSC 
Audi tor ) . " 
The staff are divided into two categories: the auditors and the administrative 
personnel. The administrative personnel are also divided according to their occupation: 
those staffing the administrative services in general (personnel, budget, administration); 
those dealing with the translation and the interpretation of in-coming and ECA issued 
documents (this service like in every European institufion is one o f the most important 
with regard to the ECA's effectiveness); and those concerned with general services 
(library, professional training, bailiffs).''* Among them there also those who work within 
the cabinets o f the members of Court, since each member has a cabinet of five 
administrative staff, usually but not always drawn from the same country." Some of 
those spend part o f their time effectively working as auditors.'* I t is anyway stated in 
Art. 83(1) o f the Financial Regulation that the ECA and its members may, in carrying out 
their task, be assisted by officers of the Court. 
The auditors are classed into category A or B, according to their qualifications. 
Sometiines according to the ECA's practical needs they are assigned to administrative 
duties as well (some having a category B appointment are essentially documentation 
clerks), while there are also among them the directors and heads of division which have 
largely supervisory duties." Most auditors are officials o f the ECA and the rest are on 
short term contracts.'^ The auditors are recruited from a wide range of professional 
backgrounds in the public or private sector, and their qualifications are most commonly 
in accountancy, audit, law, economics or finance.'^ Because of their limited number in 
" Ibid, p. 350. 
^"P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 103. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p.222. 
'•^T. M. James, op. cit., p. 473. 
" Ibid, p. 473. 
National Audit Office, op. cit. p. 222. 
T M. James, op. cit., p. 473. 
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relation to the wide range and geographical spread of the ECA's audits, the individual 
auditor's abihty to work in several languages is a most important addifional qualification, 
since i f an auditor cannot read and understand easily the documents brought to him, he 
has a very restricted auditing ability.^" Some are seconded from national audit institutions 
and other bodies o f each member state.*"' Recently, the ECA issued Decision 97-12*^, 
according to which some temporary posts will be occupied by staff coming from national 
audit institutions o f the Member States. This way of staffing is not unusual in the ECA. 
In the second chapter o f that Decision, stipulating the qualifications of the candidates, it 
is mentioned that the candidates must be part of the staff of the specific audit institution. 
I t is possible however for the ECA to accept, after consulting with the national audit 
institution, candidates from another administrative institution of the Member state, 
provided that the candidate wil l have " A level" experience in financial control and audit 
of the Communities' expenses.''^ I t is easy to understand that dispositions like this one 
may endanger the ECA's efforts to obtain the best possible control of the Communities' 
financial management. People working in institutions different than the audit institutions, 
even i f they have experience in financial control, cannot perform the auditing task as 
someone who has been working in an audit institution. The professional training 
provided in an audit institution and the experience gained is useful in dealing with the 
complicated audit system of the Communities. 
Generally speaking the auditors (including those of the ECA) in order to be able 
to perform their duties in the best possible way, must: a) have high professional 
standards, b) be independent from any personal or external interventions and pressures 
so that there wil l be no doubt about their impartiality, c) be alerted and perform a 
°^ Ibid, p. 473 & Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 244. 
National Audit Office, op. cit. p. 222. 
''^  Decision 97-12 regarding the listing, selection and ranking of personnel hired in temporar)' posts in 
accordance with the National Audit Institutions, 7* April 1997. 
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complete audit including the preparation of the relative reports, d) comprehend the 
system o f internal audit already existing in the organization under audit and try to review 
it in order to improve its effectiveness.*'' In everything that concerns their independence, 
there are three kinds o f reasons that may effect it.*' The first is personal reasons, e.g. a 
personal or financial relationship, prejudiced ideas against people, groups or 
organizations, social or political beliefs, previous association with the audited 
organization, and economic interest. The second includes the organizational ones caused 
by the auditors' position in the hierarchy of the organization. This category can not apply 
to the ECA auditors themselves because they are external auditors and do not interfere in 
the audited organizations hierarchy. The third kind are the external reasons meaning 
mainly interventions from external factors that influence the audit by selecting the object 
o f audit, the time of audit, the persons who are going to perform the audit, or by cutting 
the funding o f the auditing organization. This category also is difficult to apply to the 
ECA auditors because an interference like that would demand for an institutional 
amendment o f the Communities concerning the ECA, something which is now very 
difficult. 
ECA personnel come from all the Member states of the Cominunities. So, it is 
natural to have a certain heterogeneity in everything that concerns the language, the 
culture, the qualifications, which the ECA has considered as an advantage in facing the 
multiplicity o f the various audit forms necessary by the materials subjected to its 
control**. But this situation constituted also a danger for the internal cohesion of the 
Court's works. The Court has to elaborate on a vast amount of material, collected from 
many countries and concerning several issues, and without a common notion of the 
®^  "A level" experience means that the candidate will be eligible to be placed in category' A of the ECA 
auditors. 
'''' A. Maggina, Governmental Accounting, A. N. Sakkoulas Publications, 1995, p. 140-141. 
'^ ^Ibid, p. 141-143. 
'^ ^ T. M. James, op. cit. p. 473 & P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 103-104. 
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appreciation o f the sound financial management, it is difficult to obtain an effective and 
impartial audit o f a public finance system like thatone of the Communifies.*^^ So in order 
to develop a common approach to audit, the ECA has established a Training and 
Working Methods Service which is headed by one of the Court's directors. Staff training 
programs have been developed and guidelines to auditors in the form of a manual have 
been prepared and distributed.*^^ 
I t is interesting to note that in 1980 the E C A ' s establishment plan included 237 
permanent and 22 temporary posts*^ ^ while today there are 500 staff at the Court 
comprising 240 auditors, 55 translators, 140 administrators and 65 other staff.™ It is true 
though that the size o f the material that needs to be audited requires more staff, 
especially after new tasks have been assigned to the Court (Statement of Assurance, 
audit o f the expenses o f the European Union's second pillar etc) by the Treaties. 
Something noteworthy is the trade-union actions o f the ECA personnel, which 
caused an intensive disagreement between the personnel and the administration (meaning 
the President) o f the ECA in 1987. More specifically, the Trade Union of the European 
Communities' Personnel in Luxembourg accused the ECA for its decision to increase its 
temporary staff instead o f hiring permanent staff, adding that this kind of policy 
downgraded the european public service and threaten the ECA's independence and role 
as "financial conscience" of Europe. The ECA's President responded by sending to a 
member o f the ECA staff, who was member of the executive committee of the Union, a 
letter in which, after condemning the Union's statement, he informed him that from then 
the Union's Bulletins would not be circulated via the internal post service of the ECA, 
but only through the personnel committee o f the ECA and any other way of distribution 
P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 104 & Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 244. 
®* T. M. James, op. cit. p. 473 & P. Lelong, op. cit, p. 104. 
European Yearbook, Vol. XXVIII, 1980, p. 431. In order to have an idea of how the number of 
personnel has increased through out the years see European Yearbook, Vol. XXIX, 1981, p. 435, Ibid, 
Vol. X X X , 1982, p. E C 16, Ibid, Vol. XXXIIl , 1985, p. E C 16 & T.M. James, op.cit., p. 473. 
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should be carried out only on the Union's initiative. In addition to that, the President of 
the ECA denied leave o f absence to the members of the ECA staff" which belonged to the 
Union's representative coinmittee, in order for them to participate in the Unions 
ineetings, something that the Union had requested. The ECJ, after an appeal from the 
Union and an ECA official, in its judgment^^ stated that the first decision of the ECA not 
to allow the distribution o f the Union's Bulletins via its internal post service, simply 
denied an advantage to the Union's members but did not obstruct the union activities. 
Furtherinore the freedom to take an active part in the union inovement -freedoin that all 
ECA staff enjoy- is not so extensive as to include an obligation o f the ECA to place at 
the Union's disposal its internal post service. Also the European Court of Justice, in the 
same judgment, pointed out that all institutions and authorities of the Communities, 
including the ECA, should not obstruct the representatives o f the Union to take part in 
the meeting held by the Union in order to prepare itself for its participation in collective 
bargaining. So, according to that judgment the ECA personnel have every right to 
participate in Unions and enjoy all the freedoms deriving from this right. 
m . Organization 
The EC Treaty does not contain inuch of information concerning the ECA's 
organization. According to Art. 188b(3) [247(3)] 
"The members of the Court shall elect the President of the Court of Auditors 
from among their number for a term of three years. The President may be re-
elected". 
This is the only disposition in the Treaties on how the ECA must be organized. 
The prediction o f a President's election^^ is the basic point of the ECA's organization. 
So, the ECA is completely free to draw up and adopt its own rules of organization and 
'° National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 222, 
" Cases 193/1987 and 194/1987, Mauhssen and Union Syndicate vsECA, [1990] ECR, p, 95-123, 
" There is an annex presenting all the Presidents of tlie E C A at the end of the text, 
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procedure, having as its only obligation to respect the dispositions and the principles set 
by the Trea t i e s .Th i s self-organizing authority is also provided for by Art. 16 of the 
ECA's Internal Regulation. 
The ECA, using this freedom and in an attempt to obtain the best possible 
internal organization adopted in 1978 its first Internal Regulation which was not 
published in the Official Journal but it was accessible to the public.^'' This internal 
Regulation mainly dealt with three issues: a) the election and the powers of the President 
of the Court in Art. 2-3, b) the allocation of dufies and the collective responsibility of 
the Court's members in Art. 4-7 and c) the fijnction o f the Court (quorum, voting, 
decision-making procedure) in Art. 8-9.^ ^ In 1981 the ECA adopted a new Internal 
Regulation, which also was not published in the Official Journal. This Regulation, with 
some amendments, is the document containing the Court's current Rules of Procedure. 
According to Art. 1 o f the Internal Regulation, the Court is organized and acts as 
a corporate body. This provision is supported by Art. 188c(4) of the Treaty which states 
that 
"The Court shall adopt its annual reports, special reports or opinion by a 
majority of its members" 
and by the disposition o f Art. 22 o f the Internal Regulation that describes the majorities 
necessary for the adoption o f every ECA decision. This emphasis on the corporate nature 
of decision making was made to resolve any potential conflict between the collective 
responsibility o f the ECA's members and the need for the efficient conduct of day to day 
business.^*' However this coUegiality is not considered to be an obstacle for an internal 
allocation o f responsibilities and competence among the members of the Court. This is 
done, in order to facilitate the general flinction of the Court and the preparation and 
" T. M. James, op. cit., p. 471 & P. Lelong, op. cit, p. 102. 
G. Isaac, Les Finances..., op. cit., p. 349. 
" Ibid, p. 349. 
T. M. James, op. cit, p. 472. 
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implementation o f the Court's decisions in particular a reas .So, even i f the ECA is a 
collective institution, each of its metnbers is responsible for a specific sector of audit. 
The tasks within the ECA are divided vertically and horizontally.^^ The vertical 
division covers the audit operations and the investigation activities of the Court, The 
horizontal division concerns the internal functions of ECA (personnel administration, 
working schedule, intersectional coordination etc),^" According to Art 9(1) of the 
Internal Regulation the Court forms groups among its members and to each group a 
sector o f activity is assigned. Art. 9(2) states that responsibilifies should be allocated 
equally among the Members of each group. Members are responsible to the group and 
the Court for the conduct of the sectors assigned to them. 
Currently the Court is divided into three Audit Groups, an Audit Development 
and Report Group (called ADAR) and a Statement of Assurance Group (in total five 
groups) and each group is composed of between three and five members of the Court.^* 
Audit group 1 audits both sections (Guidance and Guarantee) of the EAGGF (European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund), Audit Group 2 covers the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion 
Fund, the ECSC and some other areas like tourism, measures to assist Central and 
Eastern Europe, energy etc, while Audit Group 3 audits the European Development 
Funds, the administrative expenses o f the Institutions, Communifies "Own Resources" 
and cooperation with non European Union count r ies .The ADAR group coordinates 
the Court's annual report, provides training and computer audit support, advises on the 
Court's reports and opinions, coordinates the Court's work program, oversees the 
" Ibid, p. 472 & P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 102. 
G. D. Drisis, op. cit, p. 94. 
G. Isaac, Les Finances,,,., op. cit, p. 348 & P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 102. 
°^ G, Isaac, Les Finances...., op. cit,, p, 348 & P, Lelong, op. cit., p. 102. There is an annex at the end of 
the text presenting the division of tasks among the first members of the E C A in 1977 and among the 
current members. 
'^ National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 221. 
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Court's working methods and its Audit Manual, while the Statement of Assurance 
Group is responsible for drawing up the Statement of Assurance and coordinafing the 
financial audit and general accounting work supporting this Sta tement .Ar t . 9 of the 
Internal Regulation states that these groups have a preparatory nature, and their role 
mainly is to provide a forum for more detailed discussion o f an issue than is generally 
possible in the Court's plenary sessions.^'' 
In each o f these groups there is a member who is the head of the group. This 
member is responsible for organizing the work of his group in order to meet the needs of 
audit that the Court is requested to perform annually. The other members of the group in 
association with ECA staff, audit or accomplish the tasks assigned to them. At the end 
they present the results in a draft which they analyze in front of the other members of the 
group. This way a verification o f the materials is made and every detail is being 
confirmed. These meetings are very important because during this procedure the main 
problems are located and the groups focus on them, creating also in this way the main 
substantial framework o f the ECA's reports and opinions. 
A very important disposition concerning the cooperation between the members of 
the Court is that o f Art. 11 o f the Internal Regulation according to which each member is 
entitled to have access to information concerning the various sectors of activity of the 
Court. In addition to that every member is obliged, i f he has information concerning 
another member's sector or information that could be of general interest to the Court, to 
notify the competent member(s) or to announce it to all the members. These provisions 
reaffirm the corporate nature of the ECA. Following this direction, the ECA introduced 
in 1995 a "contra rapporteur" system in which members discuss reports from their 
sectors with another member from a different Audit Group, while cabinet staff also 
Ibid, p. 221. 
Ibid, p. 221. 
T. M. James, op. cit, p. 473. 
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provide written comments, which are examined by the originafing Audit Group and 
suggestions are integrated into the reports.^* 
The President o f the ECA, as mentioned before is elected by its members for 
three years. In Art. 6 and 7 o f the Internal Regulation there are detailed provisions about 
the election proceedings and the replacement o f the ECA's President: The election of the 
next President is held iinmediately prior to the expiration of the previous presidency and 
i f the current President wants to participate in the elecfion, the procedure is organized by 
the senior member o f the Court. There is a secret vote and the candidate who obtains 
two thirds (2/3) o f the votes is elected President, I f nobody obtains two thirds, there is a 
second secret vote and the candidate who obtains an absolute majority is the President. 
According to Art. 8 o f the Internal Regulation the President's tasks are: calling and 
chairing meetings o f the Court and to be responsible for the proper conduct of the 
sessions; seeing to the implementation of the Court's decisions; ensuring that the various 
activities o f the Court and of its sections are properly conducted; appointing the ECA's 
legal representative in judicial proceedings; and representing the Court in all his external 
relations (mainly those with the other insfitutions o f the Communities and the national 
audit institutions). Generally speaking the President is considered to be "primus inter 
pares" ainong the meinbers o f the ECA.^^ 
In the Internal Regulation there is also a provision concerning the General 
Secretary o f the ECA (Art. 10). According to this provision, the Court appoints its 
General Secretary by a secret vote for a term of office o f six years (like the members of 
the Court). The Secretary is a inember of the Court's staff with inajor responsibilities: To 
take care o f the minutes o f all the Court's ineetings, to keep and file the original 
documents o f all the decisions of the Court, its preparatory groups and the President's 
For a detailed description of the proceedings in these groups see P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 103. 
'"^  National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 227 & I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 610. 
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official letters, and to help the President in preparing the meetings of the Court and 
attend to other duties. The General Secretary is also the Court's Authority for staff 
appointments unless the Court itself has appointed someone else for this task. In general, 
the Secretary is responsible for the personnel's management and the administration of the 
Court. 
The operation of the Court's plenary sessions is regulated by Art. 17-26 of the 
Internal Regulation. According to these dispositions the ECA must adopt its Annual 
Report, its Statement o f Assurance, its ECSC reports, its special annual reports (Berlin 
Centre, Dublin Foundation, European Schools, Euratom Supply Agency, Joint European 
Torus), its opinions, its decisions concerning the appointment o f the General Secretary 
and the formation o f the preparatory groups, the amendments made by it concerning its 
predicted expenditure, the execution of its budget and its Internal Regulation in a plenary 
session and by a majority o f its members (this latter disposition is based on Art. 188c(4) 
[248(4)] o f the EC Treaty). The schedule of the sessions is arranged by the Court itself 
twice a year, before Christmas hoHdays and before summer holidays. There is the 
possibility o f extra sessions. The agenda is given to the Court's members five days before 
session (in exceptional circumstances this can change) and at the beginning of every 
session the Court may decide unanimously to consider issues not mentioned in that 
session's agenda. The necessary quorum for the Court to begin a session and reach a 
decision is eight members. The Court's sessions are not pubHc (Art. 23). This disposition 
should be combined with the disposition o f Art. 11(4) according to which the ECA will 
decide whether or not its documents will be published in the Official Journal or 
elsewhere (unless o f course the publication of the documents is obligatory according to 
the Treaties stipulations i.e. the Annual Report). In Art. 25 of the Internal Regulation 
'^ European Court of Auditors, Auditing the Finances of the European Union, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1996, p. 8. 
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there are provisions concerning the minutes of the Court's sessions while in Art. 26 there 
is a provision for a different procedure o f the Court as an alternative to the one of the 
sessions. According to this, the President prepares a document which is delivered to all 
the members o f the Court and they have the right to propose amendments within at least 
seven days. I f nobody objects, the document is considered as approved. I f there are 
objections then the issue mentioned in the document, is included in the agenda for the 
following session. This procedure "in writing" (as it is called) can be used also for the 
most important documents o f the Court (Annual Report, Statement of Assurance etc.) 
but only i f these documents have been discussed in a previous session. 
All these proceedings and administrative structures are expensive. The necessary 
expenses are included in the ECA's section of the general budget of the Communities 
and for 1996 the appropriations for ECA amounted to 56 millions ECU (1.3% of the 
administrative expenditure o f the European institutions or 0.06% of the general budget 
total).''^ External audits of the utilization of these appropriations are carried out by the 
Court's staff who are responsible for the administrative expenditure o f all the institutions 
but in order to guarantee the greatest possible transparency the ECA has an independent 
audit for its expenses, carried out every year by a private firm o f accountants.^^ 
A final question about the ECA's organization is the Court's Seat. According to 
a decision by the representatives o f the governments of the Member states, the Court 
was provisionally located in Luxembourg.^" This choice was confirmed by the European 
Council in its Decision on the seats o f the existing institutions.^^ There have been some 
reservations as to how the audit can be performed from a two hundred kilometers 
distance between Brussels and Luxembourg, but in practice "this distance from the 
Ibid, p. 10. 
Ibid, p. 10. 
°^ Council Decision 77/323/EEC, 011977, L-104/40. 
'^ Council Decision on tlie location of the Seats of the Institutions and of certain bodies and departments 
of tlie European Communities, 011992, C-341/1. 
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Commission, who is the main object o f audit, has not been always a disadvantage".^^ 
Furthermore, a large part of the on-the-spot audits is now being performed in the 
Member States since the implementation of the Communities' policies has been 
"delegated" to administrations at the national level, so it would be a sensible solution to 
have liaison offices o f the ECA in the Member States, located within the national audit 
institutions.^^ 
Ch. Kok, The Court of Auditors of the European Coimnunities: "The other European Court in 
Luxembourg", CMLRev, Vol. 26, 1989, p. 345-367 (349). 
Ibid, p. 349. 
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Chapter Two 
The Competences of the European Court of Auditors 
A. Description and Analysis of Competences 
L Extent of the Auditing Competences of the Court 
Art. 188a [246] o f the EC Treaty states that 
"The Court of Auditors shall carry out the audit". 
This is a very general provision, having as its aim to set the limits of the Court's 
jurisdiction. I t was included in the Treaties just in 1993 by the Treaty of the European 
Union. The context o f the article does not add anything legally substantial but it is a 
broad specification o f what the ECA is competent of doing and it gives the impression of 
enlarging the ECA's competences.' In any case, this disposition should be regarded as 
introductory to the Treaties' provisions about the ECA's tasks. 
According to the first sub-paragraph of Art. 188c(l) [248(1)] 
"The Court of Auditors shall examine the accounts of all revenue and 
expenditure of the Community. It shall also examine the accounts of all revenue 
and expenditure of all bodies set up by the Community in so far as the relevant 
constituent instrument does not preclude such examination ". 
In comparison to Art. 188a [246], this is a more detailed description of what the 
ECA must do. Its primary task is to examine the accounts o f all revenue and expenditure. 
There is a big difference between the audit performed by the Audit Board and the ECA's 
one: the Audit Board could audit only revenue and expenditure shown in the budget 
while for the ECA there are no limits and it can control all revenue and expenditure of 
the Communities, even those not included in the general budget.^ This extension of the 
ECA's power attributed greater importance to the general principle which has hitherto 
been included in Art. 87 o f the Financial Regulation only: 
' D. Strasser, Les disposotions financieres du Traite de Maastricht, RFFP, No 45, 1994, p. 195-205 (196-
197). 
G. Orsoni, La Cour des Comptes des Communautes Europeenes, RFFP, No 36, 1991, p. 77-90 (79). 
^ F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p. 45, G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 796, & 
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"The grant of Community funds to beneficiaries outside the institutions shall be 
subject to the agreement in writing by the recipients to an audit being carried 
out by the Court of Auditors on the utilization of the amounts gj-anted. 
In complete accordance with these dispositions, the Member States, when signing 
the Second Budget Treaty that established the ECA, included a declaration in its annex 
stating that the ECA will be competent to control the operation o f the European 
Development Fund. Thus the uncertainty about this Fund was ended, since it was 
claimed that it was not founded by the Community but by the Member states, so the 
ECA should not audit it.'* The ECA audits also the ECSC since according to Art. 78d of 
the ECSC Treaty (as modified by the E U Treaty), it has to prepare an annual report 
concerning the regularity o f the expenditure, the revenue and the financial management 
of the ECSC, and this means that it will control the operating budget of the ECSC and its 
borrowing/lending activities.^ Another sector where the ECA takes action is the 
European Economic Area. According to Art. 7 of Protocol 32 of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area 
"The control of the determination and of the availabiUty of all income as well as 
the control of the commitment and of the scheduling of all expenditure 
corresponding to the participation of the EFTA States, shall take place in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty estabUshing the European 
Economic Community, of the Financial Regidation and. of the apphcable 
regulations in the fields referred to in Art. 76 and 78 of the Agreement. 
Appropriate arrangements shall be estabhshed between the auditing authorities 
in the Community and in the EFTA States with a view to facihtating the control 
of income and expenditure corresponding to the participation of EFTA States in 
Community activities in accordance with paragraph 7. " 
This means that the Member States of European Free Trade Association (EFTA),^ will 
participate in areas o f Community activity making the respective financial contributions 
^ D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 271-272. 
" F. Wooldridge, M. Sassela, op. cit., p. 45, G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 796, & 
G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 79. 
^ D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 274 & G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 80. 
^ Now only Iceland, Norway and Liechtestein, since Austria, Finland and Sweden are already members 
of the E C and the E U . 
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to the budget and the audit o f this additional revenue and expenditure shall be carried out 
by the ECA according to the EC Treaty's provisions.' 
The ECA's audit includes the Decentralized Community Bodies as well. These 
can be divided into three types o f agency: a) the so called "first generation decentralized 
bodies", given a discharge from the Council and the Parliament (the European Centre for 
the Development o f Vocational Training in Salonica, the European Foundation for the 
Improvement o f Living and Working Conditions in Dublin), b) the "non self-financing 
second generation bodies", given a discharge from their own Governing or Management 
Boards (the European Environment Agency in Copenhagen, the European Training 
Foundation in Turin, the European Monitoring Center for Drug and Drug Addiction in 
Lisbon, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work in Bilbao), and c) the "self-
financing second generation bodies", given a discharge by their own Governing or 
Management bodies (the European Agency for the Evaluafion of Medicinal Products in 
London, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market in Alicante, the Translation 
Center for bodies o f the European Union in Luxembourg).^ Also the ECA audits the 
Euratom Supply Agency, the Joint European Torus research undertaking, the European 
Schools and the Community Plant Variety Office in Brussels.^ The Court in its Annual 
Report for the Financial Year 1996 has noticed some defaults in their accounting 
systems. These agencies have two accounting systems, one that records budget entries 
and one that records general accounts entries.'" The first system for the budgetary 
accounts is nothing more than an application allowing ex post modifications and 
sometimes it cannot be linked with the second system of the general accounts.'' Possible 
shortage o f appropriations cannot be detected so the agencies are spending more than 
' European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 16. 
^ Aimual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial Year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/360. 
^ European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 16 and 17. 
'° Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial Year 1996, 01 1997, C-348/360. 
" Ibid, p. 360. 
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their available appropriations.^^ The Court has recommended the using of more complex 
accounting systems including analytical accounts in order to have the opportunity to 
compare the real cost o f all the works and projects carried out. 
n. Reporting Competences 
The E U Treaty added another subparagraph to the Art. 188c(l) [248(1)] 
concerning the Statement o f Assurance. According to that amendment, 
"The Court of Auditors shall provide the European Parliament and the Council 
with a statement of assurance as to the reUability of the accounts and the 
legality and regularity of the underlying ti-ansactions. " 
This disposition was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam which provides that 
this Statement will be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
This latter amendment has a very important significance in everything that concerns the 
way information is provided by the ECA. From a legal point o f view though, it did not 
change anything because even before the Amsterdam Treaty, the ECA's Statements of 
Assurance were being published in the Official Journal by virtue of Art 11 (4) of the 
ECA's Internal Regulation that allows the Court to decide which documents will be 
published in the OJ. The Financial Regulation also contains a disposition about the 
Statement o f Assurance (Art. 88a) which has a context similar to the one of the Treaties' 
articles. 
From the provisions concerning the Statement of Assurance it is obvious that the 
ECA has been obliged to extend its audit coverage across the whole range of 
Communities' expenditure.''' With that Statement the Court must declare that, after 
having conducted all the necessary audits, it has reached a point of assurance that all the 
accounts presented reflect the reality and that all underlying transactions are legal and 
'-Ibid, p. 361. 
Ibid, p. 361. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 225. 
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regular.'^ The amount of work required by the Court to produce such a Statement is 
enormous (especially after the Court's decision that it needs to audit expenditure down 
to the level o f the final recipient o f the Community spending'^), so complefing this 
Statement has become a major focus for the Court's financial audit.' ' But i f the ECA 
cannot conduct all the audits that it thinks necessary in order to assure the legality and 
regularity o f the accounts or i f during its audits it locates important anomalies that effect 
a substantive part o f the accounts, then it has the right to refuse to produce the 
Statement o f Assurance.'^ Something like that has happened for the financial years 1995 
and 1996. The ECA, because o f the high rates o f substanfial and formal errors 
concerning transactions and payments, and because of not obtaining sufficient evidence 
to reach an opinion as to the correct use of Community funds, declined to provide a 
positive global assurance as to the legality and regularity o f the transactions underlying 
the payments for the financial years 1995 and 1996.'^ This has been considered to be 
giving the ECA a formidable power of sanction:^" the insfitution concerned would be 
required to make the necessary rectifications in order to avoid any qualifications in the 
Court's Annual Report or a complete refusal of producing the Statement of Assurance. 
With regard to the Statement o f Assurance as a completely new competence, its 
objectives include a) providing a basis for the Parliament to make a global judgment 
about the work o f the Commission during the discharge process, b) providing a lever for 
the ECA to use in getting better access to information and c) putting pressure on the 
ECA to adopt a more coherent approach to its work.^' I t must be said though that such a 
statement was not provided before 1993 by the Treaties because as the European 
D . Strasser, Les dispositions , op. cit., p. 200. 
Statement of Assurance of tlie Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1995, 01 1996, C-395/19. 
" Audit Office, op. cit., p. 225. 
D . Strasser, Les dispositions...., op. cit., p. 200. 
Statement of Assurance of the Court of Auditors for tlie Financial Year 1995, 01 1996, C-395/9, 
Statement of Assurance of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1996, 01 1997, C-348/8. 
- " D . O ' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 187. 
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institutions were presumed to keep accurate accounts, the certification of these accounts 
was not regarded to be essential or even necessary.The ECA itself had interpreted the 
provisions o f the Treaties and concluded that they were not obliging it to examine the 
accuracy o f the EC accounts as a w h o l e . T h i s situation had caused a criticism against 
the ECA that it looked only in areas where it expected to find mistakes and did not praise 
areas o f management where things were safisfactory.^'' The Statement of Assurance, 
providing a global view of the Communities' financial management, has eliminated this 
criticism. 
The case though is different for the ECSC, for which the Court has been issuing 
annually a certificate on the financial statements of operational expenditure, annexed in 
the Court's Annual Report on the accounts o f the ECSC, even though the ECSC Treaty 
did not include (until 1993) any such obligafion.^^ 
Art. 188c(4) [248(4)] provides for something that for many is considered to be 
the ECA's most important contribution to the European Communities' institutional 
system, its Annual Report: 
"The Court of Auditors shall draw up an annual report after the close of each 
financial year. It shall be forwarded to the other institutions of the Community 
shall be published, together with the replies of these institutions to the Official 
Journal of the European Communities". 
The adoption o f the annual report is the result of a long and complex procedure 
described in the Financial Regulation. According to Art. 78 and 81 of the Financial 
Regulation, each year the Commission shall draw up, not later than 1 May, a 
consolidated revenue and expenditure account o f the general budget of the Communities 
for the previous financial year and a consoUdated balance sheet of assets and liabilifies of 
'^ 1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 614. 
D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 278. 
I. Harden, F. Wliite, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 612. 
House of Lords, Select Committee on tlie European Coimnunities, Financial Control and Fraud in the 
Commmiity, Session 1993-1994, 12"" Report, HL paper 75, para. 30. 
D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 278, 
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the preceding financial year. Al l these, according to Art. 80, will be escorted by an 
analysis o f the financial management of the year in question. Art. 79 states that all 
institutions must transmit by 1 March to the Commission the information required for 
drawing up the account and the balance sheet. The Commission will forward to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the ECA these documents by 1 May (Art. 82). 
The ECA, after the auditing procedure of the general budget's implementation and also 
after every other issue within its jurisdiction has been carried out, shall transmit, 
according to Art. 88(1), to the Commission and the institution concerned by 15 July any 
comments which should, in its opinion, appear in the annual report. These comments are 
confidential and each institution shall address their response to the ECA by 31 October 
the latest. Indeed, the Court must transmit, by 30 November, to the authorities 
responsible for giving discharge, its Annual Report accompanied by the institutions' 
responses and must also ensure their publication in the Official Journal (Art. 88(4) of the 
Fin. Regulation). The Annual Report contains an assessment o f the soundness of 
financial management (Art. 88(2)) and includes a section for each institution while the 
ECA must ensure that the responses of each institution are published immediately 
following its comments (Art. 88(3)). 
The Annual Report's structure is basically the following: At the beginning there is 
an introduction concerning the financial management of the Communities, then there is a 
First Part containing the ECA's observations for the overall revenue and the operating 
appropriations o f the Commission and the European Development Funds, followed by 
the respective responses o f the Commission. A Second Part follows with the ECA's 
comments on the operating appropriations o f the other European Communities' 
institutions and authorities, accompanied by their responses.^'' In other words, the Annual 
Report includes general observations on the management of the Communities' finances 
40 
during the previous financial year arising from both financial and value for money work 
along with the institutions' responses to these observations.^^ The Annual Report for the 
financial year 1996 had a different structure. There are two volumes, one with the actual 
report (structure o f the financial perspectives) and one incorporating the Statement of 
Assurance for the financial year 1996.^^ This inclusion o f the Statement of Assurance in 
the Annual Report does not reduce the importance of such a Statement. The reason for 
this change must be mainly practical, namely to have all the information concerning the 
annual estimation o f the European Union's financial management gathered in one 
document. 
I t has been noted even from the very first two annual reports produced by the 
ECA, that the Court was searching for ways to establish a fruitful cooperation between 
itself and the other Communities' institutions, especially the Commission.The Court 
has tried to achieve this by introducing innovations to its report (in comparison with the 
reports made by the Audit Board). The first one was to add after its Annual Report an 
important analysis with statistical information concerning the Communities finances, 
something that pleased the European Parliament.^" The second one sought to facilitate 
the authority for the budget discharge. So the Court included in the report some 
comments on the institutions responses as a rejoinder,^' something that the Commission 
contested intensively saying that the ECA had no authority to do that, otherwise the 
Court should allow the institutions to respond again to its comments.^^ Since the ECA 
had included in the annual report comments on the insfitutions replies (mainly on the 
Commission's responses), the Commission sent a document to the Parliament expressing 
D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 275. 
'^ National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 226. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/7. 
G. Isaac, Les Finances...., op. cit., p. 351. 
°^ Ibid, p. 351. 
'^ See the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1979, OJ 1980, C-342/10, 16, 
25, 53, 59, 128, 132 etc. 
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its opinions on the ECA's comments. The Court has since refrained from making 
additional comments but officially has never renounced this prerogative.^^ The European 
Pariiament in its resolution giving a discharge to the Commission for the implementation 
of the 1979 budget had accepted that the ECA was entitled to add comments to the 
institutions' replies to its observations.^'' 
The ECA and the Commission have however reached an agreement in 1982 that 
estabHshed the above mentioned procedure which has been successfully characterized as 
"preliminary".^^ The ECA sends to the Commission the observations which are going to 
be included in its Annual Report before 15 July. The Commission prepares a draft reply 
suggesting even amendments to the Court's observations and sends this draft to the 
ECA unofficially by the end o f September. In early October the services of the ECA and 
of the Commission examine the points that create conflict between the two institutions. I f 
necessary, the matter is referred to higher levels of the institutions' hierarchy for a 
solution and any amendments made from the one part are made known to the other the 
soonest possible (in practice, there have been meetings not only between audit staff from 
the ECA and personnel for the Commission but since 1995 these meetings involved 
Commissioners and Members of the ECA). After the Commission's submission of 
proposals on 31 October, the ECA prepares its Annual Report taking into account the 
findings of its collaboration with the Commission and refrains from including in the 
Report issues that have not been elaborated during this procedure.^^ 
Ibid, p. 351, note 164, & D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 280 
Ibid, p. 351, note 164. 
Resolution of 18 June 1981 containing tlie comments accompanying the decisions granting a 
discharge on the implementation of the budget of the European Conununitj' for 1979, 01 1981, C-
172/80. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 241. 
'^^  G. Vitalis^ Hearing of the Auditee, in Honorar>' Volume for the 150 years of the Greek Court of Audit, 
Athens 1984, p 125-132 (131), 1. Harden, F. White, K. Domielly, op. cit., p. 617, T. M. James, op. cit., 
p. 480, P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 112-113 & SirN. Price, op. cit., p. 241. 
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The Annual Report, being considered as the ECA's primary mission''^, is not 
only a part o f its competences but at the same time also the crowning of its auditing 
work, as the most vivid means o f expression of the C o u r t . T h e r e are also other 
reporting activities from the ECA, 
First there are also some annual reports that the ECA must produce. One of them 
is the ECSC Armual Report, I t has been mentioned above that among the competences 
of the ECA is to audit the ECSC. According to Art. 78d o f the ECSC Treaty the Court 
must draw up a report stating whether the accounting concerning operating acfivifies of 
the ECSC has been effected in a regular manner. The administrative income and 
expenditure o f the ECSC are covered by the Annual Report on the general Budget.^^ 
This report must be drawn up within six months from the end o f the financial year to 
which the account refer and must be submitted to the Commission"*" and the Council, and 
then the Commission wil l forward it to the Parliament. This report is published in the 
Official Journal but its appendix which contains private financial information is not 
published, but only submitted to the Council and the Commission which must inform the 
Parliament o f its existence.'*' Also the ECA has to present annual reports for the 
Decentralized Community Bodies but these reports are not published in the Official 
Journal.'*^ 
that 
The second sub-paragraph of Art. 188c(4) [248(4)] of the EC Treaty provides 
"The Court of Auditors may also, at any time, submit observations, particularly 
in the form of special reports, on specific questions and deliver opinions at the 
request of one of the other institutions of the Community". 
G. Isaac, Les Finances...., op. cit., p. 350. 
R. Leonard, The Public Report of the Court of Auditors, in Audit of Public Finance in Greece and 
Abroad (Studies), Athens 1975,p. 225- 232 (226). 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 481. 
''° After the E U Treaty, the High Autliority of ECSC was renamed as the Conunission (Art. 7 of the 
E C S C Treaty). 
D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 275. 
Ibid, p. 275-276, for more details. 
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Art. 90(1) o f the Financial Regulation has exactly the same context. So it is clear 
that the ECA has two other ways of acting, its special reports and its opinions. 
According to the disposition of Art. 90(2) the special reports shall be transmitted to the 
institution or body concerned, which has two and a half months to make any comments 
on the Court's report. Should the ECA decide to publish the report in the Official 
Journal then, it has also to publish the comments of the institution or body concerned. In 
everything that concerns the opinions. Art. 90(3) of the Financial Regulation provides 
that i f these opinions are not related to legislative proposals or legislation drafts for 
which the ECA has been consulted, the Court can publish them in the Official Journal 
after consulting the institutions that requested the opinion or the institution concerned by 
the ECA's analysis, the replies o f which must be published along with the opinion. The 
special reports are giving to the ECA the opportunity to express itself, comparable to 
that provided by the annual report, but with a great degree of flexibility in time and 
space.''^ They generally consist o f the treatment in depth, outside the framework of a 
timetable o f the Annual Report, o f a particular group of related activities and being 
completely independent of the Annual Report's calendar year, they may, when 
appropriate, be completed and issued relatively rapidly and thus with greater immediacy 
draw the attention o f the budgetary authorities and the EC financial managers to 
particular weaknesses which come to light in the course o f these major audit inquiries.'*'' 
In any event the fiexibility o f format and the homogeneity o f subject matter mean that the 
special reports are, despite the sometimes complex nature of their contents, more easily 
handled by the authorities to whom they are addressed that the Annual Report, which of 
necessity contains a somewhat dense assemblage of very varied material.''^ According to 
another opinion though the special reports have the major drawback that Parliament 
Ibid, p. 276. 
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(which is mainly the recipient o f the special reports) often has neither the means nor the 
time to assess the points made in them.'"^ This latter opinion is not persuasive since the 
ECA's special reports are examined by ad hoc parliamentary committees, whose own 
reports generally lead to a resolution by the Parliament, Hsting the problems for which it 
expects a solution to be found and the Commission must then take follow-up action."*^ As 
it is obvious from the context o f the dispositions of the Treaties and the Financial 
Regulation, the special reports can be issued at the ECA's own discretion or upon 
request from another institution. So far, mainly the Pariiament has made use of this 
facility'*^, starting practically from the establishment of the ECA and in 1979 the 
President o f the Parliament requested from the Court a report concerning the 
representation expenses o f the members o f the Commission.''^ This report was issued 
later in 1979 and even though it was not published in the Official Journal, had such an 
impact that led to the changing in the methods by which such expenses are controlled.^" 
The Commission itself has recognized the importance of these reports by noticing their 
usefiilness in the discharge procedure and by acknowledging the recommendation of the 
European Council at Essen to the European institutions about taking action to make use 
o f these reports.^' 
In everything that concerns the opinions issued by the ECA, they must be 
included in the so called "Consultative Competence"" o f the Court. There are two kinds 
of opinions that the ECA may dehver. The first one has been already mentioned above 
and is regulated by Art. 188c(4) [248(4)]. These opinions are not obligatory in a sense 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 479. 
Ibid, p. 479. 
""^ D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 276. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 227. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 242 & T. M. James, op. cit., p. 480. 
G. Isaac, Les Finances...., op. cit., p. 352 & Sir N. Price, op, cit., p. 242. 
^° G Isaac, Les Finances...., op. cit., p. 352 & Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 242. 
'^ European Commission, Report on the function of the Treaty for the European Union, SEC (95) 731 
final, 10.5.1995, p. 27, point 65. 
P. Lelong, op. cit,, p, 108 & T. M. James, op. cit., p. 480. 
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that the institutions are not obliged to ask for them and they certainly do not have to 
follow them. But the practice followed so far, fortified also by a written unofficial 
agreement between the ECA and the Commission, is for the institutions to consult 
systematically the ECA when taking action that has a budgetary or financial aspect or 
effect." The second kind o f opinion is described in Art. 209 [279] of the EC Treaty 
according to which 
"The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and. after 
consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the opinion of the Court of 
Auditors shall: 
a) make financial regulations specifying in particular the procedure to be 
adopted for estabhshing and implementing the budget and for presenting and 
auditing accounts; 
b) determine the methods and procedures whereby the budget revenue provided 
under the arrangements relating to the Communities' own resources shall be 
made available to the Commission, and. determine the measures to be applied, if 
need be, to meet cash requirements; 
c) lay down rules concerning the responsibility of financial controllers, 
authorizing officers and accounting officers and concerning appropriate 
arrangements for inspection." 
This disposition provides that the ECA must obligatorily be requested to deliver 
an opinion on the issues mentioned in i t . ' ' ' This obligation covers only the request of the 
opinion and does not extent to the Council's activity according to the opinion. So the 
Council may act without taking into consideration the opinion issued by the ECA, which 
is not b i n d i n g . B u t given the nature o f the issues mentioned in Art. 209 [279] of the EC 
Treaty, the ECA's opinion is a very useful guide. The ECA is able, at any time, because 
of its duties to evaluate the budget procedure (adoption and implementation), to know 
the effectiveness o f the "Own Resources" systems about the Communities revenue and 
to understand (better than anyone else) the importance of the responsibility of financial 
controllers and authorizing officers. Indeed this was very soon realized by the Council 
and immediately after the ECA's establishment, it requested an opinion on a proposal for 
P. Lelong, op. cit. p. 108. 
Ibid, p. 108. 
D. 0' Keeflfe, op. cit., p. 184. 
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the modification of the Financial Regulation.The Court knowing that it had first to 
settle into his job before doing anything else, reserved its right to comment later on this 
proposal and delivered his opinion in 1981, having an experience of three years of 
auditing the Communities' finances." So, in general the ECA's opinions have only 
"advisory" force, but because of their technical nature and the fact that some of them are 
ofl;en published in the Official Journal, they are given some fiirther weight.'^ 
Besides its reports and opinions the ECA has also created what has been called 
the "Presidential Letters" method.These notes are sent by the ECA's President to the 
person in charge of a national audit institution (President, Director, etc) and their 
purpose is to inform their recipient about the ECA's findings during a particular audit.*" 
Based on the repHes of the national audit institution the ECA will decide whether it is 
going to keep the matter on a bilateral level or to issue a special report on it or even to 
include it in its Annual Report.*' 
As shown above, the procedure concerning all the reports of the ECA (Annual 
Report, Statement of Assurance, special reports, opinions, Presidential Letters) includes 
taking into account the auditee's replies. As soon as the initial findings are known, the 
institutions that have been audited are given the opportunity to justify their management 
and formulate such counter-arguments as they feel to be necessary.*^ The proceedings 
concerning the exchange of opinions between the ECA and the Commission about the 
Annual Report have been described above. This is called a "Contradictory Procedure" 
("Procedure Contradictoire") -even though some consider the term "Adversarial 
'^^  Ch. Kok, op. cit. p. 348. 
" Ibid., p. 348 and p. 356. 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 481. 
N. Themelis, op.cit., p. 122. 
Ibid, p. 122. 
Ibid, p. 122. 
®^  European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 14. 
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Procedure" as more accurate^^- during which the right of the audited bodies to be 
granted a hearing by their auditor is completely guaranteed. '^' The reason for the 
existence of this right is to make the document in question (report, opinion, etc) more 
clear, more objective and more effective*'^  in its mission which is to present the situation 
in the Communities' financial management and also to focus on any anomalies of this 
management. The aim of the reports is to make the executive power (in the case of the 
Communities the Commission) prudent in its management but in order to succeed, the 
report itself must be prudent, and that is assured by the right of the auditee to be granted 
a hearing.But within the particularities of the Communities' system, this right also has 
a completely different aspect,. Through the exercise of the auditee's right to be granted a 
hearing, the ECA informs the audited institutions about its points of view on several 
issues of financial management. This "dialogue" is the best way for the Court to obtain 
the cooperation of the audited bodies for its observafions and to develop a more 
collaborative relationship with them.^ ^ 
in. Audit of the other pillars of the European Union 
The Treaties of the Communities, as amended so far, are not the only texts 
including provisions for the ECA. The Treaty for the European Union has some specific 
provisions that even though they do not mention the ECA, they are very clearly imposing 
on it some new tasks. According to Art. J.l 1(2) [28(2)] 
"Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred 
to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the 
European Communities ". 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 617. 
G. Vitalis, op. cit., p. 130. 
'^^ Ibid, p. 126. 
Ibid, p. 126. 
•^'P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 113. 
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This article refers to expenses concerning the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. Parallel provisions are to be found in Art. K.2(2) [41(2)] concerning the 
administrative expenses of the Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. In 
addition to this, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended not only the numbering but the 
context of these articles which is now (for both of them): 
"(2)Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas 
referred to in this Title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget 
of the European Communities. 
(3) Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions 
gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, 
except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence 
implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. 
In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European 
Communities it shall be charged, to the Member States in accordance with the 
gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides 
otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or 
defence implications. Member States whose representatives in the Council have 
made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not 
be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof. 
(4) The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty estabUshing the European 
Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the 
European Communities." 
According to all these provisions the expenditure (administrative and 
operational-unless the Council decides otherwise) for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and for the Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home affairs will be included 
in the general budget of the Communities.*^ This means that the ECA must audit these 
expenses. To uphold this opinion it is enough to mention that according to the above 
mentioned dispositions the procedure for the EC budget will apply to all expenditure 
charged to the Communities' budget. This means that since the external control made by 
the ECA is included in that budgetary procedure, the ECA must audit all expenditure 
made by the Communities concerning the pillars of the European Union. 
^^This amendment has been proposed in order to promote the cohesion between the Union's foreign 
policy and the complete framework of the Union's foreign activities and external relations while a 
definition of the administrative and operational expenditure of the foreign policy has been requested but 
so far has not been adopted. See P. K. loakimidis, The Revision of the Treaty of Maastricht, Themelio 
Publications, 1995, p. 60. 
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B. Methods and Types of Audit 
1. General Aspects 
Before analysing the ECA's system of audit, in order to comprehend and evaluate 
it properly, it is usefiil to present very briefly some principles concerning audit and 
especially public audit, which is mainly the kind of audit the ECA performs. 
In every form of organisation, whether it is a state or an international 
organisation, or something in between, like the European Communities, there are mainly 
four stages of financial activity: a) Planning and Programming, b) Budgeting, c) 
.Implementation of the Budget, and d) Audit and Evaluation which are going to form the 
basis for a new Planning and Programming procedure etc.^ ^ This circular system is called 
the Circle of (Financial) Management.™ It is clear that the existence of a successfijl Audit 
is essential for the Circle to work. Such an Audit must meet the following conditions: a) 
it must include an examination of whether the financial acfivities are rational or not, 
whether the financial reports and sheets are presented properly or not, whether the 
procedures estimated during Planning as necessary and the action taken are in 
accordance with each other or not , b) it must conclude whether the resources of the 
Organisation are used by it in an economic and effective way, c) it must establish the 
effectiveness of the action taken.^' These conditions can be described in one phrase e.g. 
"controlling the regularity of financial management". The regularity's control has a 
double context: it means the examination of both the legality of financial management 
(whether the revenue received or the payments made are based on a legislative text's 
disposition and included in the budget) and i f the supporting documents (invoices etc.) of 
the financial actions are complete and legitimately drawn up.^ ^ 
''^  A. Maggina, op. cit., p. 80. 
Ibid, p. 80. 
" Ibid, p. I3I-I32. 
K. X. Sarantopoulos, General Principles of Public Audit, in The Audit of Public Finance in Greece 
and Abroad (Studies), Athens 1975, p. 11-34 (22). 
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In order to achieve these goals various types of audit have been created using 
different criteria. There is first of all the institutional criterion, meaning which insfitution 
performs the audit. Accordingly there are a) the administrative audit (performed by 
administrative institutions), b) the judicial audit performed by judicial institutions and 
mainly courts) and c) the parliamentary audit (performed by Parliaments or their 
committees).^ •^ Another criterion involves the time of audit's performance, meaning when 
the audit is made. So, there are a) the ex ante audit which means that the audit is being 
performed before the completion of the financial acfion (whether this is a receipt of 
revenue or a payment of expenditure), and b) the ex post audit which means that the 
audit is performed after a specific time period aiming to examine all the financial activity 
that took place during this period.^'' A similar criterion focuses on the audit's duration. 
Based on that, there can be distinguished a) the regular or constant audit which means 
that the audit is being performed constantly during the financial acfivity and b) the 
extraordinary or periodical audit which means that the audit is being performed on a 
specific occasion covering a particular issue.Another division of audits is between 
internal and external: internal is the audit performed by people or bodies within the 
audited organisation while external is the audit performed by people or bodies outside 
the audited organisation's hierarchy.The audit's context has been used as a criterion to 
create another distinction. So, there are a) the general audit that contains a complete and 
without any limits examination of the total financial management, b) the special audit that 
focuses on a specific aspect or problem of management, being performed especially for 
that issue and c) the partial audit that also deals only with a sector of financial 
" Ibid, p, 16-17. 
Ibid, p. 17-18. 
" Ibid, p. 18. 
Ibid, p. 18. 
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management but is not performed to examine especially an issue.Another criterion has 
been the audit's extent. According to this there are a) the complete audit that covers all 
the financial activities throughout their realisation and b) the indicative audit that covers 
only a number of selected financial actions.It will be attempted to examine the ECA's 
audit in the light of these distictions. 
n. Types of Audit used by the Court 
According to Art. 188c(2) [248(2)], first sub-paragraph of the EC Treaty 
"The Court of Auditors shall examine whether all revenue has been received 
and. all expenditure incurred in a lawfid and regular manner and whether the 
financial management has been sound. " 
So the purpose of the examination of the accounts has several objectives. In 
everything that concerns the revenue, to check that the amounts due to the Union (since 
the ECA, as demonstrated above, audits all the three pillars of the European Union and 
not only the Communities) have been duly established, recorded and entered in the 
accounts. Respectively, with regard to the expenditure, to confirm that the amounts 
owed by the Union have been recovered or paid. A third objecfive is to verify that the 
operations carried out have been backed up with supporting documents and that the 
available information is sufficient to enable the management and control authorities to 
carry out their respective tasks to the fiall.^' 
There are some key words in these dispositions that must be analysed; legality, 
regularity, sound financial management. The Court's examination as to legality and 
regularity is based on checking whether individual acts of assessment and payment of 
revenue and, in parallel with these, individual commitments and payment operafions, 
" Ibid, p. 18 where it also acknowledged tliat the distinction between special and partial audit is ver>' 
difficult. 
78 Ibid, p. 18-19. 
European Cou 
cit., p. 122 & D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 279. 
™ rt of Auditors, op. cit., p. 18, National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 224, N. Themelis, op. 
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have been carried out in compliance with the relevant legal provisions (sectoral 
regulations, conventions, mandates, agreements and contracts).^" The legality audit goes 
a little fiarther by including a review of the management as a whole, focusing mainly on 
its compatibihty with the Treaties and the secondary legislafion (budget. Financial 
Regulation, internal management rules).The ECA's audit also examines whether the 
accounting systems of the Communities are adequate and capable of recording all 
transactions correctly. The Court while performing its audit a) will respect the 
budgetary rules^ ,^ b) will report any cases of fraud detected and c) will respect and 
follow the observations concerning the auditing standards and practices.^ '* 
As for the quesfion of establishing whether the financial management has been 
sound or not (otherwise called "value for money" audit), there are three inter-related 
aspects of management which are practically examined, called the three "Es": Economy, 
Efficiency and Effectiveness.^^ The "Economy" relates planned input of resources to the 
actual input meaning the examination of whether the least expensive means of achieving 
a given target have been used or not (examination of ahernatives). The "Efficiency" is 
reflected by the relationship between actual input (resources) and actual output (results 
achieved) meaning the examination of whether the means adopted were employed in the 
most appropriate manner (examination of performance). The "Effectiveness" which is 
measured by the comparison of actual output with planned output meaning the 
examination of whether the purpose has been achieved or not (success rate). 
European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 18-19. 
'^ Ibid, p. 19. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 224. 
Unity-all financial activity of the Union will be included in one single document knowai as the budget, 
Universality-budgetary revenue may not be allocated to particular items of expenditure and no 
adjustments between revenue and expenditure may take place, Annuality-covering a single and complete 
financial year by the budget, Specification-the appropriations made available are not aggregated but 
allocated to the various budgetary headings and subheadings, Equilibrium behveen expenditure and 
revenue-according to Art. 199 [268] of the E C Treaty the revenue and expenditure shown in the budget 
shall be in balance. For a detailed analysis of the budgetary rules see D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. 
cit., p. 41-72 & G. D. Drisis, op. cit., p. 119-121 and 148-151. 
G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 81-83. 
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It must be pointed out though that this kind of audit should not include the 
evaluation of the purpose selected which is a question of political choice.^ * The ECA 
must not question policy decisions but it will investigate the financial and other 
consequences of such decisions and their implementafion.^^ In other words, the Court is 
not empowered to decide whether the Communities should introduce a particular kind of 
policy but only to report as to whether that chosen line of policy is being conducted in a 
cost effective way.^ ^ It should refrain from evaluating policy goals and it distinguishes 
between goal achievement and effectiveness, as not every goal achievement can be the 
result of the implemented policy.Effectiveness auditing is defined as "auditing that 
focuses on the extent of goal achievement, the effects and/or effectiveness of the policy 
as well as the efficiency of its implementation".Of course, in order for the ECA to be 
able to audit and conclude that the financial management has been sound, it is necessary 
for the political authorities to set clearly the objectives of their selected policy^'. This 
setting is done as follows: all the appropriations in the budget are accompanied by a 
commentary in which there is an analysis of the legal basis of the respective 
expenditure.^^ This commentary very often contains just a statement of political aims or 
makes reference to an act of political context, like a resolution.^^ So the goals, even 
though they are mentioned in a legislative text like the budget, are expressed in rather 
vague terms. The result of this situation is that the audit of economy and efficiency 
cannot draw the necessary attention to misuse of resources, while effectiveness in 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 475 & D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 279. 
87 
G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 83. 
D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 188. 
D. Swann, The Economics of the Common Market, Penguin Books Publications, 1995, p. 65. 
F. L. Leeuw, Effectiveness auditing in the Netherlands: History, Charter and case studies, EUROSAl, 
No 1, 1993-1994, pp. 16-20 (17). 
°^ Ibid, p. 17. 
'^ P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 105. 
A. Dashwood, The limits of European Community powers, ELRev,Vol. 21, 1996, p. 113-128 (126). 
Ibid, p. 126. 
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achieving poHcy aims cannot be judged.^ '* The less the auditee is defining precisely the 
objecfives, the more difficult it is for the auditor to distinguish between questioning the 
merits of policy objectives (which falls beyond the limits of audit) and assessing whether 
value for money has been achieved in the pursuit of those objectives.^' 
There are two reasons for this vagueness in defining policy objectives. One is that 
those with political responsibility for poHcy matters do not accept any crificism for their 
actions,even i f this criticism is made by an institution established exactly for that 
purpose. The other is more complex since it has to do with the so called "abuse of 
budgetary powers".Some times, the vague terms used in order to describe a policy of 
the Communities aim to include in the budget the financing of activities that are 
doubtfiilly within the Communities' own competence.^ ^ There are procedural, political 
and legal causes for this.^ ^ The procedural cause has to do with the distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. Since the Council, an institution that has 
to be carefial about the limits of Communities' competence, has the final say for only the 
compulsory expenditure (the respecfive competence for the non compulsory belongs to 
the Parliament), it cannot actually control the choice of political objecfives for which non 
compulsory expenditure is authorised."^ The political cause is that within the Council, 
several Member States find it difficult to oppose certain polifical choices that perhaps are 
beyond the Communifies' or the Union's competence, but have a laudable context.'"^ 
The legal cause has to do with the doctrine of "acfions ponctuelles", according to which 
'^^  T. M. James, op. cit., p. 476. 
1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 615. 
''ibid, p. 615. 
'' For this abuse see A. Dashwood, op. cit., p. 126-128. 
Ibid, p. 126. 
Ibid, p. 126. 
See Art. 203 [272] of the E C Treaty. The relative definitions are included in the Joint Declaration by 
the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, on 30 June 1982. For a detailed analysis of this 
declaration see P. Dankert, The Joint Declaration by the Community Institutions of 30 June 1982 on tlie 
Community Budgetary Procedure, CMLRev, Vol. 20, 1983, p. 701-712. 
A. Dashwood, op. cit., p. 126-127. 
'°'lbid, p. 127. 
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expenditure on these kind of actions does not require legislative authorisafion because "it 
falls within the scope of the inherent powers which are incidental to the Commission's 
executive role".'°^ All these create an environment that does not tolerate preciseness in 
the political goals' setting, giving the ECA a very hard time when it performs its audits. 
A "value for money" audit is based on an assessment, made by the ECA, of the 
adequacy of internal systems and on taking into consideration a wide range of internal 
and external data to inform its views on the organisafion's administration.'"'' More 
specifically, the Court investigates thoroughly and evaluates the internal mechanisms and 
systems that govern the revenue and expenditure in question and must take also into 
account their nature and individual characteristics.'"^ This implies an analysis of various 
types of data and information according to the sector under investigation, data that are 
both internal and external to the administration or organisation in question, macro-
economic data, comparative studies of other management systems, and more particularly 
an examination of a significant number of operations and gradually the auditor will arrive 
at a judgement, as objective as possible, that will enable him to form and express an 
opinion as to whether the system implemented is likely to lead to the results that it was 
meant to achieve.'"* 
nr. System of Audit 
The ECA always wanted to find a way of using its limited auditing personnel in 
controlling very important and complex capital flows from the Communities in large 
Ibid, p. 127. 
National Audit Office, op. cit., p. 226. 
European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 19. 
'°^Ibid, p. 19-20. 
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areas, so it decided to adopt a method called "systems-based approach of audit".'"^ This 
system, as described by the Court itself in its Annual Report for 1980,"^ 
"...means that the auditor seeks to rely, as far as possible, on the way in which 
the informafion he is to audit is produced. It is based on the idea that the internal 
administration, by its organisation and mode of operation, should be self 
controlling; this constitutes the concept of internal control. In applying this 
approach the Court examines all the elements of the institution's internal 
management which makes up the processes of authorising, recording and 
verifying financial transactions e.g. the organisafion plan and the allocafion of 
responsibilities for acfions and decisions having financial and accounting 
implications. I f the systems and procedures appear to be sound, the Court carries 
out tests of cases and transactions and such analytical checks as it deems 
necessary to confirm that the systems are operafing as described and producing 
safisfactory results. I f systems' weaknesses are identified, cases and transactions 
are examined to establish the practical consequences of weaknesses.... It is in the 
interests of the Communities in general that any deficiencies in management 
procedures should be idenfified and remedied." 
In July 1979, the ECA sent an audit nofice to its staff describing the main 
elements of the systems based audit (which are still valid): 
"a) to ascertain and document the whole system of control within the 
organisation, 
b) to check that the prescribed system is actually followed, 
c) to evaluate the system and identify weak areas, 
d) to carry out compliance tests over the whole year (these tests are to provide 
each year a reasonable degree of assurance that the prescribed accounting 
system and controls actually exist and are being complied with, including the 
questions: i) were the necessary procedures performed? ii) were they 
performed by the appropriate person, iii) how well they were performed), 
e) to prepare audit plans and programmes of the substanfive tests indicated to be 
needed (these tests are to obtain evidence as to the validity and the propriety 
of the treatment of accounting transactions or, conversely, of errors or 
irregularities therein, unintentional or intenfional, which have a material 
monetary effect on the accounts being audited, 
f) to carry out these programmes, 
g) to carry out such other tests (e.g. analytical, comparative) as considered 
necessary, 
h) to record and report the results, 
i) to determine and carry out substanfive tests on the final accounts."'"^ 
The key to this method is that the ECA at first examines, analyses and documents 
the system of internal control within the organisation under audit and then tests the 
N. Themelis, op. cit., p. 122. 
OJ 1981, C 344/8-9. 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 477. 
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compliance of the system's actual fianction in practice with the theoretical model made by 
the ECA after the first examination."" I f the resuhs of this test show that the system is 
valid, then the ECA's auditor proceeds with the examination of essential figures of 
financial transactions using though a limited number of samples and carries out 
substantive and comparative tests.'" 
This method has been adopted not only because it could produce important 
substantive results but also because it has been easy to apply since the organisations 
under the ECA's audit are obliged, according to Art. 83(3) of the Financial Regulafion, 
to "transmit to the Court of Auditors any rules of procedure they adopt in respect of 
financial matters" so the ECA has always had a complete and detailed picture of their 
internal financial system."^ This is very helpfiil for the audit's effective performance. 
Thus the systems based approach of audit has two advantages: firstly an economy of 
means (by avoiding the double controlling -externally and internally- of the same issues) 
and secondly the presentation of the defaults of the system used by examining globally 
the system's crucial points and not after an individual examination of each of the 
system's final results, creating this way a "cartography" of the sectors that are going to -
and should- be controlled."^ 
An important exception from this method has been the audit work performed in 
order for the ECA to adopt the Statement of Assurance, an audit work that focuses 
primarily in direct substantive testing."'' The method used in this case is known as 
"monetary unit sampling" and involves taking individual units of account as the 
population and then taking a sample of 600 so-called "hits", ensuring at the same time 
that the samples selected are broadly representative of the total population of which they 
""Ch. Kok, op. cit. p. 354. 
European Court Of Auditors, op. cit., p. 21. 
"^P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 106. 
"'Ibid, p. 107. 
""^  European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 21. 
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are drawn. "^ The transactions of which the "hit" units form part are audited down to the 
level of the final beneficiary. A judgement is made about the significance of any errors 
detected and the resuh from the sample is then extrapolated to the whole budget."* The 
ECA's aim is to be able to say with 95% certainty that error in the execution of the total 
budget is no more than 1%."'' This methodology, as the ECA has admitted, is largely 
experimental. Ways of developing it have been examined by specialists which suggested 
that the ECA must increase the amount of audit work undertaken in areas considered to 
be of greater risk"^, which means an increase of sampling and a closer monitoring of 
transactions in these areas. This diversification of the audit procedure is a result of the 
above mentioned Court's position that it cannot comment on materials that it has not 
examined. Before 1993 the ECA did not think that it should check the accuracy of the 
EC accounts as a whole, so it had to come up with a new audit method in order to be 
able to provide the Statement of Assurance. 
According to the other subparagraphs of Art. 188c(2) [248(2)] 
"The audit of revenue shall be carried out on the basis both of the amounts 
established as due and the amounts actually paid to the Community. 
The audit of expenditure shall be carried out on the basis both of commitments 
undertaken and payments made. 
These audits may be carried out before the closure of accounts for the financial 
year in question." 
In these dispositions it is clear that the ECA is performing both ex ante and ex 
post audits since it may audit a financial transaction either before a payment is made to or 
by the Communities or after, not only locating where the Communities have already 
wrongly collected or given money but also preventing them from wrongly collecting or 
paying money. The ECA's competence to perform ex ante audits is very important since 
this kind of audit precludes any misuse of state's money (in this case the Communities' 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 612, National Audit Office, Report on the Annual 
Report of the European Court of Auditors & the Statement of Assurance for 1995,London 1997, p. 36. 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly,op. cit.,p. 613 & National Audit Office, Report on..,op. cit., p.36. 
" ' I . Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 613. 
59 
money) and consequently any damage to the State"^ (in this case the Communifies). 
Also the provision concerning the possibility of the audit being performed before the 
closure of the financial year is based on the previous experience of the Audit Board's 
function since the audits performed by this Board were interpreted (mainly by the 
Commission) to be conducted only after the closure of the financial year.^ "^ This created 
a gap that undermined the whole audit system of the Communifies. But under the current 
provisions the audits take place during the financial year and may begin as soon as the 
event giving rise to the revenue or the expenditure has occurred. This results in the 
carrying out of the management and the control with a greater degree of simultaneity 
than would not otherwise be possible.'^' 
Two very good examples of the ECA's competence to control the soundness of 
financial management are the cases involving the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI). According to Art. 27 of the Protocol concerning 
the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank Statute, which 
was annexed to the EC Treaty by the EU Treaty 
"(I) The account of the European Central Bank and national central banks shall 
be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing 
Council and approved by the Council The auditors shall have full power to 
examine all books and accounts of the European Central Bank and national 
central banks and obtain full information about their transactions. 
(2)The provisions of Art 188c of this Treaty shall only apply to an examination 
of the operational efficiency of the management of the European Central Bank. " 
Exactly the same is to be found in the wording of Art. 17(4) of the Protocol 
concerning the European Monetary Institute Statute, which was also annexed to the EC 
Treaty by the EU Treaty. These disposifions are very clear stafing that the ECA will 
examine the operational efficiency of the management of ECB and EMI. But as 
explained above the audit concerning the sound financial management includes three 
National Audit Office, Report on.., op. cit., p. 37. 
" ' K . X . Sarantopoulos, op. cit., p. 17. 
G. Isaac, op. cit., p. 797. 
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objectives, in order to be complete: the economy, the efficiency and the effectiveness. So 
the ECA must not limit itself to examining only the efficiency but will also check whether 
these two organizations have used the most economic means necessary to succeed in 
their tasks (economy) and whether the objectives, that they themselves have set, have 
been obtained and to what extend (effectiveness). It must be said also that according to 
the above mentioned provisions the legality and regularity of the accounts of the ECB 
and the EMI are subjected to audit by independent external auditors. The fact that the 
ECA is not mentioned, led to the conclusion that it should not perform this audit and 
thus the ECA does not examine the legality and regularity of the accounts of the ECB 
and the EMI. But the dispositions only mention what are the general characteristics of 
the auditors ("independenf and "external"). Since the ECA has both these qualifications, 
there is no reason why it should not audit completely the ECB and the EMI. Not 
mentioning the ECA does not mean that it is automatically excluded. And furthermore, 
the "systems based" audit of the ECA can cover in a very satisfactory extend the 
transaction performed by the ECB and the EMI, on administrative and operational level. 
It has been suggested though that the ECA's audit should be limited to examining only 
the ECB's and the EMI's operational efficiency as stated in the above mentioned 
dispositions.'^^ Of course, such a limiting point of view is overlooking the above 
mentioned points regarding the audit for sound financial management and the qualities of 
the ECA as an independent and external audit body. 
Generally speaking, given the size and complexity of the Communifies' structure, 
the audit system adopted by the Court is considered to be inevitable and sensible. '^ ^ 
European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 22-23. 
'^ ^ R. Dunnet, Legal and Institufional Issues affecting Economic and Monetar)' Union, in D. 0' Keeffe 
and P. M. Towmey (ed.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treat>', Chancer '^ Law Publishing Ltd, 1994, pp. 
135-147 (p. 140, note 38). 
House of Coimnons, Committee of Public Accounts, The Court of Auditors of tlie European 
Conununities, Session 1981-1982, 5* Report, HC paper 92, para. 13. 
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C. The role of the European Court of Auditors in the battle against fraud 
and corruption in the European Communities 
"The huge sums which are being lost due to fraud and irregularity against the 
Community are losses borne by all the taxpayers and traders of Europe. This 
strikes at the roots of democratic societies, based as they are on the rule of law 
and its enforcement, and it is a public scandal".'^'' 
This conclusion, reached by the House of Lords in 1989, shows the significance 
of the issue of fraud in the European Communities. This significance is considered to 
have four dimensions: The first one involves the so called "direct effects" of fraud, 
meaning the informal misallocation of resources resulting in a distribution of money 
which is not based on the criteria of the Communifies' rules and policies.'^^ The second 
concerns the "indirect effects" of fraud, meaning the damage that fraud is causing to the 
Communities' image with regard to European public opinion, especially about the EC 
capacity to reach further goa l s .The third dimension of fraud is that this phenomenon 
is a very worrying "symptom" in the course towards European Union and the 
collaboration of the Member States with the Communities is required in order to 
eliminate any fraudulent activities.The forth dimension is that Community fraud is a 
"stimulus" for an organisational restructuring of the Communities, based on the 
European institutions' conclusions from their attempt to limit fraud. I f the resources 
absorbed by the tackling of fraud are added to all these, then a pretty good picture of 
the fraud within the Communities is obtained. 
According to the Commission's findings in the area of its own resources fraud 
represents 787 mil. ECU (5,8% of the revenue collected in 1996 while the respective 
'^ ^ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Fraud against the European 
Conmiunities, Session 1988-1989, 5* Report, HL paper 27, para. 205. 
M. Mendrinou, European Community Fraud and tlie politics of institutional development, EJPR, Vol. 
26, 1994, p. 81-101 (87). 
Ibid, p. 88-89. 
'^ ^ Ibid, p. 90. 
Ibid, p. 90-93. 
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percentage for 1995 was 3,6%)/^° Also, in the area of expenditure the level of fraud 
stands at 498 mil. ECU (0,7% of the total expenditure while in 1995 it was 0,6%)/'' 
The overall figure for fraud totals 1,3 bil. ECU while in 1995 it was 1,1 bil. ECU/'^ In a 
sector by sector examination, in 1996, there have been reported throughout the 
Community 297 cases of fraud against the Structural Funds concerning an amount of 
almost 64 mil. ECU, while in the sector of the EAGGF-Guarantee Section 1.944 cases 
of fraud have been reported, concerning an amount of almost 204 mil. ECU.'^' 
Frauds in the European Communities are related both to revenue (money 
collected by the Communities) and expenditure (money paid by the Communities). 
The ECA, because of the nature of its task, is perhaps the only institution that faces 
such a very large number of cases of fraudulent behaviour. In its very first Annual 
Report for the year 1977, the Court tried to focus on the issue of fraud by defining it: 
"We should be very clear what it is meant by fraud. It has been defined as 
criminal deception, the use of false representations to gain an unjust advantage. 
In the Community context it is the deliberate misappropriation of money or 
goods, inevitably involving breaking the law or the relevant rules and instructions 
of the organisation concerned. It is necessary to distinguish fraud in this sense 
from actions designed to exploit loopholes in existing legislation. These, although 
they may result in material benefits which were not intended by the by the 
legislators, cannot be considered to constitute fraud. Indeed they may be carried 
out openly, whereas it is the nature of fraud to be secret. In any such case where 
the existing law contains loopholes or results in exploitation which is thought to 
be undesirable, it may be necessary to revise the law to ensure that its original 
purpose is achieved. But actions which remain within the law cannot be 
considered to be fraudulent.""^ 
This definition clearly demonstrates that the ECA uses as a measure of fraud not 
the effect of the fraudulent activity on the Communities' resources but whether a legal 
Ibid, p. 93-96. 
European Commission, Protection of Community Financial Interests-Fight against fraud, Annual 
Report 1996, (www.europa.eu.int/coimTi/sg/uclaf/arl996.htm). 
Ibid. 
•^^Ibid. 
'^ ^ "Commission facing Euro-frauds", E . E . , issue 3, 1997, p. 31. 
'^ ^ A. Sherlock, dir. Harding, Controlling Fraud within tlie European Communit>', ELRev., Vol. 16, 
1991, p. 20-36 (22). 
'^ ^ Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1977, OJ 1978, C-313/8. 
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rule has been violated or not. Following this approach the ECA does not use very often 
the term fraud but it replaces it with the term "irregularities". This is in accordance with 
its competence to control the regularity and the legality of the Communities accounts, 
but when it comes to the audit of the soundness of the financial management, this 
measure is not enough. The examination of whether economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness have succeeded demands for a more substantive approach and not just 
examining i f a legal rule has been violated. The "loopholes", as the ECA calls the cases 
where law is not providing a complete coverage, are indeed the points where the 
soundness of the financial management is tested. In these cases the ECA is required to 
examine essentially the means used for the implementation of the Communities' policies, 
i f they were suitable and efficient and if they were effective in achieving the goals set. 
These points of view seem to have been included in the Court's elaboration on the issue 
of fraud, because in its Opinion adapted in 1979, the ECA gave a different definition of 
fraud saying that the irregularities that the Member States have to report to the 
Commission should 
"be confined to those which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, 
involve any act or practice or omission designed to result in a loss of own 
resources or any act or practice or omission whereby the establishment of 
resources is unduly delayed."'^'' 
Judging from this wording, it seems that the ECA is focusing not only on the 
violation of law but also on the substantive outcome of fraud in order to define it, even if 
in this particular case only the sector of revenue is involved. 
More recently, in an attempt to establish a more effective mechanism to combat 
fraud, the Council has taken the following action: At first, it has drawn up the 
'^ ^ Opinion of the Court of Auditors on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the measures to be 
taken in the event of irregularities affecting the own resources referred to in the Decision of 21 April 
1970 and the organization of an information system for the Coimnission in tliis field, OJ 1979, C-
187/10. 
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"Convention on the Protection of European Communities' financial interests" (hereafter 
referred to as PFI Convention). According to Art. 1 of the PFI Convention 
"Fraud affecting the European Communities financial interests shall consist of: 
a) in respect of expenditure, any international act or omission relating to: 
-the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statemetits or 
documents, which has as its effect the misappropriation or wrongful retention of 
funds from the general budget of the European Communities or budgets 
managed by, or not behalf of the European Communities 
-non disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the 
same effect 
-the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for which they 
were originally granted; 
b) in respect of revenue, any international act or omission relating to: 
—the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or 
documents, which has as its effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the 
general budget of the European Communities or budgets managed by, or not 
behalf of the European Communities 
-non disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, with the 
same effect 
-misapplication of a legally obtained, benefit, with the same effect". 
Second, it has adopted the Regulation 2988/95'^ ^ on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, according to Art. 1 (2) of which 
"Irregularity shall mean any infringement of a provision of Community law 
resulting from an act or omission by an economic operator, which has, or would 
have, the effect of prejudicing the general budget of the Communities or budgets 
managed by them, either by reducing or losing revenue accruing from own 
resources collected directly on behalf of the Communities, or by an unjustified 
item of expenditure. " 
These definitions, although they are not exactly the same as those given by the 
ECA, have a substantive similarity to them. So, it is obvious that the ECA, during its 
audits, is targeting to the correct objects in its attempt to prevent fraud. 
But all these do not give a complete reply to the very important question, posed 
along time ago: "What should the ECA's role be?"'^ ^ In January 1989, during a public 
hearing organised by the Commission, the President of the ECA said: 
"The Court is not -and I cannot emphasise this strongly enough- an antifraud 
squad,.... it is not a police force,.... We do, on the other hand, consider that its is 
Council Act of 26 M y 1995, OJ 1995, C-316/48-53. 
'^ ^ OJ 1995, L-312/1-4. 
139 Ch. Kok, op. cit. p. 363. 
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perfectly within our powers to point out weaknesses of management or 
organisation which might create a danger of fraud or irregularity. In other words, 
we are interested more in deterrence and the prevention of fraud that in detecting 
i^„140 
This statement shows clearly the orientation of the ECA's efforts. The ECA has 
not been created just to trace individual fraud and irregularities. Its practice so far has 
been to address the fiandamental issues and, when it spots a weakness in the system of 
internal control that might suggest or result in fraudulent activity, to notify the 
Communities and the authorities of the Member States.''*^ This has been included in the 
wording of the EC Treaty after the amendment of Art. 188c(2) [248(2)], first sub-
paragraph, concerning the ECA's method of audit, by the Treaty of Amsterdam which 
added one phrase at the end: "In doing so, it shall report in particular on any cases of 
irregularity". 
This is a clear indication of what the Communities expect from the ECA. The 
Court will be able to draw up reports concerning irregularifies detected in the financial 
management of the Communities. In these reports the Court will include irregularities 
and frauds detected not only in the Communifies' institufions but also in the Member 
States. These reports can be either incorporated in the Annual Report or can be separate. 
It would be an interesting development, i f for these reports a small variation of the 
proposal of the House of Lords^"^ had been adopted, meaning the Council to be obliged 
to state to the Parliament what action has been taken concerning the conclusions of the 
reports about frauds. 
The protection of the Communities' financial interests is not limited to the 
prevention of fraud. Very often, cases of fraud have revealed cases of corruption of 
'''°D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit. p. 297. 
Ch. Kok, op. cit.,p. 363. 
Ibid, p. 363-364. 
'''^  House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Fraud against the European 
Communities...., op. cit., para. 203 where it is suggested that when the Council reports to the Parliament 
on the ECA's Annual Report it must also state what action will be taken and if none, then why not. 
66 
oflFicials in the European Communities.''*'* Even though corruption is a issue of mainly 
criminal substance (in everything that concerns its legal aspect), escaping thus the ECA's 
jurisdiction, the connection between fraud and corrupfion is so evident, that gives the 
ECA an indirect role in the Communities' dealing with corruption. 
During 1995, two instruments against corruption have been proposed: a) a 
Protocol to the PFI Convention and b) a Convention against corruption by oflTicials of 
the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union.'""^ The 
definition of corruption given by both these texts is almost identical, since both define 
"passive corruption as the deliberate action of an official who requests, accepts 
or receives, directly or through a third party, for himself or for a third party, 
offers, promises or advantages of any kind whatsoever to act or to refrain from 
acting in accordance with his functions or in the exercise thereof in breach of 
his officials duties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the European 
Communities financial interests " 
and 
"active corruption as the deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, 
directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind whatsoever to an 
official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from acting in 
accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his 
official duties in a way which damages or is likely to damage the European 
Communities ' financial interests ". '^^ 
As it is obvious, corruption (active or passive) by definition is a situation 
hazardous to the financial interests of the Communities. An institution like the ECA, 
established to protect these interests, cannot be indifferent to such phenomena. The 
ECA's reaction is going to be similar to that one against fraud. The Court will examine if 
in the system of the audited organisation there are situations that can be considered 
symptoms of corruption and in such case will inform the other European institutions and 
the Member States. Again here the ECA is not going to search for specific cases of 
Case 46/72, De Greefv. Commission, [1973] ECR, p. 543, Case 326/91, De Compte v. European 
Parliament, [1994], E C R I, p. 2091. 
'''^  S. White, Proposed Measures against corruption of officials in the European Union, ELRev., Vol. 21, 
1996, p. 465-476 (466). 
""^  Ibid, p. 467 and 470. 
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corruption. The systems based audit will allow it to spot situations in the system that can 
be interpreted as corruption, not whether a specific official has been bribed or not and, if 
yes, by whom. This latter task is purely out of the ECA's jurisdiction and lies within the 
jurisdiction of national authorities.^''^ 
Sadly the EC is not even mentioned once in the PFI Convention or Regulation 
2988/95 or the texts concerning corruption. Thankfiilly, this kind of excluding behaviour 
is not reflected by the wording of the Treaties' disposifions concerning the fight against 
fraud. According to Art. 209a [280] of the EC Treaty, as modified by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
"(4) The Council, , after consulting the Court of Auditors, shall adopt the 
necessary measures in the fields of the prevention of and fight against fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Community with a view to affording 
effective and equivalent protection in the Member States. These measures shall 
not concern the application of national criminal law or the national 
administration of justice." 
This new advisory competence of the ECA, will enable it to have a more global view of 
the problem of fraud (and consequently of corruption up to a point). Of course it must be 
said that also in the past, the ECA had adopted reports concerning issues of irregularities 
either as independent documents like the Special Report on the system for the payment 
of refiands on agricultural exports (Audit of the export of agricultural products),"^ and 
Report No 2/1990 on the management and control of export refiands,'''^  or incorporated 
in its Annual Reports like in those for the financial years 1979, 1983, 1984,1986, 1989, 
1993, etc.^^° This reporting activity probably is going to focus more on the problem of 
147 Ibid, p. 468 and particularly for the officials of the Communities p. 471-474. 
'''^  OJ 1985, C-215/1. 
OJ 1990, C-133/1. 
See OJ 1980, C-342/67-69, OJ 1984, C-348/26-27 & 43-44, OJ 1985, C-326/43, OJ 1987, C-336/62, 
OJ 1990, C-313/44-45, OJ 1994, C-327/109-110, respectively. 
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fraud and corruption in the Communities, considering the new duties that the Treafies are 
imposing on the ECA, after the Amsterdam amendments. 
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Chapter Three 
Relations of the European Court of Auditors 
with the other European Institutions and Organisations 
Judging from the provisions of the Treaties concerning the European 
Communities and the European Union, there are two levels of relations between the 
ECA and the other European Institutions. The first is the level of joint audit. In this case 
the ECA is practically "joining forces" with other European institutions in order to audit 
another organisation, inside or outside the institufional framework of the European 
Union. The second is the auditor-auditee level. In this case the ECA is auditing the 
accounts of the European institutions, according to the respective provisions of the 
Treaties. The institution that is mainly "joining forces" on the level of joint audit with the 
ECA is the European Pariiament. And the Commission is the main auditee. 
It is true that some times it is difficult to distinguish between the two levels of 
audit. This situation is caused by the audit method used by the ECA. The "systems 
based" approach, as mentioned above, is focusing on the internal control framework of 
the organisation under audit. So, sometimes even though there is an audit based on the 
second level (auditor-auditee), it is easy to create the impression that there is a joint audit 
procedure. This confiasion is being avoided if the object of audit is located, isolated and 
focused on. When the procedure has as an object to detect mainly malflinctions within 
the system of internal control, then there is a auditor-auditee level of audit. When the 
procedure has as main object to find substantial irregularities in the accounts of the 
audited organisation, then there is a joint audit level of audit. 
The Member States in a Declaration of the Intergovernmental Conference which 
led to the Treaty on European Union asked for the other institutions to examine along 
with the ECA all the means necessary for the reinforcement of its work's eflfecfiveness. 
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A. Cooperation with the European Parliament 
The final subparagraph of Art. 188c(4) [248(4)] provides that 
"The Court shall assist the European Parliament and the Council in exercising 
their powers of control over the implementation of the budget". 
The key-word in this disposition is "assists". The Audit Board (predecessor of the ECA), 
as mentioned above, had the exclusive mission to prepare the Annual Report in order to 
present it to Parliament to be used it in the discharge procedure. Parliament's persistent 
desire had always been to have the external audit insfitution placed at its service, as an 
auxihary body.' The final subparagraph of Art. 188c(4) [248(4)], being so "laconic", 
imposes to the ECA a mission of assistance very general and similar to the assistance 
provided by the national audit institutions (judicial or not) of the Member States to the 
Parliaments of their respective countries.^ This has caused tensions between the ECA and 
the Parliament, especially the Parliament's Budgetary Control Committee (BCC).' The 
BCC has considered the ECA to be no more than a technical adjunct to its own work 
rather than an independent audit institution.'* There have been three main points of 
conflict. The fact that the ECA is providing the Commission with information not 
available to the BCC is one of them.^  Another point has been the BCC's will to direct the 
ECA to conduct audits in a specific area.*^  And the ECA's efforts to create its own public 
profile and to gain public support in its criticisms concerning the European Union's 
financial management, did not please the BCC.^ 
' G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 800. 
' Ibid, p. 800. 
^ Tliis Coimnittee, was established as such in 1979. Before, it used to be a sub-committee and under this 
scheme had promoted the idea of the ECA's establisliment. It has 28 members and its competences 
include the Financial Regulation, the discharge given by the Parliament to the Commission, the 
evaluation of the financing activities of the European Union, the studying of the ECA's reports and the 
combat against fraud. For more details, see Office of the European Parliament in Greece, European 
Parliament-The parliamentary institution of the European Union, Athens, 1997, p. 41. 
I. Harden, F. Wliite, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 625. 
^ Ibid, p. 625. 
•^Ibid, p. 625. 
' Ibid, p. 625. 
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The context of the assistance provided by the ECA is defined by Art. 206(1) 
[276(1)] of the EC Treaty. According to this 
"'The European Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the Council 
which shall act by a qualified majority, shall give a discharge to the 
Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget To this end, the 
Council and the European Parliament in turn shall examine the accounts and 
the financial statement referred to in Article 205e[275], the annual report by the 
Court of Auditors together with the replies of the institutions under audit to the 
observations of the Court of Auditors, and any relevant special reports by the 
Court of Auditors." 
The Treaty of Amsterdam amended this disposifion by adding to the documents that the 
Council and the Parliament must examine before discharging the Commission the 
Statement of Assurance of the ECA. This amendment had been proposed by the then 
Dutch Presidency of the Council in order to formalise in the Treaty a practice which 
existed already. 
It is believed that the only "meaningfial" way to assess the ECA's position in the 
institutional system of the European Communities is within the context of the discharge 
procedure.^ The Annual Report is considered to be the "link" between the ECA and the 
Parliament.^ The President of the ECA formally presents the Annual Report to the 
Parliament's Budgetary Control Committee by highlighting the main points and 
conclusions and by answering questions.But in addition to the Annual Report the ECA 
submits to the "Budgetary Authority" (Council and Pariiament) the Statement of 
Assurance and any relative special reports that it has adopted. This latter case of the 
"relative special reports" has raised some issues. These reports are treated equally to the 
Annual Report. So, a first problem will be how is it going to be decided that a special 
report is relevant to the discharge procedure?'^ And secondly, given the difference of 
procedures between the Annual Report and the special reports, is it going to be 
^ Ch. Kok, op.cit., p. 349. 
^ Sir N, Price, op. cit., p. 241 & National Audit Office, State Audit...., op, cit., p. 223. 
'° National Audit Office, State Audit...., op. cit., p. 223. 
" D. Strasser, Les dispositions....,op. cit., p. 201. 
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necessary to organise besides the procedure of the annual discharge an ad hoc discharge 
procedure referring to the issue mentioned in the special reports?'^ The solution to these 
problems cannot be separate since they are two aspects (substantial and procedural) of 
the same issue: what is the use of the special reports in the discharge procedure? The 
context of the special reports themselves may provide the reply to the substantial aspect 
of the problem. A special report is by definition presenting more detailed information on 
a specific issue which arose during audit, thus allowing the Budgetary Authority to 
examine it more carefully with regard to the discharge. In everything that concerns the 
procedural aspect, there is no reason to have a parallel ad hoc discharge procedure. 
According to the relative dispositions of the Financial Regulafion (Art. 78-89) the 
Commission has to send all the necessary information for the accounts of the year N to 
the Parliament, the Council and the ECA till May of the year N+1. The ECA must adopt 
its Annual Report by November of the year N+1. The Budgetary Authority gives the 
discharge to the Commission by 30 April of the year N+2. So there is a time limit of 
about one year and four months. Within this limit the ECA may adopt special reports 
concerning specific issues of the financial management of the year N. The flexibility in 
the procedure of adopting special reports gives this advantage to the ECA. 
The special reports are very carefully and systematically examined by the 
Parliament.'^ When the Parliament is adopting its resolution to give the discharge to the 
Commission it includes in its observations specific references to the ECA's special 
reports.'"* So despite the above mentioned problems in the collaboration between the 
ECA and the ParUament, a sort of alliance between these two institutions is detected.'^  
Given the political significance of the discharge procedure which can be used as a 
political sanction (it is very embarrassing for the Commission if the Parliament denies to 
'^Ibid, p. 201 
'^P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 117. 
"Ibid, p. 117. 
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give it a discharge^''), this alliance of the ECA with the Pariiament is a very decisive 
element in the institutional system of the European Union. 
The ECA's contacts with the Pariiament are very frequent at a number of levels, 
like the presidential (the Presidents of the two institutions), the members' level (members 
and staff" of the ECA meet with members and officials of the BCC to analyse individual 
chapters of the Annual Report) and the informal level (ECA members with other 
members of the Parliament).'^ 
B. Cooperation with the Commission 
It has been pointed out that the Commission is the major spender of the European 
institutions since it is the competent institution for implementing the policies of the 
European Union. It is logical then for this institution to be the main auditee. The ECA 
though, using the "systems based" audit, has tried not to treat the Commission just as an 
auditee but also to collaborate with it on a joint audit level, especially in the fight against 
fraud and corruption within the European Union. This kind of relationship has made 
possible to organise joint audit tasks, to exchange information and to try to reconcile 
points of view between these two institutions. 
As the main auditee, the Commission must respect the dispositions of the 
Treaties concerning the procedure of audit namely Art. 188c(3) [248(3)] of the EC 
Treaty and the respective dispositions of the ECSC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty: 
"The audit shall be based on records and, if necessary, performed on the spot in 
the other institutions of the Community... 
The other institutions of the Community shall forward to the Court of 
Auditors, at its request, any document or information necessary to carry out its 
task." 
G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 87. 
The Parliament has denied to give a discharge to the Conunission in 1984 for tlie implementation of 
the 1982 budget. For more details on that see Ch. Kok, op. cit., p. 350-351. 
" G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 86-87. 
National Audit Office, State Audit..., op. cit., p. 224. 
D. Strasser, The Finaces , op. cit., p. 280. 
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These dispositions have been specified by Art. 85 and 87 of the Financial 
Regulation according to which 
"....the Court of Auditors shall be entitled to consult, in the manner provided for 
Art. 87, all documents and. information relating to the financial management of 
the departments or bodies subject to its inspection; it has the power to make 
enquiries of any official responsible for a revenue or expenditure operation, and 
to use any of the auditing procedures appropriate to those departments or 
bodies. 
The Court of Audi tors.... may be present at its request, during the operations 
carried out by the Commission in implementation of Art 8 and 9 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 729/70 and Art. 17 and 18 of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 
1552/89 " (Art. 85) 
"The Commission .... shall afford the Court of Auditors all the facilities and 
give it all the information which the Court may consider necessary for the 
performance of its task, and shall in particular provide all the information 
obtained as a result of the checks which they have carried out, as required by 
the rules laid down by the Community.... they shall place at the disposal of the 
Court of Auditors all documents concerning the conclusion and implementation 
of contracts and all accounts of cash or materials, all accounting records or 
supporting documents, and also administrative documents..., all documents 
relating to revenue and expenditure, all inventories, and all documents and 
data created or sorted on a magnetic medium " (Art. 87) 
The Financial Regulation's provisions are defining what "on-the-spot audif and "audit 
based on records" means. From these dispositions it is clear that the ECA has access to 
all documents concerning any kind of account run by the Commission. The Court is 
using all the information provided in order to evaluate the Commission's internal control 
system. The "Contradictory Procedure" followed during the drawing of a Court's report 
has been already described. The evaluations of the Court usually are not positive for the 
Commission's control system. In 1994, after the publication of a very criticising /^nual 
Report concerning the financial year 1993, the Secretary-General of the Commission was 
obHged to analyse that the Commission and the ECA are really on the same side^ ", acting 
in order to serve the Communities' interests. 
This kind of conflict has existed always since the ECA's establishment. The 
Commission, despite some declarations of political nature, has always considered the 
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ECA as a Parliament's instrument against the executive authority of the Communities.'^ ' 
So, the Commission often is not willing to provide the ECA with all documents or 
information, when requested to do so by the Court or even the discharge authority (like 
in 1989).^ ^ In an attempt to explain the Commission's behaviour it has been suggested 
that since the Commission is the "guardian of the Treaties" enjoying the respective 
prestige, it has not been accustomed to such thorough investigation of its management 
and accounts.^ ^ A solution proposed is for the ECA to be less tactless in its observations 
and to reaHse the vastness of the Commission's task while on the other hand the 
Commission should consider the ECA's remarks not as pointless criticism but as a 
foundation for reform. '^* It has been pointed out though that because of the 
Communities' financial system it is difficult for a good relationship between the ECA and 
the Commission to be established.^' Since the ECA had been imposed in 1977 as a 
framework of external accountability without any corresponding changes to the internal 
financial management and control of the Commission, the tension between the two 
institutions was inevitable.^'' The Commission exercises little managerial control over the 
Community resources' use by the final recipients in the Member States, thus being unable 
to establish a robust managerial system that the ECA could monitor through its "systems 
based" a u d i t . A n d the whole procedure concerning the Statement of Assurance may 
cause even bigger problems since the sampling method used in order to draw up this 
document is going to give room for disagreement between the ECA and the Commission 
concerning the real meaning of the results of the audit.^ ^ 
°^ I, Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 619. 
'^ G. Orsoni, op. cit., p. 88. 
Ibid, p. 88-89. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 243. 
Ibid, p. 243. 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit, p. 619. 
'^ ^ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Financial Control and Fraud in the 
Community..., op. cit., para. 32. 
'^ 1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 619. 
Ibid, p. 620. 
76 
The ECA has repeatedly pointed out the "holes" in the Commission's 
management and control system. 
So, it has been noted that the Commission's monitoring of the introduction of the 
Directive 77/43 5/EEC^^ on Scrutiny by the Member States of transactions forming part 
of the system of financing by the EAGGF (Guarantee Secfion) has been "intermittent" 
and consequently of "weakened quality".^" The Commission's departments did not 
examine the conditions under which the accounting checks were really carried out or 
how the Directive fitted into the overall system of control of the Member States.'' Al\ 
these had as a result the lack of adopting the optimal control techniques on behalf of the 
Commissions departments (coordination between controlling departments, ufilisation of 
programmes and audit checklists in order to standardise audit approaches, cross 
checking of data, etc.).^^ The Directive 77/435/EEC was once again a point of conflict 
between the ECA and the Commission in 1987. The Court has deemed as "less than 
satisfactory" the Commission's monitoring of the Directive's applicafion because the 
Commission a) did not have complete records of the implementation of the Directive by 
the Member States, b) had not exchange views with the Member States on the 
implementation of the Directive since 1983, c) did not always supplied the Member 
States with information requested regarding the Directive, d) did not analyse the Member 
States' information regarding the uniform and effective implementation of the Directive 
etc.'' 
Also the ECA has pointed out that the Commission had not given the necessary 
priority in exercising its supervisory responsibilities with regard to the prevention of 
OJ 1977, L-172/17. 
°^ Special Report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of Directive 77/435/EEC of 27.6.1917 
on Scrutiny by tlie Member States of transactions forming part of the system of financing by the EAGGF 
(Guarantee Section), OJ 1984, C-336/8. 
Ibid, p. 8. 
Ibid, p. 9 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1987, OJ 1988, C-316/77-78. 
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fraud since it had not improved the organisation of its information and had not subjected 
control systems in the Member States to serious scrutiny with regard to their efficiency.^'' 
Remarks of a similar context were made again when the ECA noted that the Commission 
in 1986 a) had not established a system which will allow it to assess the degree of 
efficiency of national controls, b) had not centralised completely the informafion sent to 
it through its computerised system and c) had participated only in a very small part of the 
on-the-spot checks.^' But it has been acknowledged by the ECA that the Commission 
had made considerable progress in reducing the delays in clearing the Member States' 
annual accounts of EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure.^ *" Some defects though have not 
been eliminated yet, and the Commission is still not able to state whether the Member 
States' EAGGF-Guarantee accounts are correct or not." 
All this did not prevent the Commission from accepting as positive the fact that 
the ECA has been reinforced with regard to its competences and its status as an 
institution of the Communities after the Maastricht Treaty."^ And, mainly after 1993, 
these two institutions have acted together in the battle against fraud in the European 
Communities. This collaboration is based on the audits performed by both institutions, 
even though there no joint audit procedure taking place. The ECA is auditing the 
Commission's internal control system against fraud while the Commission is controlling 
the use of Community resources by the various organisations and bodies. It is though 
possible for the ECA to audit the accounts of such an organisation or body at the same 
time with the Commission. 
The Commission in 1988 set up the Coordinating Unit for the Fight Against 
Fraud (CUFAF, or as it is better known by its French acronym UCLAF) that has been 
Annual Report of die Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1983, OJ 1984, C-348/43-44. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for tlie Financial Year 1986, OJ 1987, C-3 36/66. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for tlie Financial Year 1987, OJ 1988, C-316/78. 
Ibid, p. 78-79. 
European Commission, Report on tlie fiinction op. cit., p. 28, point 69. 
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attached to the Secreteriat-General of the Commission.This Unit has focused on three 
aims: prevention of fraud, cooperation with other institutions and Member States, and 
suppression of fraud/*" Its operational role is to investigate complex and very serious 
cases of fraud, especially of international scale, in collaboration with the appropriate 
national authorities.'*' Comparing these aims with the above mentioned goals of the ECA 
in its anti-fraudulent campaign, it is obvious that the two institutions are determined to 
prevent fraud, and the best possible way to succeed is to cooperate. A very promising 
field for such a cooperation is the on the spot checks. Council Regulation 96/2185/EC''^  
concerning on the spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission, has some 
very interesting dispositions which could lead to such a cooperation. Especially Art. 8(3) 
of this Regulation which provides that the reports prepared by the UCLAF agents 
constitute admissible evidence in judicial proceedings. Such a provision must be made 
also for the reports of the ECA, regardless of whether they are published in the Official 
Journal or not. On the spot checks, on behalf of the ECA, are being performed in an 
increasing rate and the information provided by them could be invaluable in a judicial 
procedure against fraud or corruption. UCLAF has already launched a series of specific 
investigations on the basis of information supplied by the ECA."*^  
Another anti-fraud body was introduced by Council Regulation 89/2048/EEC'''', 
called Specialised Commission Control Body and its task is to combat fraud in the wine 
sector. But the staffing of this body never reached a level which would enable it to 
perform its duties efficiently and effectively.'*^ The Court has noted that only one audit 
D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 251. 
Ibid, p. 251. 
European Commission, The Budget of the European Union: How is your money spent, Europe on the 
move Series, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996, p. lO-l 1. 
OJ 1996, L-292/2. 
'^^ European Commission, Protection of Coimnunity Financial Interests-Fight against fraud. Annual 
Report 1996, (vvww.europa.eu.int/comm/sg/uclaf/arl996.htm). 
44 
45 
OJ 1989, L-202/32. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/89. 
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was carried out by this body during 1996 and at the end of 1996 there is only one 
controller to this body and he is integrated in the Commission's clearance department/*^ 
Because of this de facto abolition of this body, a question was posed, whether the 
Commission considered that the tasks this body was designed for are unnecessary/*^ The 
Commission replied that this situation exists because there is a regrouping of the control 
functions within Directorate General VI , where this body belongs, and because it is 
difficult to find staff qualified for such a posifion.'*^ 
The problem of fraud in the European Communities has a significant structural 
dimension since there is a complex system of collecting and paying money through 
agencies without a natural interest in the efficient and fair operation of that system.''^  So, 
it is in the Communities' interest for the two institutions charged with internal control 
(Commission) and external audit (ECA) to be able to work together against fraud. The 
Commission, being the financial manager of the Communities, may be able to identify 
fraudulent behaviour, since there are also the necessary legislative and empirical 
definitions. The ECA, on the other hand, has all the necessary expertise to audit the 
accounts and through its "systems based" audit, it is able to see which are the weak 
points of the European financial management's system. The exchange of information, the 
performance of joint audits (even on-the-spot audits), the cooperation in general between 
the Commission and the ECA may be very fruitful in the fight against fraud. The 
combination of these institutions' abilities is one of the most important weapons that the 
European Union has in order to fight fraud and corruption. 
'^^  Ibid, p. 89-90. 
Ibid, p. 90. 
Ibid, p. 98. 
A. Sherlock, Chr. Harding, op. cit., p. 25. 
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C. Cooperation with the Council 
According to Art. 206(1) [276(1)] of the EC Treaty the Parliament will give the 
discharge to the Commission acting on a recommendation by the Council. So, it is during 
the discharge procedure that there is the main interface between the ECA and the 
Council.^" The Council's recommendation is prepared by a subordinate committee of 
budgetary experts, within the framework of the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER).^' The context of this recommendation is an attempt (but not a successfial 
one) to compromise politically the Member States' point of view on the issues raised in 
the discharge procedure by the ECA's reports." These reports have not, so far, been 
examined carefully by the committees preparing the Council's recommendation.^ ^ The 
reason for this has been that the members of these committees have been very busy and 
did not welcome the addition to their tasks of the examination of a document with the 
size and the complexity of the ECA's Annual Report.^'' The ECA has let the Council 
know its disappointment about this situation and the Council has promised to improve 
i t . " So, it has been recently decided that any future report from the ECA will be carefially 
studied by a relevant committee of the Council or a working party from the 
COREPER.^^ In any case though, the Council is not obliged to take action according to 
the ECA's reports and it does not have to justify its choises." 
°^ I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 625. 
" Ibid, p. 625, Ch. Kok, op. cit., p. 352, D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 183. 
Ch. Kok, op. cit., p. 352. 
" I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 625. 
Sir N. Price, op. cit , p. 242. 
Ibid, p. 242. 
I. Harden, F. Wliite, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 625. 
" D. O' Keeffe, op. cit. p. 183. 
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D. Cooperation with the European Investment Bank. 
The cooperation between the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB) has 
not been the best possible so far. A description of the problem had been made by the 
ECA in its Annual Report for the Financial Year 1987:'^ 
"The Court has never attempted in any way to audit operations carried out by the 
European Investment Bank from its own resources. The Court has nevertheless 
been obliged to observe that greater and greater obstacles have been put in the 
way of the exercise of its audit prerogatives, as defined in the Treaties, over the 
Community resources used under the Commission's responsibility to finance 
operations in which the EIB is, in one way or the other, involved (EIB 
management of funds as the Commission's agent, interest subsidies, co-financing, 
etc.) 
The most substantial, in terms of volume, of the resources that are managed by 
the EIB are borrowed on the financial markets by the Commission and 
redistributed by it, with the help of the EIB. In its annual Report on the financial 
year 1986 the Court noted that when it "came to carry out its audit of the NCI 
loan transactions for the financial year 1985 it turned out that the information and 
documents requested from the Commission and supplied by it were not adequate 
for the Court to be able to express an opinion as to the extent to which the 
objectives set out by the Council of Ministers in its Decisions had been achieved". 
These repeated observations have led the Court to be especially vigilant as 
regards the way in which the Commission fulfils its obligations as manager of the 
funds in question and, consequently, the procedure by which it exercises its own 
powers of control... 
The fact however is that the Court was obliged to observe during audit visits in 
October and November 1987 that the EEB had approached beneficiaries of NCI 
loans managed by the Bank on behalf of the Community in order to prevent the 
Court from exercising its audit prerogatives on the spot. The argument put 
forward was that, as the funds in question were being managed by the EIB as the 
Commission's agent, the beneficiaries could not permit an audit visit from the 
Court without having received prior "audit authority" from the Bank..." 
This conflict forced the Commission to try and conciliate the opposing points of 
view and the result of this effort has been the reaching of an agreement in June 1989 
between the ECA, the EIB and the Commission.The agreement is covering all 
transactions before and after its signing and it is renewed every three years.*^ " According 
to its wording there are two types of audit that the ECA may perform with regard to the 
EIB financial management. 
OJ 1988, C-316/19. 
D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 130-131. 
The agreement is not published in tlie Official Joiu-nal of tlie European Communities. 
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First, there is the audit based on documents and records ("Documentary Audit"). 
During this audit the EIB and the Commission have to place at the ECA's disposal all 
information necessary for a complete audit, always based on the ECA's audit approach 
(mainly the "systems based" audit). The procedure for this exchange of information is 
drawn up as follows: a) the Commission's departments place at the ECA's disposal all 
the information listed in the Annex of the agreement, b) the ECA's departments inform 
the 19* (XIX) Directorate General of the Commission about the information they need 
and they send a copy of this request to the EIB's departments concerned, c) the EEB 
place the information required at the disposal of the XIX DG of the Commission and 
sends a copy at the ECA. 
The second type of audit is the on-the-spot audit. According to the agreement the 
ECA informs the Commission about the transactions that it considers necessary to be 
audited on-the-spot. Also it proposes a certain time-schedule for the performance of 
these audits. The Commission lets the EBB know about the information received from the 
ECA. The EIB asks its Verification Committee to take the necessary action in order to 
perform these audit in common with the ECA. Accordingly the audits' programme is 
decided jointly by the Verification Committee and the ECA. The logistics of the audit 
missions fall within the Verification Committee's responsibility. The Commission, the 
EIB and the ECA exchange information with each other concerning their respective 
approach to audit, in order to be prepared. It is noteworthy that the Commission 
participates in the preparation and performance of the audits especially when it is invited 
by the ECA to do so. The ECA representatives during the audit mission may examine all 
documents necessary and pose any question that they think is useful. Of course the ECA 
representatives have to respect the obligation of professional secrecy (Art. 214 [287] of 
the EC Treaty) and the banking secrecy. After every visit the ECA and EIB delegations 
draw up their reports which, of course, they send to each other. As in the case of the 
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Annual Report, the ECA sends to the EIB and the Commission its observations and they 
send to it their replies, before the official publication of any audit results. The information 
obtained during the on-the-spot audits is treated as discretely as possible. In case of co-
financed projects, the ECA makes no use of any informafion relative to the part of the 
project not financed by the European budget. 
In case of any difficulties there is a conciliating procedure during which the 
Presidents of the ECA, the EIB and the Commission meet and attempt to resolve the 
problems arisen, especially during the implementation of the agreement. 
The attention paid to the relafions between the ECA and the EIB is demonstrated 
also by the amendments made by the Treaty of Amsterdam to Art. 188c(3) [248(3)] of 
the EC Treaty. An extra subparagraph has been added providing that 
"In respect of the European Investment Bank's activity in managing Community 
expenditure and revenue, the Court's rights of access to information held by the 
Bank shall be governed by an agreement between the Court, the Bank and the 
Commission. In the absence of an agreement, the Court shall nevertheless have 
access to information necessary for the audit of Community expenditure and 
revenue managed by the Bank" 
So, the agreement is now mentioned by the Treaties, thus having a very upgraded status. 
But what must be noted is the fact that even without such an agreement, the ECA, 
according to the new provisions, has the right to access information concerning the 
EIB's financial management of Community resources. From now on then the EIB is 
obhged to place at the ECA's disposal every document or record concerning projects 
financed (or co-financed) by the European Communities. 
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Chapter Four 
Collaboration between the European Court of Auditors 
and other Audit Institutions 
A. Collaboration between the European Court of Auditors and the National 
Audit Institutions of the Member States of the European Union 
The legal framework regarding the relations between the ECA and the Nafional 
Audit Institutions of the Member States is Art. 188c(3)[248(3)] providing that 
"The audit shall be based on records and, if necessary, performed on the spot... 
in the Member States. In the Member states the audit shall be carried out in 
liaison with the national audit bodies or, if these do not have the tiecessary 
powers, with the competent national departments. These bodies or departments 
shall inform the Court of Auditors whether they intend to take part in the audit 
.... the national audit bodies or, if they do not have the necessary powers, the 
competent national departments, shall forward, to the Court of Auditors, at its 
request, any document or information necessary to carry out its task. " 
These dispositions may be considered as a specification of Art. 5 [10] of the EC Treaty 
which provides for the obligation of the Member States to contribute actively to the 
fiinction of the Community: 
''Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the objectives of this Treaty." 
By comparing these Articles, it is obvious that even if the provisions of Art. 188c(3) 
[248(3)] did not exist. Article 5 [10] could form a legal basis in order to establish some 
kind of cooperation between the ECA (as a Community institution) and the Nafional 
Audit Institutions of the Member States.' This does not mean that Art. 188c(3) is 
unnecessary. On the contrary, its usefiilness has been proven so far several times. 
The ECA, since its establishment, took advantage of these provisions and tried to 
develop as much as possible its relations with the national audit authorities of the 
Member States. The key-word in this effort is "liaison". This liaison is realised as 
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follows: Each member of the ECA, within the sector allocated to him/her, notifies the 
respective national audit institution of the date and nature of the audits planned, at least 
two months in advance, using a so called "letter of notification".^ The audit areas 
covered by this liaison do not include only cases of direct Member State responsibility 
for the implementation of the Community budget and the production of accounts for 
Community funds (EAGGF-Guarantee Section, Own Resources system).^  Cases of 
national administration handling aid applications and payment requests for the ulfimate 
beneficiaries (especially from the Structural Funds) are also examined.'* The frequency of 
these contacts depends on the ECA's annual programme of work and the organisation of 
audits in each sector.' 
This Haison takes place at a number of levels. First of all, there is a very important 
forum of communication between the national audit institutions of the Member States 
and the ECA, which is the Contact Committee of Heads of Supreme Audit Institutions.^ 
Each year, the presidents of the national audit institutions and the ECA president meet 
alternately in Luxembourg (even-number years) and in a Member State.^  They discuss 
mainly technical issues and matters of coordination. Indicative of the range of these 
discussions is the agenda of the Committee's meeting on 29-30 October 1997 which 
included issues like the auditing of VAT in internal Community Transactions, the 
formation of general auditing standards, the cooperation between the ECA and the 
national audit institutions inside and outside the European Union, the role and auditing 
methods of the supreme audit institutions concerning procurement contracts and the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
' For a detailed analysis of Art. 5 [10] of the E C Treaty see J. Temple Lang, The Duties of National 
Authorities under Coimnunity Constitutional Law, Durham European Law Institute, 1997. 
^ D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 281. 
^ T. M. James, op. cit., p. 481. 
'Ibid, p. 481. 
^ D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 281. 
^ T. M. James, op. cit., p. 482. 
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Another way of contact is via liaison officers. The ECA and the national audit 
institutions have each appointed a liaison officer, i.e. an officer responsible for day-today 
contacts, the ironing out of any difficulties regarding ECA audits in the Member States, 
the exchange of information and reports of mutual interest, the arrangements for 
upcoming audits etc.^  These liaison officers meet twice each year in Luxembourg and 
they discuss issues for which they are responsible. During these meetings they also 
prepare the issues that are going to be included in the agenda of the annual meeting of 
the Contact Committee of Heads of Supreme Audit Institutions. 
The objective of these contacts is to establish a flincfional Hnk between the ECA 
and the national audit institutions.^ The collaboration requirements set by the dispositions 
of the EC Treaty demand for such a link. The most common and important case in need 
of a form of cooperation between the ECA and the nafional audit insfitufions is the case 
of on the spot audits in the Member States. As it has been noted before, the ECA's 
objecfives in every audit is to conclude whether the transacfions under audit have been 
legal and correct (regular) and whether the financial management has been sound. This 
latter objective, being a more recent concept, has not been so far something with which 
all national audit institutions were famiHar. Thus techniques and auditing standards used 
in order to establish the soundness of financial management may be unknown to the 
nafional audit institufion and difficult to understand. All these problems may be solved if 
the national audit institution is well informed on these issues by the ECA and cooperates 
with it, during the audit. ^ '^  The nafional audit institutions through these contacts 
familiarise themselves with the context of nafional expenses that are financed by the 
Communifies' budget, being thus also Communities' expenses." So, it is easier for these 
' Ibid, p. 482, & D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 281. 
* T. M. James, op. cit. p. 482-483 & D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit. p. 281. 
^ European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 24. 
SirN. Price, op. cit., p. 243-244. 
" P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 111. 
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national audit institutions to perform their audifing duties going beyond the simple 
legality and regularity audit, to appreciate the eflfecfiveness and the efficiency of the 
Union's financial policies and management.'^  Also, it must not be ignored that in the 
Member States there is a variety of audit systems, sometimes completely different from 
each other. It is thus difficult for the ECA auditing staff to keep track of all these systems 
in order to perform their audit tasks, without any assistance from the national audit 
authorities. So, through the liaison the ECA is being constantly informed on the audit 
systems of the Member States in order to have a complete picture of the audit situation 
in the Union's members. 
On the spot audits create also another side effect. The auditors' reports after the 
audits may contain comments, remarks or conclusions which of course cannot be 
officially announced until they are approved by the ECA. And when the audit has 
revealed something of immediate urgent concern for the work of the national 
administration, then there is a problem. It has been mentioned before that within the 
framework of the "Contradictory Procedure", every auditee has the right to be informed 
about the remarks of the ECA. But the ECA has been appointed as the external auditor 
of the Communities and the European Union, not the Member States.'^  The ECA 
therefore is obliged to direct its draft-reports to the Commission, and if in the report 
there are points that require remedial action, it is the Commission that has to put things 
right in collaboration with the Member States.''* But the national audit institufions have 
requested to be informed in any such occasion that defaults in the national 
administration's management of Community resources are detected.'^ The ECA, being 
aware of the fact that the auditee, on the European Union's behalf, is the Commission, 
has agreed to give notice to the national audit institutions of any matter of national 
"Ibid, p. 111. 
'^SirN. Price, op. cit., p. 245. 
Ibid, p. 245. 
interest, before the pubhcation of the respective report but after the Commission has 
been informed of the final text.''' Especially for the ECA's Annual Report, the members 
of the ECA inform the national audit institutions about the contents of the report and if a 
national audit institution wishes to comment thereon, the ECA may take these comments 
under consideration.'^ 
Nevertheless on the spot controUing activifies are very important in order to 
examine the quality of the European resources' management by the national authorities. 
This is verified by the fact that in Art. 10 of Council Regulafion 95/2988/EC there is a 
provision regarding adoption of further legislative measures for on the spot inspection 
and checks. Accordingly, Council Regulation 96/2185/EC'^ concerning the details of 
such on the spots checks was adopted. This Regulafion, however, provides only for the 
on the spot controls performed by the Commission. These provisions do not include on 
the spot audits performed by the ECA since these latter ones are covered directly by Art. 
188c(3) [248(3)]. It should be noted that since both the Commission and the ECA are 
performing on the spot controls, it necessary to establish a coordinated working 
relationship. Thus double checks regarding the same issue will be avoided and the 
controlling activities will cover a larger number of transactions. 
Included in the provisions of Art. 188c(3) [248(3)] is the possibility for the 
national audit institutions to take part in audits performed by the ECA in the Member 
States. This is a more advanced form of cooperation between the ECA and the national 
audit insfitutions. Such a form of cooperafion had been discussed during a meeting called 
"The Europe of 1992", organised by the ECA in Luxembourg in 1990.'^  The name of 
'^T. M.James, op. cit., p. 484. 
Ibid, p. 484. 
" Ibid, p. 484. 
OJ 1996, L-292/2. 
D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 281. 
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this new cooperation level was called "Joint Audit" and according to the definition 
formulated in the meeting it 
"is an audit carried out jointly by a national audit institution and the European 
Court of Auditors on Community revenue and expenditure on the basis of a 
common plan and approach by a joint team with a view to reaching joint 
conclusions which may lead to a joint or separate report."^" 
Judging from the definition, the joint audit demands for an audit team formed by auditors 
from the ECA and a national audit institution. This team must have a common plan and 
approach not only to the object but also to the method of audit, conditions achievable if 
there is a collaboration between the ECA and the national audit institutions as described 
above. The audit must have joint conclusions but the necessary reports may be separated. 
The distinction between the conclusions and the reports in which these conclusions will 
be presented is creating some doubts about their homogeneity. It is always possible that 
in one report the conclusions may be presented in a different way than in the other 
report, creating thus different impressions and confusion concerning the audited 
transactions. In order to avoid such a situation, the only solution is to abolish this 
distinction and the conclusions should be presented in one report, common for everyone 
involved in the audit. 
Within the framework of the cooperafion of the ECA with the national audit 
institutions one of the most important issues is the adoption of auditing standards. The 
Contact Committee of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions, during its meeting in 
Madrid on 24-25 September 1991 decided to form a working group that would elaborate 
proposals on auditing standards. So far this group has prepared nine proposals which 
have been called "Guidelines of Audit in the European Community". They include 
programming of audit, evidence and method of audit, evaluation of internal control and 
sampling audit of accordance, documentation of audit, reassurance of audit quality. 
°^ Ibid, p. 281-282. 
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importance and risk of audit, audit sampling, audit reporting, audit of irregularifies based 
on fraud. Of course all these standards do not have a regulative nature, so far, but their 
usefulness for every national audit institution is obvious, taking into account the 
continuously developing collaboration of the ECA with the nafional audit insfitufions.^' 
The cooperation between the ECA and the national audit institutions has been a 
very important issue since the decentralisation of Community management towards the 
national authorities started increasing.The ECA though has had a negative experience 
with decentralisation in the past. The transfer of management responsibilities by and/or 
from the Commission have resulted sometimes in a refusal of ECA's access to 
information necessary for its auditing tasks.^ ^ The ECA has presented the implications of 
this shared management in its Annual Report for the year 1987: 
"Most Community budgetary expenditure is managed either by entrusting 
management responsibilities to authorities or economic agents in the Member 
States (for example, agricultural guarantee spending or the collection of own 
resources) or is managed jointly with the Member States (e.g. in the case of the 
structural policies). The consequences of sharing management responsibilities in 
this way are felt when the time comes to audit them. The checks are carried out 
by and in the Member States, acting in association with the Commission. 
Although different in nature, these management procedures have this much in 
common, that they presuppose, in accordance with Art. 5 of the EEC Treaty, 
active cooperation between the Commission and the Member State authorities 
concerned, particularly as regards monitoring, exchanges of information, 
coordination and the follow-up to any results thus obtained. 
.. .the Court must emphasise that the Commission has not always been 
sufficiently active in the matter of coordination and supervision, in particular as 
regards the question of ensuring that national controls are carried out on an 
integrated basis from the Community point of view. Serious shortcomings in this 
area lead not only to a yawning gap between the intentions of the legislator and 
the practical application of the measures at local level, but may also have by no 
means negligible consequences for the Community's finances."^'' 
Another aspect of this wrongly implemented decentralisation policy has been pointed out 
in the Court's Annual Report for the financial year 1996. The Commission can recover 
'^ Court of Audit of the Hellenic Republic, Coimnunity Auditing Standards, National Press Office, 
Athens, 1996. 
European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 24. 
Ch. Kok, op. cit., p. 362. The most characteristic example has been the case of the European 
Investment Bank, analyzed in the tliird Chapter. 
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wrongly used fiinds only by proving this wrong use, so it is necessary for all beneficiaries 
and intermediary organisations to have accounting and control systems which could 
provide with sufficient and relevant evidence regarding their management.^ ' 
Unfortunately such a management informafion and accounting system has not been 
created, thus not permitting the Community authorities to exercise their overall 
supervisory function. 
From this presentation it is obvious that the cooperation between the ECA and 
the nafional audit acfivifies is not a mere legal obligation but also a necessity dictated by 
the fact that Community and national management competences have become intimately 
linked.^^ 
Given the vast amount of transacfions that must be audited, it has been suggested 
that the ECA would ask the national authorifies to actually carry out on-the-spot audits 
on its behalf and report directly to it the results.But such a effort would have to 
overcome two very important difficulties. First, the above mentioned difference in 
traditions of public audit controls between the various Member States. Second, in most 
Member States, the nafional audit authorities are part of the administrations, the 
management quahfies of which are going to be audited. So, problems of uniformity and 
1 • • • • - 2 9 
objectivity are going to arise. 
Such an important and yet delicate point could not pass undetected during the 
negotiafions of the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
According to the new dispositions 
"The audit shall be based on records and, if necessary, performed on the spot..., 
on the premises of any body which manages revenue or expenditure on behalf of 
the Community and in the Member States, including on the premises of any 
OJ 1988, C-316/17-18. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/8. 
Ibid, p. 8. 
'^ European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 24. 
'^D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 191. 
^'ibid, p. 191. 
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natural or legal person in receipt of payments from the budget In the Member 
states the audit shall be carried out in liaison with the national audit bodies or, 
if these do not have the necessary powers, with the competent national 
departments. The Court of Auditors and the national audit bodies of the Member 
States shall co-operate in a spirit of trust while maintaining their independence. 
These bodies or departments shall inform the Court of Auditors whether they 
intend to take part in the audit 
.... any bodies managing revenue or expenditure on behalf of the Community, 
any natural or legal person in receipt of payments from the budget, and. the 
national audit bodies or, if they do not have the necessary powers, the competent 
national departments, shall forward to the Court of Auditors, at its request, any 
document or information necessary to carry out its task. " 
These amendments are the result of a proposal by the Dutch Presidency. The ECA, 
according to Art. 188c(3) [248(3)], has the right and obligation to audit all Community 
funds, regardless of the manager of these funds. In order to exercise this audit more 
efficiently the ECA's right of access to information must be recognised unambiguously. 
And thus, the wording of the new dispositions allow the ECA to perform on the spot 
audits on the premises of every body managing revenue or expenditure on behalf of the 
Community and of any natural or legal person in receipt of Community funds. 
There is also another new provision concerning the way that the ECA and the 
national audit bodies of the Member States shall cooperate. Both sides must work 
together in a spirit of trust while maintaining their independence. Trust in a joint audit is 
vital. When there is a large number of transacfions that must be audited, it is easy to 
understand that it is impossible for each auditor of the audifing group to check all the 
respecfive accounts. Therefore there is a division within the audifing group into smaller 
teams and each team undertakes the audit of certain accounts. In these teams there are 
auditors of both the ECA and the national audit insfitufion. Each team has confidence 
that the others perform their duties equally well. The European auditors trust that the 
national auditors will do their job correctly and vice versa. Within this auditing scheme 
there is no hierarchy between the ECA and the national audit institutions. The auditors 
are independent from each other and they cooperate on equal terms. This equilibrium is 
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based on the following elements: The European auditors are more accustomed and 
informed in everything that concerns the ECA audit methods and requirements. The 
national auditors are well aware of the national financial systems and auditing 
requirements. So, each side contributes with its knowledge and experience to the joint 
audit. 
But there has been yet another proposal for amendment, brought forward by the 
British delegation. According to this proposal", the option of national audit authorities 
to refiase to cooperate with the ECA should be eliminated. This proposal was not 
accepted by the Intergovernmental Conference. This rejection is obviously the result of a 
more political than legal or even financial point of view. The elimination of this option 
would be considered to signify a quasi-hierarchy between the national audit institutions 
and the ECA, giving precedence to the latter. Given that the joint audit procedures and 
methods have not been standardised yet, this option has a reason to exist. But when there 
are standard procedures and methods of joint audits, adopted to each Member State's 
financial system, any denial by the national audit institutions to take part in the audit is 
going to be pointless. After all, the European integration procedure is advancing rapidly, 
at least in the financial sector, so the joint audit procedure is going to be the rule and not 
the exception (as it is now) in the European Union's financial management scheme. 
B. Collaboration between the European Court of Auditors and National 
Audit Institutions outside the European Union 
The ECA has not restricted its acfivifies to only auditing the implementation of 
the European Union's budget. Since its establishment it has tried to develop its relations 
with respective audit institutions outside the Union. In order to do that, the ECA joined 
the two international organisations comprising audit institutions. 
°^ A. Duff (Ed.), The Treaty of Amsterdam, Federal Trust, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p. 170. 
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The first one is the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI). This organisation comprises most of the supreme audit institutions of the 
United Nations or its speciaHsed agencies.^ ^ INTOSAI was first established in Cuba in 
1953. Now its head office is established in Vienna, at the Austrian Court of Audit. 
According to the regulations of INTOSAI^^ this organisation's purpose is to promote the 
exchange of ideas and experience between supreme audit institutions with regard to 
financial and administrative control. Its organs are, according to the same regulations, a 
congress (all the members), a Managing Committee (15 members meeting certain 
criteria), a Secretariat-General (in Vienna), regional working groups and standing 
committees. The ECA is not actually a member of INTOSAI, even though most of the 
national audit institutions of the Member States have already joined this organisation. 
ECA's role has been confined to attending INTOSAI congresses as an observer.^ ^ 
The other international organisation is the European Organisation of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (EUROSAI). It was formed in Madrid in 1990, within the framework 
of INTOSAI.^'* Its head office is estabUshed in Madrid at the Audit office of Spain. In 
general it has the same purpose with INTOSAI but its interest is confined to problems 
connected with public finances in Europe.''^ The ECA is a full member of EUROSAI and 
as the external audit institution of the European Union, its role within this organisation is 
a vital one. 
In addition to these two organisations, the ECA has developed on its own 
initiative relations with the Supreme Audit institutions from Central and East European 
Countries (CEEC). In October 1996, a meeting was held in Luxembourg between the 
ECA and the Supreme Audit Institutions of Central and Eastern Europe 
'^ D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 282. 
Articles of Association of INTOSAI dated 30 May 1968 & Procedure for the meetings of the 
Managing Committee of INTOSAI dated 10 May 1966. 
" D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 283. 
Ibid, p. 283. 
95 
representatives.^ *' Thus a new cooperation was established and according to the ECA's 
point of view, it can be compared with the existing cooperation between the ECA and 
the national audit institutions of the Member States." The aim of this cooperation is the 
strengthening of the audit capacity of these countries, which is a very important element 
for their preparation for future EU membership.The forms of cooperation are going to 
be the same as the ones used between the ECA and the national audit institutions of the 
Member States: joint audits, parallel audits, exchange of information etc. 
It must be pointed out that all these contacts of the ECA with supreme audit 
institutions from inside and outside the European Union are very useful. The political 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the information technology revolution, the 
increasing demand for more accountability for public funds and for more information 
about public spending are issues that all audit institutions, including the ECA, must deal 
with as part of their regular work.^^ The contacts between them allow them to learn from 
each other and to develop common doctrines about audit, common auditing standards, 
common auditing methods. The ECA, as an audit institution of a sui generis scheme as 
the European Union, has a lot to offer but also a lot to gain from this kind of 
cooperations. 
Ibid, p. 283. 
The meeting was named "Actions to assist the C E E C , tlie new independent states (former USSR) and 
Mongolia". SeeEUROSAI, issue No. 3, 1996, p. 11-12. 
'^ European Court of Auditors, Press Release, 7-8 October 1997. 
Ibid. 
Ch. A. Bowsher, Mutual Experience does benefit all, IJGA, Vol.23, No 4, October 1996, p. 1-2 (1). 
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Chapter Five 
The European Court of Auditors and the Policies of the European Union 
Audit institutions have always considered interfering with political choices as 
something that is beyond their jurisdiction. This is the case for the ECA too. It has been 
analysed before what the limits of the ECA's competence are. It must be said though that 
the Court is entitled to take stock of policy decisions in order to clarify issues for the 
budgetary authority and the decision-makers.^ This helps the Court to be as accurate as 
possible in its evaluations and to reach conclusions after taking into account all aspects 
(political, legal, financial, social) of an issue. So it is normal for the ECA to assess the 
policies adopted and implemented by the European Union. 
A. The Common Agricultural policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), being the Union's premier common 
policy, has attracted the ECA's interest. The cost of the CAP, incurred mainly by the 
Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF), has covered the major proportion of the European Union's budget despite its 
downward trend. In 1996 it was 48,6% of the total budget expenditure while in 1988 it 
was 59%.^ The ECA, not being able to comment on whether this amount should be spent 
on CAP or not, focused on the management of the relative resources. Its findings were 
that the existence of numerous management committees resulted in fragmentation of 
responsibility for the financial aspects of the CAP implementation and prevented any 
effective action to limit expenditure.^ The national controls concerning the quantity and 
quality of agricultural products eligible for Community funding were "very few or 
' European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management in the European Union Budget, 
Luxembourg 1997, p. 9. 
^ Eurostat, The European Union; Key Figures, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1997, p. 37. 
^ European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management..., op. cit., p. 15. 
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superficial, or simply non-existent".'* The objectives of the CAP, set by the EC Treaty,^  
have not always been taken into consideration. An example is the objective of the 
stabilisation of markets. The ECA has noted that since consumer demand has remained 
steady while productivity gains, there should have been a more balanced development of 
production, income and agricultural prices.*^  With regard to the assistance provided under 
Community subsidies, the Court has suggested the sugar market as a model for all the 
other market organisations because it was financed by producers themselves.^  
When examinations of stocks' management took place, the Court, using its 
"system based" audit, spotted shortcomings in the quality of inventories, inaccurate 
monthly declarations of expenditure and an inadequate regulatory framework.^ The same 
audit method, used in the area of export refiands, revealed inadequate customs controls, 
absence of risk analysis and misuse of the refunding advantages by traders.^ It is obvious 
that both the storage and reflinds areas are very sensitive to fraud. Another issue that has 
attracted the ECA's interest has been the implementation of the Integrated 
Administrative and Control System (lACS) for aid applications made by farmers. This 
system, introduced by Council Reg. 92/3508/EEC^°, has four main elements: a) the aid 
appHcations submitted annually by farmers indicating agricultural parcels for which the 
aid is requested, b) a computerised data base which will record the data provided by the 
applications, c) an alphanumeric identification system for the agricultural parcels in order 
to locate the areas declared and to monitor them via computerised cross checks and on 
the spot checks, d) an integrated control system for administrative control and field 
'Ibid, p. 16. 
^ According to Art. 39 [33] of the E C Treaty the CAP has tlie following goals: 
1) to increase agricultm-al productivity; 2) to ensure a fair standard of living for tlie agricultural 
community; 3) to stabilise markets; 4) to assure tlie availabilitj' of supplies; 5) to ensure that supplies 
reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 16. 
' Ibid, p. 16. 
^ Ibid, p. 17. 
^ Ibid, p. 17. 
'°OJ 1992, L-355/1. 
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inspections. The Court used its "system based" method to examine the lACS, The first 
remark was that the introduction of a system based on appHcations caused a series of 
bureaucratic procedures and increased the administrative work required by the national 
administrations in order to deal with these applications.With regard to the 
computerised data base, the Court concluded that only the United Kingdom had applied 
adequate standards for computer developments whilst weaknesses and incompatibilifies 
appeared in other countries.'^ In that field the Commission should have been more acfive 
and ensure good computer practice either by making reference to general industry 
standards or by using the guidelines issued by its own Informatics Directorate.'^ The 
administrative checks should include cross checks meant to detect double declarations of 
parcels.''* The effectiveness of such controls is linked to the existence of a well 
estabhshed alphanumeric identification system and a fully developed computerised data 
base, which did not exist in the first years of the system's implementafion.'^ Also the 
Court noticed that even though the payment of the aid should be made between 16 
October and 31 December each year,'*" most of the Member States could not keep this 
deadline because they had to perform all necessary administrative checks. So, in order 
to pay in time, the national administrations made the payments before complefing the 
checks^ ,^ making thus the area of aids very vulnerable to fraud. The situation had become 
worse because of the falsely completed inspection reports. These reports should indicate, 
among others, which agricultural parcels were measured during the inspection. But in 
" Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for tlie financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/75. 
Ibid, p. 76. 
"ibid, p. 82-83. 
'"Ibid, p. 77. 
Ibid, p. 77. The cross checks system was implemented initially only in Italy (1993) and it was 
gradually developed in the other Member States. At the end of 1996 though, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal had not yet developed the cross checks system. 
Council Regulation 92/1765/EEC, OJ 1992, L-181/12. 
" Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/77. 
" Ibid, p. 77. 
Art. 12 of Commission Regulation 92/3887/EEC, OJ 1992, L-391/36. 
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the majority of cases, the Court found that the agricultural parcels measured were not 
specified, not allowing the checks performed to be revised.^" 
Another fault noted by the ECA is the complexity of the Regulations concerning 
CAP. There is a very large number of Regulations (several thousand) covering a very 
wide range of issues and these Regulations are renewed at a variable rate, depending on 
the subject matter, while their provisions are often very complicated.^^ So, there is 
always an uncertainty as to whether an issue is covered by a Regulation or not, and if it 
does, whether this Regulation has been amended by another one. A characteristic 
example is the case of lACS. The Court has found that the Regulations concerning this 
system were not precise enough and their instructions were vague while "the 
implementation regulation did not properly reflect some the provisions laid down in the 
Council Regulations".^^ 
The background for changing this situation was provided by the Council Decision 
88/377/EEC^^ concerning budgetary discipline. This Decision was followed by an 
Interinstitutional Agreement on 29 June 1988^" on budgetary discipline and improvement 
of the budgetary procedure. The perspectives adopted with these documents divided 
Community expenditure in six categories'^ setting a ceiling for each of them regarding 
annual commitment appropriations. With regard to the CAP, the ceiling took the form of 
an "agricultural guideline". According to this guideline, the expenditure ceiling for the 
CAP of the financial perspective in year x corresponds to the basic amount of 27.500 
°^ Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/79-80. 
'^ European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 18. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/82. 
OJ 1988, L-185/29. 
OJ 1988, L-185/33. 
1) EAGGF-Guarantee Section (CAP), 2) Structural operations, 3) Policies with multiaiuiual 
allocations, 4) Other Policies, 5) Repayments and administration, 6) Monetary Reserve. For a detailed 
analysis regarding these issues see P. Zangl, The Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline 
and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure, CMLRev, Vol. 26, 1989, pp. 675-680 & L. Kolte, The 
Community Budget: New principles for finance, expenditure planning and budget discipline, CMLRev, 
Vol. 25, 1988, pp. 487-501. 
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milHons ECU for 1988 plus 74% of the real rate of increase in GNP between 1988 and 
year x.^ *^  The ECA has evaluated this guideline positively: 
"The fact is that agricultural expenditure to date has always remained within the 
limits of the guideline, despite various unforeseen events ranging from German 
unification to the "mad cow" crisis and excessive compensation for cereal 
producers. The agricultural guideline has thus proved to be a useful instrument of 
EU financial policy, even i f it is at its most effective in the area of budgetary 
management, and despite the fact that the EAGGF appropriations have been 
under-utilised for a number of years. There is every reason to suggest that the 
guideline should be maintained for a number of years to come. The matter would 
need to be reconsidered, however, should the financing of structural aspects of 
agricultural poHcy be taken over by the Guarantee Fund in the fiature."'^ ^ 
Within this framework the Council attempted to erase some of the CAP's 
disadvantages with the 1992 reform. The overall aim of this reform was to reduce the 
CAP 'S cost without damaging its competitiveness in the world market.The production 
had to be limited. The Council's reforms tried to balance production and demand, to 
reduce the volume and increase the quality of agricultural products, and to discourage 
overproduction which is disastrous for the environment.^^ The ECA considered that the 
Council's attempts did not go that far. In the Court's opinion the only way of limiting 
expenditure and redistributing income is abandoning guaranteed prices and placing a 
ceiling (or even regionalising) on individual compensatory aids for producers."" 
Developing the 1992 reform is crucial for the ECA. The price guarantees' system should 
be replaced gradually by a form of individual subsidies completely unrelated to 
production or prices. 
^^P. Zangl, op. cit., p. 680. 
European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 21. 
P. Fontaine, Europe in Ten Points, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1995, p. 20. 
Ibid, p. 21. 
°^ European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 27. According to tlie ECA's 
information only 20% of farms account for about 80% of production and consequently receive 80% of 
E A G G F subsidies. This minority of producers ought to be fully able to cope with external competition. 
The E C A thinks that if subsidies are adjusted to economically homogeneous regions, it will be possible 
to maintain the minimum of aid necessary for these producers and to make substantial savings which 
can be allocated to otlier objectives (environmental or social issues). 
Ibid, p. 27. 
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Another factor taken into account by the ECA is the possible enlargement of the 
European Union to the East. The Commission has estimated that after a transifional 
period of accession, on the assumption that conditions remain unchanged, the CAP's 
cost will be increased by 30% (about 12.000 milHons ECU) while the new Member 
States' contributions in the form of own resources will cover only 25% of this increase 
(3.000 millions ECU).^' These numbers are a good reason for trying to reduce the CAP's 
cost. 
The ECA has also made some other remarks. Regarding the relation between 
agricuhure and health/public hygiene, it noted that these latter issues have not been 
included as a general objective of the CAP in Art. 39 [33] of the EC Treaty.The Court 
has pointed out also that more attention must be paid to the industrial utility of 
agricultural products (plants as energy sources, tax relief for "green energy" etc).'''' And 
with regard to the environment in general, it is the ECA's opinion that intensive 
agriculture is damaging the European landscape creating problems not only for the 
population as a whole but for agriculture itself (bad quality of air, unclean groundwater, 
dry land etc).^ ^ 
In general, the ECA has approached so far the CAP basically from a financial 
point of view, though making some substantial remarks. The outcome of the CAP's 
assessment by the ECA is realising that European agriculture, developed under cover of 
a pohcy of public intervention, cannot support anymore the cost of overproducing in 
guaranteed prices.^'' The Court is in favour of an attempt to limit budgetary costs whilst 
Ibid, p. 28. 
Ibid, p. 29. For the ECA, the improvement of living standards requires for Community subsidies to be 
paid after taking into account not only the quantity but also the quality of tlie production. 
Ibid, p. 30. 
36 
Ibid, p. 30. 
Ibid, p. 30. 
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preserving the European Union's productive potential in competitive agricultural sectors 
within the world market's framework.^' 
B. The Structural Measures 
There are several instruments with which the European union implements its 
structural policies. The Structural Instruments are defined as the financing mechanisms 
managed by the Commission and the EIB and which may support actions or works 
reahsed within the Community for purposes of common interest: regional economic 
development, employment, environment, saving and new forms of energy, 
communications, etc.^ ^ The main ones are the three Structural Funds (European 
Regional Development Fund - ERDF, European Social Fund - ESF, and the Guidance 
section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund - EAGGF), the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guigance - FIFG, and the European Cohesion Fund -
ECF. The two latter ones are of recent origin being established in 1993^ ^ and in 1994'*° 
respectively. The three Structural Funds were estabHshed much earlier (The ESF in 
1957"*, the EAGGF in 1962'*' and the ERDF in 1975''0. 
A key point for the Structural Funds has been the 1988 reform. Before 1988, 
according to the ECA's remarks, most of the assistance provided by the Funds took the 
form of reimbursement of expenditure for the cofinancing of individual projects and 
programmes were financed exceptionally.'*'' The background for the 1988 reform was 
provided by the Single European Act in 1986, which aimed to strengthen the 
''Ibid, p. 31. 
European Commission, Vade Mecum on the Reform of tlie European Community's Structural Funds, 
Brussels, 1989, p. 10. 
Council Regulation 93/2080/EEC, OJ 1993, L-193/1 and Council Regulation 93/3699/EC, OJ 1993, 
L-346/1. 
Council Regulation 94/1164/EC, OJ 1994, L-130/1. 
Art. 123 [146] of the E C Treaty. 
Council Regulation 62/25/EEC, OJ 1962, L-30/991. 
Council Regulation 75/724/EEC, OJ 1975, L-73/1. 
'''' European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 41. 
103 
Community's economic and social cohesion.''^  This aim had been analysed in three levels: 
political, financial and legal. Regarding the polifical level, the principle of solidarity 
among the Member States and the purpose of the common market, required a reduction 
of the differences in the level of development between the various regions."*^  The 
financial aspect included not only the need of an assistance to the underdeveloped 
regions, but also the need to assure a better financial management of the Community's 
resources which are, actually, a burden paid by the European citizens.'*'' The legal base 
was Art. 130D of the EC Treaty, as amended by the Single European Act, which 
provided for an amendment of Funds' structure and operational rules.'*^ The reform was 
realised with the adoption of several Council Regulations.'*^ 
The results of the reform are obvious through an examination of the financial 
data. The Funds' resources increased from 6.800 millions ECU in 1987 to 20.700 in 
1993 and the prediction for the period 1994-1999 is 147.000 millions ECU.'° The 
expenditure regarding structural operations was 18% of the European Union Budget in 
1988 and 31% in 1996.^ ^ This increase is justified by the enlargement of the Funds' 
objectives." The ECA also noted a change in the financing pohcies: priority was given to 
European Commission, Vade Mecum...., op. cit., p. 9. 
"'^ Ibid, p. 11. 
Ibid, p. 11. 
"^Ibid, p. 11-12. 
Council Regulation, 88/2052/EEC, OJ 1988, L-185/9, Council Regulations 88/4253/EEC to 
88/4256/EEC, OJ 1988, L-374/1-25. 
°^ European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 42. 
'^ Eurostat, op. cit., p. 37. 
The E C A (See European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 43, note 12), 
based on the respective Regulations has summarized the Funds' objectives, including those of the FIFG 
as follows: 
objective 1: promoting tlie development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is 
lagging behind 
objective 2: converting the regions, frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment areas and 
urban communities) seriously affected by industrial decline 
objective 3: combating long-term unemployment and facilitating the integration into working life of 
young people and persons exposed to exclusion of the labor market 
objective 4: facilitating tlie adaptation of workers of either sex to industrial changes and to changes in 
production systems 
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the financing of programmes instead of the financing of projects." The result of this 
change was to finance sets of multi-annual measures, with greater impact because of 
their volume and duration, and to monitor the measures undertaken leaving the 
management to the national and regional authorities.^ '* The Court has noticed that it has 
not been possible to concentrate aid on a small number of ehgible areas and as a result 
over 50% of the Community's population is covered by one of the structural objectives 
with a regional context (1,2, 5b, 6, see note 52).^ ^ Also, the coordination between the 
structural Funds has not been the best possible. The administrative procedures used by 
the management authorities, both in the Commission and the Member States are different 
and there is no real coherent data regarding the Funds as a whole .The ECA has 
suggested that there should be an extensive exchange of information and a harmonisation 
of the procedures and criteria followed." The various structural instruments must 
operate in such a way as to be complementary to each other.Thus all the necessary 
information will be available in order to have an effective overall assessment of the 
measures implemented. Another remark is about the nature of the implemented 
programmes. In the ECA's point of view, the programmes that are put forward 
"are not a succession of measures projected into the future that it is proposed to 
undertake in order to achieve a specific objective, but rather measures that are 
normally adopted and undertaken by the national and regional authorities in the 
course of their usual activities, the cost of which is then transferred to the 
programme."'^ 
objective 5a: promoting rural development by speeding up the adjustment of agricultural structures in 
the framework of the reform of the coimnon agricultural policy; measures for the adjustment of fisheries 
structures 
objective 5b: promoting rural development by facilitating the development and structural adjustment of 
rural areas 
objective 6: promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions with a population density of 
eight inhabitants or less per km 
European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 43. 
Ibid, p. 43. 
Ibid, p. 44. 
Ibid, p. 44. 
Ibid, p. 49. 
Ibid, p. 49. 
Ibid, p. 45. 
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The examinations performed have revealed that the projects financed are often vague and 
there has been scant preparation as regards the definition of the operations to be carried 
out.*^ " With regard to the monitoring of operations, the Court noted that project financing 
is decided at national or regional level while the Commission has no systematic 
information on these decisions.*'* But such information must be provided to the 
Commission, the national authorities and the pubhc, while all selections of projects must 
be based on precise and controllable criteria, which will ensure that the selected projects 
are effective and have a lasting impact in terms of structural development.*^ 
A characteristic example of the poor quality of information communicated 
regarding the management of Structural measures is the case of the final reports 
concerning programmes financed by the ERDF for the period 1989-1993. Art. 25(4) of 
Council Regulation 88/4253/EEC does not have any specific provisions regarding the 
structure of these reports. So each Committee monitoring a programme had to decide on 
the structure and the context of the final reports. As a resuh, the reports did not all have 
the same quality.*^ The Commission had asked that the reports should give a concise 
survey of the implementation of the programmes and an exhaustive account of the 
realisation rate for the physical and qualitative objectives laid down in the outset of the 
programme.*''* Some of the reports submitted did not meet these requirements, and they 
were limited only to a description of the activities financed, thus disallowing any 
substantial conclusions to be drawn.''^ In some cases, the financial information provided 
did not support the amounts in the final claim, so the reports had to be returned to the 
Member States for clarifications.*'*' 
"^"ibid, p. 51. 
" Ibid, p. 46. 
''^  Ibid, p. 47. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, C-348/152-153. 
Ibid, p. 152. 
Ibid, p. 153. 
''^Ibid, p. 153. 
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The Structural measures sector is very vulnerable to fraud. Therefore, according 
to Art. 12 of Council Regulation 94/1681/EC^^, the Member States are required to 
report to the Commission irregularities with a financial impact of 4.000 ECU or over. 
From 1994 till 1996 for instance, 309 cases of irregularities, regarding ESF funding, have 
been reported with a financial impact of 34.498.717 ECU from which only 4.323.869 
ECU were recovered.^^ The main cause of this situation are the faults existing in the 
implementation of the procedures regarding funding from the ESF. The amounts 
declared by the Member States and the agencies handling the programmes are often 
inaccurate since these declarations are based on insufficient on-going and final 
verifications of expenditure.''^ In the Court's opinion, the frequent over-declaration of 
ESF amounts by the final beneficiaries is symptomatic of a system where the eligibility of 
programmes to be funded was not always clearly set out and applied.™ Thus the claimant 
gives himself the "benefit of the doubt", and rehes on the national administrations to 
accept or question the amounts declared.^ * ECA has pointed out some weaknesses 
encountered in the checking and audit procedures in the Member States:'^  a) there were 
no agreed and generally available eligibility and audit guidelines, b) the follow up of audit 
results was not so clear and prompt which prevented corrections and recovery of 
wrongly paid sums, c) weak coordination between the various national inspection 
services which could lead to undetected double financing, d) an absence of a control 
programme based on risk analysis, e) lack of reviewing at management level errors 
detected during desk checks. 
Problems have also been detected in the system of audit of expenditure incurred 
for the processing and marketing of agricultural produce, according to Council 
'^^ OJ 1994, L-178/43. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, C-348/185. 
"^^  Ibid, p. 184-185. 
™ Ibid, p. 185. 
" Ibid, p. 185. 
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Regulation 90/866/EEC.^ '^  This expenditure was covered by the Guidance Section of the 
EAGGF. The ECA noted the following:^'* a) there has not been always a sufficient 
verification of the viability of the aided enterprises and of their ability to demonstrate 
realistic market outlets prior to approving the aid, b) the eligibility of claimed 
expenditure was not always controlled adequately with documentary and physical 
inspections, c) the payment of the aid was not always made within the established time-
limits. 
With regard to the Fisheries sector, the Court has focused, inter alia, on the 
audits regarding the Financing of Small and Medium sized Enterprises. Because of the 
large number of payments made by the Commission within the framework of this 
financing scheme, it has been very difficult to carry out serious financial checks on cost 
statements put forward.The Commission had not always compared the rates charged in 
the cost statements with the rates included in the technical annex of the financing 
contracts.'*' Also the actual time spent on the project has not been always cross-checked 
with the time budgeted in the technical annex.'' All these faults weaken the possibility of 
spotting any irregularities, a possibility even more limited by the almost complete lack of 
on-the-spot checks.'^ An indication of the problem is given by the following figures: in 
1996 the open contracts concerning financing small and medium sized enterprises in the 
Fisheries sector valued in total 6.716 mil. ECU while the value of the contacts audited 
was only 179,4 mil. ECU and the amounts recovered as a result of this audits were 8,7 
mil. ECU.'^ 
" Ibid, p. 186. 
" OJ 1990, L-91/1. 
'"^  Annual Report of tiie Court of Auditors for tiie financial year 1996, C-348/203-204. 
" Ibid, p. 245. 
Ibid, p. 245. 
" Ibid, p. 245. 
™ Ibid, p. 245. 
Ibid, p. 246. 
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The Court has also examined an argument based on the principle of subsidiarity:^" 
In the Structural operations, project management is the exclusive responsibility of 
national and regional authorities and the Community authorities must only examine the 
overall effects of the financing provided.^* In the Court's opinion, the Community 
authorities need to be aware of how these powers are exercised and to supervise things 
better.^2 After all, according to Art. 23(2) of the Council Regulation 88/4253/EEC^^ the 
Commission is entitled to perform on the spot inspections regarding the measures 
financed by the Structural Funds. These inspections of course must coexist with controls 
performed by the Member States and coordination between the controlling national and 
Community authorities must be established.^ '* On the other hand the dispositions of the 
Treaties concerning the ECA's competences do not exclude any expenditure from its 
auditing powers. Therefore, subsidiarity cannot prevent Community audit authorities 
(Commission, ECA) from checking the implementation of the structural policies. 
Finally, special reference must be made to the European Cohesion Fund (ECF). 
Before being created in 1994, it had been preceded by an interim scheme, the Cohesion 
Financial Instrument, estabhshed in 1993 .^ ^ This instrument and the first period of the 
ECF's function have been examined by the ECA and the results of examination were 
presented in a Special Report.^ *" According to the Court's findings, the organisational 
structure of the instrument (a directorate, responsible for the management, within the 
framework of the Commission) is not adequate because it does not separate the duties of 
the authorising officer, the financial controller and the accounting officer, as required by 
'"Art. 3b [5] of die E C Treaty. 
'' European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 48. 
Ibid, p. 48. 
OJ 1988, L-374/10. 
For more information on the controls perfonned by national authorities regarding measures financed 
by the Structural Funds see J. Castex, M.-P. Cordier, Le controle des Fonds Structurels de 1' Union 
Europeene, RFFP, No 56, 1996, p. 119-126. 
Council Regulation 93/792/EEC, OJ 1993, L-79/74. 
Special Report No 1/1995 of the Court of Auditors concerning the Cohesion Financial Instrument, OJ 
1995, C-59/1. 
109 
Art. 21 of the Financial Regulation.^' With regard to the projects financed, the Court has 
noticed that the relative information available is not adequate to provide a complete 
image of the project's quality and to assure coordination with other structural 
measures.In contrast with the method used for the Structural Funds after the 1988 
reform, the Cohesion Financial Instrument and later the ECF are financing individual 
projects and not programmes.The main objects of financing have been for both the 
Cohesion Financial Instrument and the ECF environmental and transport infrastructure 
projects. The beneficiary States are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, which have 
absorbed in total about 1.565 milHons ECU in 1993^° and the predictions are 2.550 
millions ECU for 1998 and 2.600 milHons ECU for 1999^*. 
C. Measures Outside the European Union 
The ECA has noted that generally during the last twenty years, the Community 
external aid has increased and has been diversified geographically.^^ The Court has noted 
two main categories of Community aid. The first one consists of the European 
Development Funds (EDFs) which exist outside the Community budget and are financed 
by separate contributions by the Member States. Their objectives are helping the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries.The second one consists of budget expenditure and 
covers aid to Latin America, Asia, Mediterranean non-member countries, measures in 
Central and Easter European countries, food and humanitarian aid at world level etc.^ '* 
According to the financial data available in 1996 the EDFs had as expenditure 1.317 
Ibid, para. 2.1. 
Ibid, para. 2.9. 
Ibid, para. 3 .1. 
European Coimnission, The European Union's Cohesion Fund, Europe on the move Series, Olfice for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994, p. 8. 
'^ Special Report No 1/1995...., op. cit., table 1. 
European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management.. .., op. cit., p. 59. 
Ibid, p. 59. 
Ibid, p. 59. 
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millions ECU, the commitment appropriations for the aid to non member countries 
amounted to 5.132 millions ECU in 1996 and for the aid to countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe amounted to 1.773 millions ECU in 1996.^ ^ In total, the external aid 
covered 5% of the overall expenditure in the Union's Budget in 1988 and 9% in 1996.^ *^  
There has been a noteworthy imbalance between the volume of external aid amounts and 
the resources provided to manage this aid.^ ^ A characteristic example of this situation is 
the case of the PHARE and TACIS programmes. 
The Court noted that the Commission did not have the adequate means to be able 
to manage properly the implementation of the PHARE and TACIS programmes.So, 
external personnel had to be hired increasing thus the expenditure. But in that case also 
the lack of any plan on behalf of the Commission created the same uncertainties 
regarding the successful implementation of the programmes and the role of the external 
personnel. 
This method of seeking assistance (mainly on technical issues) from external 
personnel has been used repeatedly by the Commission. The aims of this are to increase 
the management capacity of the Commission (central services and Delegations) and to 
provide administrative support to national authorities managing programmes financed by 
the Community.^"" In the Court's opinion though this method is causing some problems. 
Hiring experts encourages competition between them and increases the expenditure 
whilst by the time these experts have been adjusted to the Community working system, 
they have to leave because their contracts have expired. And if, in order to have 
continuity, the Commission considers experts under contract as temporary staff, this 
Ibid, p. 60. 
Eurostat, op. cit., p. 37. 
Ibid, p. 61. 
Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for tlie Financial Year 1995, OJ 1996, C-340/254. 
Ibid, p. 254. 
European Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management...., op. cit., p. 61. 
'°' Ibid, p. 61. 
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creates a sort of dependence of the Commission, without reassurance that it has the best 
experts/"^ 
ECA believes that the management system of the Union's external aid must be 
decentralised because of the geographical spread, the diversity of instruments used and 
of management systems in the various beneficiary countries. Of course, the EU Treaty 
and the documents providing for external aid (for instance the Lome Conventions"'''), 
require that the decentralisation must not involve a loss of decision making power or 
responsibilities on behalf of the Commission/"^ In practice so far, several schemes have 
been tested. For instance, regarding the EDFs, management is the responsibility of the 
beneficiary states, whilst in the case of the PHARE programme, the Commission's 
Delegations are responsible for its implementation, and in the case of the MED 
programmes, the Commission's functions have been subcontracted to private 
enterprises.^ "^ The Court has located several weaknesses in controlling, monitoring and 
evaluating external aid on behalf of the Commission. According to the ECA findings 
"The economic and social problems of many non-member countries have grown, 
despite the increase in resources allocated to development aid and the 
introduction of new aid instruments. This situation is due in part to the increase in 
those countries' foreign debt burden, which has led to them devoting a growing 
proportion of their budget to servicing it and, in consequence, the danger that the 
initial destination of foreign aid might be changed in net terms (including the 
recipient country's budget contribution to the financing of expenditure on the 
target sectors). Under these conditions, better monitoring and better evaluation 
of programmes and projects is essential if aid is to be more fairly and more 
effectively allocated. It would be therefore necessary to redefine the role of the 
Commission itself and its Delegations in order to achieve these objectives.""'^ 
This focusing on the Delegations is very important. The Delegation is the Commission's 
point of contact with reality in the recipient country and must be involved in all stages of 
Ibid, p. 62. 
Ibid, p. 62. 
For more details on the Lome Conventions see D. Swann, op. cit., p. 358-363. 
'"^  Em-opean Court of Auditors, Sound Financial Management op. cit., p. 62. 
Ibid, p. 63. 
'"^  Ibid, p. 66. 
Ibid, p. 67. 
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the aid management process.Often, the Delegation has to make good with the local 
authorities failures and plays a political role in the relations between the recipient State, 
other States, international organisations and the European Union. It is of essential 
importance to equip the Delegations with the necessary personnel and powers 
(authorising, accounting, auditing) in order to have a better monitoring of the external 
aid's management. 
Ibid, p. 67. 
"°Ibid, p. 67-68. 
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Chapter Six 
The European Court of Auditors as an Institution of both the European 
Communities and the European Union 
A. Institutional status and nature of the Court 
The institutional status of the ECA had always been a problem with two parts. 
The first one included the question: "Is the ECA an institution of the European 
Communities?" This question was raised because when the ECA was established by the 
Second Budget Treaty, there was no provision concerning its institutional status. More 
specifically, the ECA was not recognised as equal to the other institutions of the 
Communities (Council, Commission, Parliament, European Court of Justice).' The 
ECA's status was considered to be more similar to that of the Economic and Social 
Committee.^ This point of view was based on the fact that the ECA was not mentioned 
in Art. 4(1) of the EC Treaty, along with the other institutions but only in the disposition 
of Art. 4(3) (now abolished by the EU Treaty) in which it was stated that 
"The audit shall be carried out by a Court of Auditors acting within the Umits of 
the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. " " 
Another argument used in order to support the opinion that the ECA was not an 
institution of the Communities concerned the method for the appointment of its 
members.'* It has been noted above the difference between the method for the 
appointment of the members of the Commission and the ECJ and the method of 
appointment of the ECA members. This had been considered to be an indication of 
distinction between the European institutions and the ECA. 
But there has also been an opposing point of view, according to which the ECA, 
although not mentioned by Art. 4(1) of the EC Treaty, was to be considered as a 
European Institution. This opinion was based first on the fact that according to the 
' F. Wooldridge, M. Sassella, op. cit., p. 49. 
^ G. Isaac, Renovation des institutions...., op. cit., p. 792. 
^ Ibid, p. 792. 
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suggestions of the Parliament before the establishment of the ECA^ the Communities in 
order to reassure the independence of the new audit body should place it along with the 
other European institutions. Given that the Parliament's efforts have been a very 
important factor for the ECA's establishment, this suggestion could not be ignored in the 
search for the ECA's institutional status. Another argument had been that the disposition 
of Art. 4(1) had not been modified by the Second Budget Treaty because of its general, 
historical (since 1957) and "declarative" nature.^  But the most decisive argument had 
been that the Member States would not like to have an insignificant audit body, therefore 
they equipped it with all the main prerogatives of a European institution: budgetary 
autonomy (according to the dispositions of the Financial Regulation the ECA can draw 
up, modify and audit its budget), administrative autonomy (the ECA can appoint its own 
staff, the status of which is governed by the EC Staff Regulations), operational autonomy 
(the ECA can adopt its own Rules of Procedure and regulate the methods of performing 
its duties by itself).^ It had been suggested that the Member States should "elevate" the 
ECA to the status of a European institution, in order to eliminate any doubts about its 
authority and other undesirable side-effects.^ 
The ECJ's case law seemed to support the first of the above mentioned points of 
view. The Court of Justice had pointed out that since the ECA was not mentioned in the 
dispositions specifying the institutions of the Communities, it was not possible to 
consider the ECA as an institution of the Communities.^ In the ECJ's opinion, the ECA 
was treated as Community institution with regard to the Staff Regulations just in order to 
" D. Strasser, The Finances...., op. cit., p. 270. 
^ H. Aigner, The Case for a European Audit Oifice, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1973, p. 25. 
"^ P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 100-101. 
' Ibid, p. 101, T. M. James, op. cit., p. 471, D. Strasser, The Finances ,op. cit., p. 270, & G. Orsoni, 
op. cit., p. 78. 
^ Ch. Kok, op. cit, p. 347. 
^ Case %2in9,Adam v Commission, [1982] ECR, p. 269-295 (290). 
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have these Regulations applied to the ECA's officials and servants, and this treatment did 
not extend to the application of the Treaties' provisions regarding the institutions. 
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union resolved this problem irrevocably. 
Art. 4(1) of the EC Treaty was modified and the ECA was recognised as an institution of 
the Communities. The dispositions concerning the ECA were moved from the Chapter 
concerning the Financial Provisions to the Chapter concerning the Institutions of the 
EC.*^ This amendment demonstrates the importance of the ECA's role in the 
Communities operational system.*^ The cause of this "elevation" is probably the will of 
the Member States to rationalise the Communities' financial management system and 
combat fraud against the European Funds. But this amendment has been the result of a 
very complicated procedure and "hazardous" diplomatic negotiations.*'' The Commission 
and the Parliament did not include in their final proposals such an amendment and the 
representatives of the Member States asked the ECA to state its opinion on becoming an 
institution of external control of the European Union'' (enlarging thus the object of 
audit). The ECA's reply showed that the Court sought to be recognised as an institution 
of the Communities (thus reducing its competence only to the first pillar of the Union) 
and to be able to have access to the ECJ by virtue of Art. 175 of the EC Treaty.'^ This 
has been the solution finally adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference. 
But this solution did not cover the other two pillars of the European Union. The 
ECA though, according to the dispositions of the Maastricht Treaty (see the above 
mentioned Art. J. 11(2) [28(2)] and Art. K.2(2) [41(2)]) had to audit the administrative 
'"Ibid, p. 291. 
" J. Shaw, Law of the European Union, MacMillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 132. 
I. Anastopoulos, New institutional balances of tlie Communities' institutions after Maastricht in Th. 
Christodoulidis, K. Stefanou, The Treaty of Maastricht-A Comprehensive View, Sideris Publications, 
1993, p. 127-139 (134). 
M. I. Tsinisizelis, The institutions of the European Union and their operation, in N. Maravegias, M. I. 
Tsinisizelis, The Integration of European Union, Themelio Publications, 1995, p. 65-96 (92). 
D. Strasser, Les dispositions financieres , op. cit., p. 196. 
''Ibid, p.l96. 
"^Ibid, p. 196. 
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expenses caused by the operation of these two pillars. So, the ECA was found in a very 
strange position, auditing a organization to the institutional system of which it did not 
belong. This problem had been pointed out repeatedly. It had been presumed that since 
there has been no budget of the European Union (the expenditure of the second and third 
pillar is charged to the Communities' budget), it was logical for the ECA not be 
mentioned in Art. E[5] of the EU Treaty.^'' During the Intergovernmental Conference 
Meeting on 5 and 6 May 1997 in Brussels among the discussed proposals concerning the 
ECA, there was also one (brought forward by the German delegation) for the insertion of 
the ECA in Art. E [5] of the EU Treaty. Since the ECA was already auditing the majority 
of the expenditure (all the administrative and most of the operational) of the European 
Union's second and third pillar, the proposed modification of Art. E [5] would merely 
recognize this reality without giving the ECA additional powers. This proposal was 
finally approved and the ECA is now also an institution of the European Union. This is 
very important because now the ECA, like any other institution of the Communities 
which is also an institution of European Union, is responsible -within the limits of its 
competence of course- for the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out 
within the framework of all three pillars of the Union. 
The second part of the problem concerning the institutional status of the ECA is 
the nature of this institution. Is it an administrative or a judicial institution? There is no 
provision in the Treaties concerning the nature of any of the European institufions. So, 
the methods used in order to assess this issue is either an assimilation/equation of the 
European institutions with the respective national insfitutions, or the interpretation of the 
Treaties' dispositions concerning these institutions. The first method has been 
characterized as "deeply misconceived".'^ The Community order has a unique and "sui 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 600, note 1. 
'^P.N. Stagkos, E . R Sahpekidou, European Coimnunities Law, Sakkoulas Publications, 1994, p. 116. 
A. Dashwood, op. cit., p. 127. 
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generis" nature and its features have their own fianction.^" So, any attempt to try to 
understand the operation of an institution of the Communities, having as a model the 
operation of a respective national institution might be misleading. But of course this does 
not mean that such an assessment must be completely excluded. After all, when the 
representatives of the Member States established the various institutions of the 
Communities, they used as models, at least at a very basic level, the respective national 
institutions of their countries. 
Given that in some Members States (Italy, Greece, France) the state's audit is 
being performed by lawyers while in other (United Kingdom, Ireland) by accountants, it 
has been difficult to assimilate completely the ECA with the national audit institutions of 
the Member States. '^ 
The ECA is generally considered to have a rather misleading name.^ ^ Despite 
bearing the name of "Court", this institution is believed not have the traditional powers 
of a Court meaning it cannot declare the law and pronounce judgments.Its tasks have 
been called "supervisory" and the ECA is not considered to have a judicial role.^'' It has 
been suggested that the ECA flinctions are more of an administrative nature rather than 
judiciaP^ According to another opinion, the ECA cannot impose any legal or 
administrative sanctions upon audited bodies or individuals.^^ All these points of view 
clearly show that the auditing activities of the ECA are considered to be deprived from 
any judicial nature and that the institution is not judicial .The ECA itself has admitted 
that it has no jurisdictional powers and that its pronouncements do have any "res 
"° Ibid, p. 127 
'^ Sir N. Price, op. cit., p. 240. 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 601. 
Ibid, p. 602 & D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., 270. 
'^^  J. Shaw, op. cit., p. 132. 
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A. Charlesworth, H. Cullen, European Community Law, Pitman Publishing, 1994, p. 32. 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 478. 
P. N. Stagkos, E.R. Sahpekidou, op. cit., p. 112. 
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judicata" value.^ ^ The Court has no jurisdiction not even to enforce its controls measures 
or to investigate suspicions of irregularity arising from its examination.^^ It cannot invoke 
legal sanctions against national officials who obstruct its work.^° One of the most 
characteristic examples has been the examination of whether the VAT own resources had 
been collected in 1985 and 1986. Several Member States refiised to accept the 
examinations planned by the ECA (reviewing statistic data, examining documentation, 
carrying out compliance tests) .The Court could only point this out in its Annual 
Reports and inform the discharge authorities that it had not been able to fulfill its 
responsibilities regarding the VAT own resources. It could not do anything more and 
the situation has remained unchanged so far. It is though noteworthy that according to 
the Parliament's proposal, back in 1973, for a new audit institution, this new body would 
be able to take disciplinary action regarding infringements of financial regulations by 
officials of the Commission.It is obvious that this suggestion has not been followed up. 
Examining the dispositions of the Treaties concerning the ECA it is possible to 
reach some very useful conclusions. First, the qualifications required for the members of 
the ECA are similar to the ones required for the members of the ECJ:^ "* a) independence 
and b) suitability for office. Also, the Privileges and the Immunities of the Judges of the 
ECJ apply to the members of the ECA. And, as pointed out before, the members of the 
ECA can be deprived of their office only by an ECJ's ruling. This ruling is considered to 
be more of a "declarative nature", since its context is described by the Treaties. Given 
that the ECJ's ruHng is produced after a relative request by the ECA, it can be said that 
European Court of Auditors, Auditing the finances ,op. cit., p. 30. 
Kl.-D. Borchardt, The ABC of Comniunit}' Law, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1994, p. 30. 
°^ I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 626. 
'^ Annual Report of tlie Court of Auditors for tlie Financial Year 1985, OJ 1986, C-321/32 & Annual 
Report of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1986, OJ 1987, C-336/39. 
Annual Report of tlie Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1985, OJ 1986, C-321/32 & Annual 
Report of the Court of Auditors for the Financial Year 1986, OJ 1987, C-336/39. 
H. Aigner, op. cit., p. 27. 
Art. 167 [223] of the E C Treaty. 
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practically the ECA decides the suitability or not of the person concerned and the ECJ 
simply declares that decision. The relative provision seems not to allow to the ECJ to 
disagree with the ECA, in case that the later decides that one of its members must be 
replaced. Of course, the ECJ's ruling must be issued according to the relative 
dispositions of the ECJ's procedure rules, so the ECA must prove that the person 
involved is not suitable for office. Otherwise the ECJ is obliged to deny the ECA's 
request. Consequently the ECA in its decision concerning the unsuitability of the member 
involved must state and prove all facts leading to its decision. From all this provisions it 
is clear that the Member States wish for the European Union to have an audit institution, 
the members of which will be so impartial and independent as the judges of the ECJ. 
With regard to the proceedings of the ECA's performance of competences, it 
must be noted that they have been adjusted to the auditing nature of the tasks and the 
quantity of the audit required. All the methods of audit used by the Court have been 
elaborated so they will give a picture of the finances of the European Union, as 
accurately as possible. And the fact that the audited institutions, organizations, bodies 
and individuals have the right to reply to the ECA's remarks and findings, explaining 
their point of view, must not be overlooked. This "contradictory procedure", guarantees 
that the auditee will be heard by the ECA. All this procedural framework has a very 
strong resemblance with the proceedings followed in a court of law. Of course the ECA 
is not equivalent to the ECJ, since, as noted before, it does not deliver any kind of 
judgments and does not have a competence of interpreting Community law as a judicial 
institution. Even the Financial Regulation, the context of which is exactly within the 
ECA's competence, is not interpreted originally by the ECA but by the ECJ, according 
to the procedure of preliminary rulings described in Art. 177 [234] of the EC Treaty. 
Taking into account all the similarities and the differences between the ECA and 
the ECJ, described in the Treaties' dispositions, we can say that the audit institution of 
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the European Union is not a judicial institution, but it is also not an administrative one. 
The President of the ECA said in January 1989, during a public hearing organized by the 
Commission; 
"The Court....is not an administrative or a legislative body...., it does not play the 
role of the public prosecutor..."^^ 
This statement defines what the ECA is not. But there has been no definition of which 
exactly is the ECA's position in the institutional framework of the European Union. This 
is why so far the only real arm of the ECA is the influence or moral effect it can bring to 
bear upon the financial management of the Un ion .Bu t the fact that the ECA cannot 
directly impose sanctions does not mean that its observations are not taken into account 
by the other institutions, national or European." It has been noted that the financial 
management authorities, European or national, very often voluntarily take the necessary 
corrective actions when the ECA submits its observations (either by drafts or in its 
official reports) concerning their management.''^  
This is though the "Achilles' heel" of this system of audit. The whole idea of 
having an effective audit in the European Union seems to be based on the "good will" of 
the various institutions and organizations managing the finances of the Union. That 
conception is though completely incompatible with the need of an effective audit within 
the Union. I f the auditor cannot impose the measures necessary for the conduction of a 
sound financial management to the auditees, then the whole system is by definition 
defective. Of course the Court is not going to dictate the policies to be followed (that is 
a political task) but it can and should prescribe, from a financial and legal point of view, 
the sound ways of achieving the goals set. 
D. Strasser, The Finances , op. cit., p. 297. 
T. M. James, op. cit., p. 478. 
'^ European Court of Auditors, op. cit., p. 30. 
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One way has been the granting to the Court of the right to take action before the 
ECJ in order to protect its prerogatives (audit rights) towards the other European 
institutions and the Member States. This solution has been divided into two proposals 
(one concerning the institutions and one concerning the member states) which have been 
discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference meeting of 5 and 6 May 1997 in Brussels. 
It had already been pointed out that the Court should be able to take legal action against 
any other institution's behavior which hindered its ability to audit the accounts.So the 
respective proposal was brought forward by the Dutch Presidency, which pointed out 
that the ECA, although one of the European institutions, did not have the possibility of 
bringing an action before the ECJ in order to protect its prerogatives. Therefore an 
amendment of Art. 173(3) [230(3)] was deemed to be necessary in order to add the ECA 
to the institutions mentioned in that disposition. This proposal has been accepted and the 
necessary amendments to the Treaties have been made. The second proposal, introduced 
by the UK delegation, included an amendment of Art. 169 [226]. This Article provides 
that: 
"If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid 
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice ". 
So, from this disposition it is clear that in order to protect the ECA's prerogatives, an 
appeal must be brought before the ECJ by the Commission. The proposal's aim is to 
make the ECA responsible for the protection of its own prerogatives by giving it the 
right to bring an action before the ECJ. This proposal is substantially connected with the 
provisions of Art. I88c(3) [248(3)] concerning the cooperafion between the ECA and 
the Member States during audit (on the spot audits, forwarding of necessary 
^^D. O' Keeffe, op. cit., p. 192. 
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documentation, participation of national audit institutions in the audit procedure). It had 
though been rejected by the delegations of the southern countries of the Union and 
therefore not adopted. 
But even the right to take action before the ECJ is not the most effective way for 
the ECA to be as effective as possible in the European Union. It is suggested that the 
ECA should be granted judicial authority, like the respective institutions in Italy, Greece, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal. The jurisdiction should include all 
disputes created during the procedure of audit, namely disputes concerning substantial 
and procedural issues of audit (for instance the responsibility of the final beneficiaries or 
the persons responsible for the management of the European resources within the 
Commission, to compensate the European Union in case of misuse of these resources). 
The ECA might as well have jurisdiction in cases involving fraud against the European 
Union, only with regard to the financial aspect (reflind of the resources misused) and not 
the criminal aspect. Also a procedure, similar to that of Art 177 [234] of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the preliminary rulings of the ECJ, might be introduced. Naturally, the 
preliminary rulings of the ECA will be limited to issues concerning its jurisdiction. 
Of course there is going to be a problem concerning the people involved in the 
relative judicial procedure. Since the ECA's staff is conducting the audit and most 
probably this staff is going to be one part of the dispute, it is at least strange to ask the 
members of the ECA to judge this dispute, since the staff is performing the audit under 
the ECA's members guidance. The solution to that problem could be the existence of a 
position similar to that of the Advocate-General in the ECJ. In Greece, for instance, the 
officer holding this position in the Greek Court of Audit is called General Commissioner 
of the State and he is a member of the Court's composition. The duties of the person 
holding this position at the ECA should be to represent the European Union's general 
interest, according to Art. I88a(4) [246(4)] , by making reasoned submissions on cases 
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before the ECA in order to assist it in reaching a decision. When a case is brought before 
the ECA by an auditor against an auditee (institution. Member State, organization, 
individual etc) or by an auditee against an auditor, this person would address the Court 
presenting his opinion, which of course would not be binding for the ECA. The person 
having this position might be permanently appointed (or elected by the ECA members 
like the President of ECA) for this task. Otherwise he might be the ECA member who is 
in charge, according to the ECA's organization, of the respective group of audit to 
which the auditor involved in the trial belongs. This latter suggestion means that in each 
trial there might be a different person holding this position i f the auditor involved belongs 
in a different group. So, the ECA, under these circumstances can operate as a judicial 
institution, having all the guarantees of impartiality and independence necessary for this 
task. 
An argument to support the idea of granting to the ECA judicial authority beyond 
the authority of the ECJ may be based on Art. 173(1) [230(1)] and 175(1) [232(1)] of 
the EC Treaty. According to these dispositions, the acts (or omissions: failures to act) of 
the ECA regarding audit activities are not subjected to review by the ECJ. For some, this 
is an indication that the ECA is not an institution with decision-making or legislative 
powers such as the institutions mentioned in these dispositions.'*" But as mentioned 
above, even the Court does not consider itself to be a legislative body. Its acts, 
concerning audit, are legally binding since according to the EC Treaty"" the ECA carries 
out the audit and it decides whether a transaction is legal, regular and within the 
framework of the sound financial management principles or not. So, in the European 
Union's legal order the characterization of a transaction by the ECA as legal, regular and 
according to the sound financial management institutions, is binding for the other 
'° Ibid, p. 191-192. 
" Art. 188a [246] and Art. 188c(2) [248(2)]. 
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institutions and the Member States. Otherwise the Statement of Assurance of Art. 
188c(l) [248(2)], regarding the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity 
of the underlying transactions, would be meaningless. Also, the ECJ's case-law provides 
with another argument on this point. It has accepted the ECA's power to examine the 
legality of expenditure with reference to the budget and the secondary legislation on 
which the expenditure is made, while the ECJ is reviewing the legality of this secondary 
legislation.''^ There is a clear distinction between the ECA's and the ECJ's object of 
review. So, since the ECA's acts are not subjected to judicial review by the ECJ but 
they, in fact, form a parallel review of certain other acts (transactions), then it could be 
possible to accept the upgrading of their adopting institution, the ECA, to a judicial level. 
Considering the importance of the ECA's acts for the function of the European Union, 
such an upgrading would reinforce the Union's audit system, since the latter would 
include a judicial institution. 
Such a proposal though demands for two very important conditions in order to 
be realized. First, it is necessary to increase the number of staff (auditors). Only with 
more personnel the ECA will be able to meet the requirements of such a judicial function. 
Second, in order to have a new judicial institution in the European Union, the European 
integration must have reached a very advanced level. The idea of having practically a 
financial court in the Union can be realized only under conditions of financial 
harmonization of the Member States, leading to a "Fiscal Federalism", a federal financial 
system. Otherwise, such a institution is not going to be successful as a judicial audit 
institution. The ECA is correctly assumed to be a "specialized court"''^ but in order to 
grant it judicial authority the Member States must be determined to accept the 
jurisdiction of a "supra-national" court that is going to audit their management with 
Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament, [1986] ECR, p. 1339-1373 (1367). 
A. Charleswortli, H. Cullen, op. cit., p. 32. 
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regard to the Union's resources. The reactions of the Member States to the above 
mentioned proposals of the ECA during the Intergovernmental Conference 1996-1997 
are a very clear indication that this determination does not exist yet. 
B. Position of the Court in the European institutional system 
The issues concerning the institutional nature of the ECA are not the only ones 
concerning this body. Its sole existence in the European Union system poses another 
interesting question: why is it necessary to have an audit institution? The reply to this 
question may have a practical and a theoretical aspect. According to the practical aspect, 
is necessary for an organization like the European Union to audit its financial 
management., since accounting mistakes (which some time are deliberate) are constantly 
discovered, concerning the collection of revenue or the payment of expenditure.'*'' The 
theoretical aspect is more complex and involves some political analysis. 
According to the Preamble on the EU Treaty, the Member States decided to 
establish the European Union 
"...CONFIRMING their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and 
respect for human rights andfundamental freedoms and of the rule of law,... 
...DESIRING to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the 
institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional 
framework, the tasks entrusted to them,... ". 
This is a clear demonstration of the Member States' will to establish a democratic regime 
within all three pillars of the European Union. One of the most basic elements of 
democracy is the notion of controlling the Executive. This control has three dimensions: 
Legality Control, Political Control and Financial Control (Audit).'*^ The context of 
financial control is that the Executive has to justify its choices: The resources created by 
the revenue have to be spent for purposes approved by the Legislature in the most 
'''' K. Stefanou, op. cit., p. 71. 
D. Beetham, K. Boyle, Democracy - 80 questions and answers, UNESCO 1995, p. 86-87. 
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efficient and effective way possible/*^ This control is performed by an independent audit 
institution, established for that purpose, namely to examine thoroughly and on a 
professional basis all kinds of expenditure."^ So, the ECA is that institution. It is charged 
with the task of auditing all financial activity within the three pillars of the European 
Union. Its existence in the institutional scheme of the European Union is required by the 
democratic context of the Union. It guarantees the financial control of the Union's 
Executive which is the Commission and this guarantee is incorporated in the Statement 
of Assurance provided by the ECA to the Council and the Parliament. 
C. Information and the Court 
The second issue has to do with the way the ECA makes the results of its audits 
known. It has been analysed above that one of the most important tasks of the ECA is its 
reporting activity. These reports, containing very important conclusions reached by the 
ECA with regard to the European Union's financial management, are being published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities, The dispositions concerning the 
pubhcation of these reports practically establish a right and at the same time an obligation 
of the ECA to make known the results of its audits."^ 
There are two categories of recipients of the information provided by the ECA. 
First there are the European institutions and the Member States. The European 
Parliament, as analysed above, must have the ECA's Annual Report in order to give a 
discharge to the Commission with regard to the implementation of the budget. The 
Council, along with the Parliament, must be provided with the Statement of Assurance, 
in order to have a certification of the accounts of the European Communities. The 
Ibid, p. 87. 
" Ibid, p. 87-88. 
C. Mayenobe, The Court and Information in Democracy, in Minutes of tlie Convention "Historical 
Development of the institution of the Court of Audit in Greece and France", Athens 1993, p. 153-157 
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Commission, being the main auditee, must have all the reports adopted by the ECA, in 
order to be able to reply to the observations included in them, within the framework of 
the "Contradictory Procedure". Finally the Member States (governments, national audit 
institutions, organisation handling European Union's resources etc) must be informed of 
the ECA's findings since thus they can improve the financial management made by them 
with regard to European Union's resources. 
The second category includes the so called "European Public Opinion" and the 
Media that are sometimes forming this opinion. Of course it has been very successfully 
remarked that publication in the Official Journal does not automatically imply bringing to 
public attention or publicise.'*^ The citizens of the Member States, who, ultimately, are 
financing all the effort for the European Union (the "Own Resources" system is based on 
various ways of taxation paid by the Member States' taxpayers) must know which are 
the results of the financial management of the Union's resources. The Media, in order to 
provide this kind of information, are organising debates between specialists or are asking 
from journalists to analyse the technical and sometimes incomprehensible information 
provided by the ECA. But there lies the danger of distortion, meaning the use of the 
Court's information by the journalists in order to produce an important piece of news.^ " 
Another danger is the premature spreading of information concerning some ECA audits 
before the completion of these procedures.^' These so called "leaks" may have disastrous 
effects since any information provided through them is incomplete and therefore 
inaccurate. The ECA, like any other audit institution, has to face a increased publication 
of information which itself has started by publishing its repor ts . I t must have a very 
good understanding of these dangers. Its place in the democratic regime of the European 
(153). This author focuses mainly on the French Court of Audit, but the dispositions in question have a 
meaning similar to tlie meaning of the respective dispositions concerning tiie ECA. 
Ch. Kok, op. cit., p. 348. 
°^ C. Mayenobe, op. cit., p. 156. 
'^ Ibid, p. 157. 
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Union requires for a flawless performance. Its members and staff must perform their 
auditing duties as seriously and accurately as possible. These are very important 
conditions in order for the audits' results to accepted and respected by the auditees and 
the pubUc," And this is very important given the fact that the ECA cannot impose any 
sanctions and it is up to the "good will" of the auditees to follow its remarks. Especially 
in everything that concerns tackling fraud, the information provided to European 
taxpayers can make them appreciate the existing "scandalous" situation regarding the 
fraudulent flow of their own money.This information will mobilise the European public 
opinion and the taxpayers' reaction to the extent of the scandal will create the necessary 
political pressure that will compel the competent institutions (national and European, 
mainly the Council) to act more effectively in the direction of combating fraud . 
The ECA, in order to resolve these problems, has adopted an alternative method 
of publication of its audits' findings. It is called "restrained publication" and is consists of 
publishing mainly summaries of the ECA's observations, reports and opinions. '^' There 
are two objectives obtained by this method;" First, since some information included in 
the reports and opinions of ECA is confidential, this information is not presented in the 
summaries, avoiding thus the violation of the confidentiality rules and principles. Second, 
the impact of the ECA's summarised reports or opinions either directly on the citizens of 
the Member States or on their pariiamentary representatives, may constitute a very 
efficient mean of pressure in order to face the reaction of an audited organisation. 
D. Other proposals 
Ibid, p. 156. 
Ibid, p. 156. 
'^^  House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Financial Control and Fraud in tlie 
Cpmmunity , op. cit., para. 52. 
Ibid, para. 52. 
•^^ P. Lelong, op. cit., p. 114. 
" Ibid, p. 114. 
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So far it has been noted that the ECA participates in the implementation of the 
European Union's Budget by controlling the financial management of the resources made 
available by the Budget. It has been suggested that the Court should participate also in 
the preparation of the Budget.^^ Since because of its duties, the ECA can have a global 
picture of the Union's finances, its opinion would be very usefijl. An alternative to that 
proposal could be to include the Court's Annual Report in the documents that the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament take into consideration during the drawing 
of the Budget.'^ The idea of an audit institution to participate in the Budget's preparation 
is not new and has been already applied. In the United Kingdom, the National Audit 
Office has performed for the first time an Audit of Assumptions for the July 1997 Budget 
Projections. The aim of such an audit is to assist the Executive in preparing its forecasts 
of the public finances.*'*^ There is not a set of financial statements prepared by reference 
to relevant accounting standards to which the audit could be related so such an audit 
cannot be conducted by strict application of normal audit standards. '^ The assumptions 
audited in such a procedure do not represent or generate forecasts of the likely outcome 
but provide a sound and cautious basis for fiscal planning within the framework of an 
inevitable uncertainty.''^ Using the same basis of audit the ECA could provide a valid 
opinion on the assumptions incorporated in the Union's Budget. 
There have been also other proposals concerning a fliture reform of the ECA. 
Most of them have focused on the structure and the organisation of the Court.Some of 
them include strengthening of the President's role, reducing the number of the Court's 
members, dividing the Court in smaller chambers, reinforcing the Parliament's say during 
D. Skiadas, The enactment of the European Community 's Budget and tlie Intergovernmental 
Conference, OIKONOMIKOS TAHYDROMOS, issue no 21 (2246) dated 22.05.1997, p. 43. 
Ibid, p. 43. 
National Audit Office, Audit of Assumptions for tlie July 1997 Budget Projections, London 1997, p. 2. 
Ibid, p. 2. 
Ibid, p. 2. 
I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 627-628. 
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the appointment of the ECA members, etc. It has to be said though that mainly, the ECA 
needs an increase of its staff. The limited number of auditors reduces respectively the 
transactions that are going to be audited. 
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CONCLUSION 
"...the specific objectives of auditing are the proper and effective use of public 
fimds; the development of sound financial management; the orderly execution of 
administrative activities; and the communication of information to public 
authorities and the public through the publication of objective reports..."' 
This definition of the Sanction of auditing provides a very good instrument to 
evaluate whether or not the ECA is a truly effective audit institution. 
The ECA has really come a very long way. Its predecessor, the Audit Board, 
was more or less a "second class body" in the European Communities. The Court 
managed to overcome this unpleasant inheritance and to be a well-established insfitution 
of the European Communities and the European Union. Its auditing powers allow it to 
go beyond a simple examination of the regularity and the legality of the transactions 
made within the framework of the Union's financial management. The soundness of this 
management is assessed through its "systems based" audit method. Thus the Court plays 
a very active role in protecting the Union's financial interests, especially in the battle 
against fraud where it is considered to have done admirable work.^ 
In a rather pessimistic evaluafion it has been noted that so far the Court has an 
uneasy relationship with the Commission, its cooperafion with the Parliament is not the 
best whilst the Council has largely ignored it.^ Despite its negative approach, this 
evaluation points out some situations that could be improved. It is logical that there will 
be tension in an auditor-auditee relationship such as the one between the ECA and the 
Commission. But since both institutions exist to serve the Communities' interest, this 
could provide a formula of cooperation between them. Such a formula seems to have 
been found in the sector of combating fraud in Communities. The Court and the 
Commission exchange information and coordinate their controlling activities. Such a 
' The "Lima Declaration", adopted by tlie International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(INTOSAI), in October 1977, during a congress on Fundamental principles of Auditing, held in Lima. 
^ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Financial Control and Fraud in tlie 
Community...., op. cit., para. 50. 
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cooperation could and should exist whenever the ECA and the Commission are "facing" 
each other during the audit procedure. With regard to the Parliament, the ECA should 
refrain from getting into the political "games" developed in the various parliamentary 
committees. The Parliament desires to get more and more decisive authority on issues 
concerning the European Union's finances. So its committees and mainly the Budgetary 
Control Committee adopt very offensive positions against the Council and the 
Commission which have resulted even in judicial proceedings in the European Court of 
Justice." The ECA must stay out of all these disputes. It should continue to provide the 
Parliament with the information necessary to enable it to give discharge to the 
Commission according to Art. 206 [276] of the EC Treaty. But as an institution will have 
its own voice and position in the institutional framework of the European Communities. 
The Council, on the other hand is obliged to work more closely with the ECA. The new 
dispositions of Art. 209a(4) [280(4)], as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provide 
for such a cooperation in order to combat fraud in the European Union. 
Generally speaking the Treaty of Amsterdam includes provisions towards the 
enhancement of the ECA's status, thus making it a real "watchdog" for European 
spending,' 
The financial issues have always been at the centre of European public attention, 
since they are of vital importance for every effort made for the development of the 
European integration process. The Union's citizens should know more about the 
financial management in Europe, Thus openness and transparency in this sector is no 
longer just a slogan but the basis for practical action,^ Like all the Community 
^ I, Harden, F, White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 627. 
" Case 34/86, Council v. European Parliament, (1986) ECR, p. 2155, Case 41/95, Council v. European 
Parliament, (1995) E C R I, p. 4411. 
^ Representation of the European Commission in the UK, The Treaty on European Union-The Meaning 
of Amsterdam, Fact Sheet, London 1997, p. 16. 
^ Kl.-D. Borchardt, European Integration-The origins and growth of the European Union, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Coimnunities, 1995, p. 79. 
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institutions, the ECA is making its acfivities more open and tries to present the matters it 
deals with as more understandably as possible.^ The reports and opinions issued by the 
Court are accessible by everybody who wants to know how the European resources are 
managed. 
Given the perspective of the European Union taking in new members, the 
Commission is working towards the reform of the financial framework of the Union. The 
new financial framework will aim, inter alia, to ensure the sound management of public 
finances in the Union. ^  Public finances must be kept on a tight rein with regard to the 
Union's Budget (both at preparation and implementation level) in order to consolidate 
sound growth.^ The ECA can and should play an important part in that area by working 
on maintaining the budgetary discipline required by the new financial perspectives. After 
all, the Court is the "financial conscience" of the European Communifies and the 
European Union. ^ ° And it is obvious from the efforts made so far that the Court has 
reaHsed the importance of its mission: 
"In the present state of accounting and financial management arrangements, the 
financial significance of audit is very high in terms of identification of expenditure 
which should not have been incurred, of amounts potentially recoverable and of 
possible fijture savings ...The audit of Community finances whether by the 
Commission, by Member State auditors or by the Court is more than ever 
necessary to protect the interests of the European Citizen."" 
' Ibid, p. 79-80. 
^ European Commission, Agenda 2000 - Vol. 1: For a Stronger and Wider Union, DOC 97/6 (final), Part 
Three: The New Financial Framework, para. 1.3. 
' Ibid, para. 1.3. 
This characterization had been given to the E C A by Mr. H. Kutscher, the President of the European 
Court of Justice at the time of the Court's inauguration in October 1977. 
" Annual Report of the Court of Auditors for the financial year 1996, OJ 1997, C-348/11. 
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List of the Presidents 
of the European Court of Auditors 
since its foundation in 1977 
Sir Norman Price (UK) 
Presiding Senior Member 
18.10.1977 to 10.11.1977 
Michael Murphy (IRL) 11.11.1977 to 17.10.1981 
Pierre Leiong (F) 18.10.1981 to 17.10.1984 
Marcel Mart (L) 18.10.1984 to 8.1.1990 
Aldo Angioi (I) 9.1.1990 to 20.12.1992 
Andre Middelhoek (NL) 21.12.1992 to 31.12.1995 
Bernhard Friedmann CD) 18.1.1996 to 17.1.1999 
* Source: European Court of Auditors, Auditing tlie Finances of die European Union, 1996, Office for 
official publications of tlie European Communities, p. 8-9. 
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ANNEX 2 
European Court of Auditors (1977 Scheme)' 
Michael MURPHY 
President of the Court 
External Organizations 
(European Schools, Business 
Cooperation Centre, Institute for 
Economic Analysis and 
Research, Euratom Supply 
Agency, Subsidies to Institutions 
of higher education, Subsidies to 
European movements, European 
Trade Union Institute, European 
Centre for the Development of 
VocationaL Training, European 
Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working 
conditions). Regulations and 
Internal and External 
procedures. 
Sir Norman C. PRICE 
Member of the Court 
Own Resources (a. Levies, 
premiums, supplementary or 
compensatory amounts witliin 
the framework of the common 
agricultural policy, b. Levies 
and other duties in the sugar 
sector, c. Custom duties, and 
other duties, d. VAT), Annual 
Report and presentation of 
Opinions of the Court, follow-
up of the observations of the 
Court. 
Pierre L E L O N G 
Member of the Court 
EAGGF-Guarantee Section, 
Work program of the Court 
Aldo ANGIOI 
Member of the Court 
EAGFF-Guidance Section, 
European Regional Development 
Fund, Studies, Documentation 
and Legal Service of tlie Court. 
Paul GAUDY 
Member of the Court 
European Social Fund, ECSC, 
Accounting and Budget of the 
Court. 
Marcel MART 
Member of the Court 
European Development Fund, 
Aid to non-member countries, 
Food aid, Relations witli the 
other institutions. Public 
relations. 
Arne K. JOHANSEN 




Office, Statistical Office, 
Information Office, European 
Export Bank, Liaison with 
national audit bodies. 
Albert L E I C H T 
Member of the Court 
Staff expenditure. Energy, 
Administration of the Court 
(staff, building accommoda-
tion, supplies and repairs). 
Andre J . MIDDELHOEK 
Member of the Court 
Research and investment 
expenditure, Ex-budget accounts. 
Working methods and training. 
Source: European Yearbook, Vol. XXV, 1977, p. 453-455. 
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ANNEX 3 
European Court of Auditors (1997-1998 Scheme)* 
Bernhard FRIEDMANN 
President of the Court 
Coordination and follow-up to 
the activities of the Court, Legal 
Service, institutional external 
relations and public relations 
John WIGGINS 
Member of the Court 
SoA group : Drawing-up of 
the draft Statement of 
Assurance, coordination of the 
financial audit, general 
accounting audit 
Giorgio C L E M E N T E 
Member of the Court 
European Development Funds 
Barry DESMOND 
Member of the Court 
EAGFF-Guarantee 3 : Common 
organisation of the markets in 
the animal products & sugar 
sectors, common policy on 
fisheries & sea, specific 
measures in the veterinary field 
Patrick EVERARD 
Member of the Court 
Measures to benefit Central 
and East European countries, 
the newly independent States 
(ex USSR) and Mongolia 
Armindo de Jesus de 
SOUSA RIBEIRO 
Member of the Court 
European Coal & Steel Commu-
nity, loans & borrowings, bank-
ing activities. Guarantee Fund & 
European Investment Fund 
Antoni C A S T E L L S 
Member of the Court 
Regional sector, IMPS, 
Transport, tourism. Cohesion 
Fund(transport infrastructure) 
Jan O. KARLSSON 
Member of the Court 
Cooperation witli developing 
and other third countries 
(general budget of the EU) 
Hubert W E B E R 
Member of the Court 
ADAR group: Coordination of 
work on the annual report & mo-
nitoring of die obser\'ance of tlie 
deadlines set. Professional trai-
ning, work program, working 
methods and Audit Manual, 
computerised audit support, 
production of reports & opinions, 
studies, coordination of 
horizontal topics and ex post 
facto assessment of audit quality 
Annus SALMI 
Member of the Court 
Administrative expenditure of 
the institutions. Office for 
Official Publications of the EC, 
external oflHces & delegations of 
the Coimnunities, European 
Schools, subsidies, satellite 
bodies (except Thessalonica) 
Centre & Dublin Foundation 
Jorgen MOHR 
Member of the Court 
Social field, industrial poli-
cies, Thessalonica Centre, 
DubHn Foundation, Cohesion 
Fund (protection of the envi-
ronment) 
Kalliopi Nikolaou 
Member of the Court 
EAGGF-Guarantee 2 : Vegetable 
products 
Francois C O L L I N G 
Member of the Court 
EAGGF-Guidance, research, 
energy and new policies, JET, 
EURATOM Supply Agency 
Maarten B. 
ENGWIRDA 
Member of the Court 
EAGGF-Guarantee 1 [Budge-
tary management and control 




Member of the Court 
Own resources, refund to the 
Member States 
Source: Wide World Web Site of the European Court of Auditors 
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